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Preface and Acknowledgments 
 
This monograph tests the OSCE approach to security. The OSCE approach to security encompasses 
all areas that can cause tensions and conflict between States, and is the result of a sustained effort by 
almost all of the world’s democracies on how to achieve both security and individual freedom. An 
important basis of the OSCE security concept is that international security cannot be achieved without 
the protection and promotion of individual rights and freedoms, for respect for individual rights is 
inherently stabilizing. 
The study first extracts from official OSCE documents a set of principles designed to achieve 
international security, and then uses the work of the first OSCE High Commissioner on National 
Minorities (HCNM), Max van der Stoel, to test the effectiveness of the principles in practice. From 
1993 to 2001, HCNM Max van der Stoel applied OSCE principles in cases involving minority tensions 
with a high potential for international conflict, and this experience provided the means to assess the 
practical effects on security when OSCE principles are implemented.  
The study examined three cases that involved potential conflict: Ukraine and separatism in Crimea; 
Estonia and tensions regarding the Russian minority; and Macedonia and tensions regarding the 
Albanian minority. The study found that in each of the three cases, the implementation of OSCE 
principles reduced national and international tensions, and increased security. The increase in security 
was seen within each State, between States, and in the region, and reduced the potential for conflict 
within and between OSCE States. The results were particularly significant in view of the instability, 
conflicts, and tensions of the post–Cold War period; the OSCE’s ongoing institutionalization during 
the period; and the limited resources and tools available to the OSCE and the HCNM.  
The study identified and articulated twenty OSCE security principles that addressed national and 
international security. The principles addressed the rights and responsibilities of State sovereignty; a 
comprehensive, cooperative, and common security approach; the prevention of security threats and the 
peaceful resolution of issues; the protection and promotion of individual rights and freedoms through 
democracy, the rule of law, and the market economy; rights and responsibilities pertaining to national 
minorities; the development and advancement of shared values; and processes and mechanisms. The 
monograph extended the research on the OSCE principles to express an OSCE security concept. The 
OSCE security concept is a security framework based on the idea that security depends on the 
development and implementation of principles guiding three areas: how States deal with each other and 
resolve problems; the protection and promotion of individual rights within States; and the processes 
and mechanisms to review and advance values, principles, and commitments. 
The study showed that the implementation of OSCE principles in Ukraine, Estonia, and Macedonia 
significantly increased security in those three countries and the OSCE region. The study found that the 
OSCE principles and the OSCE security concept constitute a significant body of thought and practice 
regarding security, and respect for the individual. The OSCE principles, the OSCE security concept, 
and the work of the High Commissioner on National Minorities merit further examination, 
development, and application to national security policy and practice. The application to national 
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Chapter 1. Introduction and Methodology 
 
 
Statement of the Problem 
 
The Security Problem and the OSCE.1 The problem of achieving national and international 
security has been a compelling concern of governments for a very long time, and many 
approaches and theories have been tried. One new approach began in 1975 when the Heads of 
State or Governments of thirty-five North American and European States signed the Helsinki 
Final Act and thereby established the OSCE. 
The Act contained a number of commitments to which all of the OSCE participating States 
had agreed; however, two aspects were particularly significant. First, by signing the Act, the 
States committed themselves to follow the Helsinki Decalogue, a set of ten principles intended to 
guide governments in their relations with each other and with their own populations. Second, the 
States agreed to the “Helsinki process,” a process in which they would meet periodically to 
evaluate their implementation of these principles and other commitments, and to negotiate new 
ones, which would then be expressed in OSCE documents adopted by consensus.  
From 1975 to 1988, the participating States implemented the Helsinki Decalogue principles to 
varying degrees—the then-communist States consistently violated the human rights provisions, 
and no State implemented all of the principles perfectly. During this period, the States made slow 
progress in developing new commitments, for the States were hampered by the deep political 
divide that existed between the Soviet and Western blocs in Europe. However, during the 1989–
1991 period at the end of the Cold War, the States were able to reach unprecedented agreements 
regarding core values pertaining to human rights, democracy, the rule of law, and the market 
economy. The States’ commitments in these and other areas were reflected in key OSCE 
documents during this period of great change (often called the “Wende”), in particular the 1990 
Copenhagen Document, the 1990 Charter of Paris, and the 1991 Moscow Document. 
A review of these documents revealed that a number of the new commitments also appeared 
to be new OSCE security principles, but were not reflected as such. In 1990, for example, the 
States agreed that democracy would be their only form of government, an agreement that had 
significant security implications but was not incorporated into the Helsinki Decalogue. Also in 
1990, the States began to establish organizational structures in the OSCE to help put the new 
commitments into practice. As examples, in 1990 the States established the Office for Free 
Elections to help the new democracies develop election processes, in 1992 established the office 
of the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM) to prevent tensions involving 
minority issues from escalating into conflict, and in 1995 changed the OSCE from a conference 
to an organization.2 The States used these structures to assist in implementing the new 
commitments; however, a review of the security literature did not reveal any studies on the effect 
on security when OSCE principles are implemented.  
This study contributes to remedying the lack of knowledge in two areas. The study first 
identified, synthesized, and articulated the security principles contained in primary OSCE 
 
                                                 
1 Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Prior to Jan. 1, 1995, the OSCE was called the 
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). For readability this study may use “OSCE” to include 
the CSCE. 
2 The Office for Free Elections became the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) to reflect 
the expansion of its mandate to include human rights, democracy, and the rule of law. 








documents from 1975 through 1992 (Chapter 3), and then uses the work of the first HCNM to 
assess the effect on security when these principles were implemented, as shown in three case 
studies (Chapters 4, 5, and 6). 
The HCNM and Assessing the Effectiveness of OSCE Security Principles.3 The High 
Commissioner on National Minorities was a conflict prevention instrument, appointed by the 
OSCE States to prevent interethnic tensions from developing into security threats that would 
endanger the peace, stability, or relations between OSCE States. The incumbent’s mandate was 
to monitor the entire OSCE region for signs of tensions involving minorities that in his judgment 
might lead to tensions between OSCE States, and then work in proactive ways to reduce or 
resolve these tensions before they escalated into crises or conflict. The region for which the first 
HCNM was responsible consisted of over fifty participating States in Europe, Central Asia, and 
North America.  
The OSCE States created the position of the HCNM in July 1992 in response to conflicts that 
had broken out in Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, Yugoslavia, and elsewhere as the Soviet Union 
dissolved. These conflicts all had an interethnic dimension and were very difficult to end, and the 
States believed it was essential to prevent minority tensions in other situations from erupting. 
The States, therefore, decided to appoint an independent and impartial individual of high stature 
who could look into minority-related problems confidentially, and work quietly to address 
problems before they became crises. 
The OSCE States appointed an experienced statesman, Max van der Stoel, as the first HCNM 
on December 15, 1992. He held the position from January 1993 to June 2001, and his work 
consisted of essentially four parts. First was the continuous monitoring of all OSCE States for 
tensions involving minority issues; second was crisis intervention if these tensions threatened to 
erupt into violence; third was to issue an early warning to the OSCE leadership if he believed he 
could not contain a situation with the tools available to him; and fourth was to work with 
governments to resolve minority issues that were causing tensions between OSCE States, or 
might cause a serious crisis within an OSCE State.  
The work of the HCNM provided a means to assess the effect on security when OSCE 
principles were implemented. The HCNM used a number of methods in his work, one of which 
was to issue formal recommendations to governments regarding minority situations in their 
countries, usually in the form of a letter to the foreign minister of the State concerned. OSCE 
principles provided a basis for these recommendations, and therefore, by identifying the 
principles contained or implied in them, the extent to which they were implemented, and any 
observed effects on security, the following research questions could be addressed:4 
 
What OSCE security principles were in effect during the first High Commissioner on National 
Minorities’ 1993–2001 tenure? 
 
Did the implementation of the OSCE security principles contained in the first HCNM’s 
recommendations have any significant effect on security? 
 
                                                 
3 For readability, abbreviations and terms such as “HCNM” and “High Commissioner” may be used interchangeably 
throughout the text. 
4 The HCNM also relied on other international standards, in particular the Council of Europe conventions (especially 
the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities), and other standards such as UN conventions.  











Phases of the Study. The study was conducted in three phases: identification of the OSCE 
security principles, case criteria and selection, and data collection and analysis. 
Phase I: Identification of the OSCE security principles. In Phase I the OSCE security 
principles were identified, articulated, and documented. This step was necessary because the 
principles were not stated explicitly in any one document, but were contained in a series of 
documents that the States negotiated and adopted through the Helsinki process. 
OSCE documents from 1975 to 1992 were selected as the potential data sources for the 
principles, and the documents selected for analysis were the six “summit documents” adopted or 
signed at meetings of Heads of State or Government, the three documents adopted at the end of 
the three “follow-up conferences” held during the 1977–1989 period, and the two documents 
adopted from the three-meeting Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE held during 
the 1989–1991 period (see Appendix B for the list of documents analyzed). The summit and 
follow-up documents were analyzed because they were adopted or signed at the highest political 
level, that of Heads of State or Government. The two documents adopted from the Conference 
on the Human Dimension (the 1990 Copenhagen Document and the 1991 Moscow Document), 
were analyzed because they expressed new and significant agreements regarding individual civil 
and political rights, democracy, the rule of law, and the market economy, and because the 
HCNM drew extensively from them in his recommendations.  
Content analysis was used to determine the principles that were in effect when the HCNM 
began his work on January 1, 1993, and subsequent documents were analyzed until June 2001 to 
identify any changes to the principles that might have occurred during his tenure (no changes 
were identified). 
Phase II: Case criteria and selection. The primary criteria used in case selection were the 
seriousness of the threat to security caused by tensions involving minority issues, and data 
availability and verifiability. Other considerations included the scope of issues involved, 
geographic location, and types of threats. To evaluate data availability and verifiability, the 
levels of HCNM involvement with all OSCE States were analyzed and organized into four 
categories as shown below. 
 
 







I. The HCNM monitored for signs of minority 
tensions that could pose international security 
threats. 
 
55 countries (all OSCE States) 
 
II. The HCNM discussed issues with a 
government and/or visited a country, but did not 
issue any formal recommendations. 
 
6 countries: Georgia, Greece, Tajikistan, Turkey, 
Uzbekistan, and Yugoslavia 
 
III. The HCNM issued one formal 
recommendation then ceased direct involvement. 
 
2 countries: Lithuania and Russia 
IV. The HCNM issued formal recommendations, 
and his involvement was sustained. 
 
12 countries: Albania, Croatia, Estonia, Hungary, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Macedonia, 
Moldova, Romania, Slovakia, and Ukraine 
 








The group of countries in Level IV was identified as the dataset from which the case studies 
would be selected (see Appendix C for an analysis of the Level-IV States). This group contained 
the countries for which data were most available and verifiable in terms of formal 
recommendations. To evaluate the seriousness of the threats to security from tensions involving 












Occurrences in Level-IV States 
 
1. Interstate war or armed intervention 
    between OSCE States 
 
None 
2. Armed conflict within OSCE States 
 
Macedonia 2001 
3. Crises resulting in HCNM intervention 
 
Estonia 1993; Ukraine 1995;  
Macedonia 1995, 1997 
 
 
4. Ethnic clashes 
 
Macedonia 1995, 1997 
 
 
Estonia, Macedonia, and Ukraine were the three countries from which case studies would be 
selected. In all three cases sufficient data were available in terms of formal recommendations. 
Macedonia experienced intrastate conflict and clashes involving minority issues, and situations 
occurred in Estonia, Macedonia, and Ukraine that resulted in HCNM crisis intervention. In 
Estonia the HCNM was primarily involved in interethnic relations between Estonians and 
Russians; in Macedonia with interethnic relations between Macedonians and Albanians. The 
HCNM’s work in Ukraine involved three primary issues: Crimean autonomy and separatism, the 
Tatars and other formerly deported peoples in Crimea, and language and culture regarding ethnic 
Russians. Of the three situations, Crimea was selected as the issue that prompted HCNM crisis 
intervention, and as an issue that involved a potential conflict between Russia and Ukraine, both 
of which possessed nuclear weapons at the time. 
Phase III: Data collection and analysis. The HCNM’s formal recommendations were 
obtained from the OSCE website, and numbered chronologically. Each formal recommendation 
contained specific recommendations, and content analysis was used to identify and number 
these. A process tracing model (Table 1–3) was developed to track the implementation of the 


















Identify Specific Recommendations 
Contained in HCNM Formal Recommendations 
↓ 
Organize by Addressee or Subject 
↓ 
Research Specific Recommendations 
↓ 
                                                                            ______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
                          ↓                                           ↓                                     ↓ 
                Identify                        Identify                  Identify 
           OSCE Principle(s)      Implementation      Observed Effect 
                Involved                     Chronology            on Security 
                          ↓                                                                                  ↓ 
                                                                           ________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
                                                                                       ↓ 
 
                Identify Effect of OSCE Principle Implementation 
 








A data collection instrument was developed on which to record the findings for each specific 
recommendation. This instrument was a form containing the following elements: Subject, 
HCNM specific recommendation(s), OSCE security principle(s) involved, Implementation 
chronology, Observed effect(s) on security, and Notes (see Appendix D). 
Each specific recommendation was analyzed to identify the OSCE security principle or 
principles involved, and relevant material was researched to identify the implementation 
chronology by year for each specific recommendation, any observed effects on security, and any 
applicable notes. Codes were developed to indicate the degree to which each specific 




















Some part of the specific recommendation was implemented, 































An effect on security was observed from implementation or 












A number of sources were used to collect data on implementation and observed effects. 
Publications produced by international organizations included documents from the OSCE, 
European Union (EU), Council of Europe, and United Nations (UN). Media sources included the 
BBC Summary of Broadcasts as found on the Minorities at Risk (MARS) project, newspaper 
accounts from the Lexis Nexis database, and Keesing’s Record of World Events. Government 
sources included statistical reports, survey results, and statements by government officials. 
Academic journals and published case studies were used. Content analysis was used to analyze 
material regarding the countries concerned, articles, and speeches by HCNM Max van der Stoel, 
and articles and books written about his work as HCNM. 
The findings on each specific recommendation were recorded on the data collection 
instrument. These findings were then analyzed for any observed effects on national and 
international security as a result of the implementation or non-implementation of the HCNM’s 
recommendations, and the OSCE principles contained therein.  








The primary types of observed effects on security sought were those directly attributable to 
the implementation or non-implementation of the HCNM recommendations regarding specific 
issues. In particular, evidence was sought regarding reduced or increased tensions pertaining to a 
specific issue referenced in the HCNM’s recommendations.  
 
Definitions. For the purpose of this study, the following definitions were used: 
 
— An “effect” is an observable change. 
— A “formal recommendation” is an official letter that the HCNM issued to a government, 
or an official HCNM press release/statement that contains recommendations. 
— An “HCNM intervention case” is an instance in which the HCNM issued a formal 
recommendation to the government of an OSCE State. 
— The “human dimension” is a category consisting of those commitments made by the 
OSCE participating States to ensure full respect for individual rights and fundamental 
freedoms; abide by the rule of law; promote the principles of democracy; and build, 
strengthen, and protect democratic institutions.  
— “Human rights” and “individual rights” are, in general, political and civil rights, and the 
rights that protect the security of the person.5 
— “Implement” is “to put into practice.” 
— “International security” is the protection of a State, including its population, from major 
external threats to its territorial, political, or economic well-being.  
— A “kinstate” is a country in which the majority of the population belongs to a group that 
is a minority in a neighboring country. 
— A “minority” is a collection of individuals who share linguistic, ethnic, or cultural 
characteristics that distinguish them from the majority.6 
— “National security” is the protection of a State, including its population, from major 
threats to its territorial, political, or economic well-being.  
— “OSCE principles” and “OSCE security principles” are those principles agreed to by the 
OSCE participating States and expressed in OSCE documents, whether or not 
specifically identified as a principle.  
— “Security” is the state of feeling or being free from fear, danger, anxiety; a sense of 
safety.  
— A “specific recommendation” is a recommendation contained within a formal 
recommendation. 
 
Limitations of the Study. Data for some HCNM intervention cases were more available than 
for others; for example, more data were available from the Estonian government than from the 
Ukrainian or Macedonian governments. The accuracy and availability of population and 
economic statistics were limited because of the unsettled conditions during the period being 
studied, which often prevented accurate statistics from being collected. The identification of the 
 
                                                 
5 The terms “individual rights” and “human rights” are generally used interchangeably in this study.  
6 Van der Stoel, address, “The Relevance of International Standards for the Protection of Minorities,” Sept. 20, 
2000. Van der Stoel also stated that these individuals, acting alone or together, usually seek to maintain their identity 
and give a stronger expression to those ethno-cultural and linguistic characteristics that give them a sense of 
individual and collective identity. 








OSCE principles was limited to primary OSCE documents from 1975 to 2001, and therefore did 
not account for any possible changes after that period. Time was a constraint, in that it was not 
feasible to conduct more than three case studies, or to visit the individual countries.  
 
 
Significance of the Study 
 
This study has significance in several areas. The articulation of the OSCE principles 
contributes to the security and international relations fields. These principles may have particular 
value because they are based on the practical experience of most of the world’s democracies, 
almost all of which were OSCE States. In addition, the OSCE documents as a whole comprise a 
significant repository of the thoughts and practices of these States on achieving security and 
respect for individual rights. The principles are also significant because they have advanced 
international security: the ideas embodied in the 1975 Helsinki Final Act stimulated the 
formation of many nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and human rights groups that helped 
to overthrow totalitarian governments in Eastern and Central Europe during the 1989–1991 
period, and establish liberal democratic governments. Of particular significance is that these 
groups followed OSCE principles while pressing their governments to implement and abide by 
the principles, and therefore, in most cases used nonviolent methods in their efforts to achieve 
change. 
The study findings add to the policy debate regarding the means to achieve international 
security, and have practical significance for future studies on the OSCE and other security 
organizations. The research goes beyond the current international security literature: while there 
have been extensive studies on international relations theories, few studies have been done on the 
effectiveness of security principles. 
The study adds to policy research methods. The process tracing model, data collection 
instrument, and data analysis methods developed are methodological adaptations that provide an 

















This chapter traces the emergence of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(OSCE) as an organization with political and moral authority, and the creation of the position of 
the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM) in response to the reemergence 
of ethnic tensions as a source of conflict in Europe. The chapter then addresses the position of 
the HCNM, including the selection of the first incumbent, the tools available to him in fulfilling 
his responsibilities as HCNM, his working methods, and his accomplishments. 
 
 
The OSCE and the Cold War 
 
Europe after World War II. After World War II, Europe was essentially divided into three 
groups of States: the Western bloc, Soviet bloc, and the neutral or nonaligned States. Most of the 
Western bloc States had liberal democratic governments and were members of the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO); most of the Soviet bloc of Eastern European States had 
communist governments and were members of the Warsaw Pact (the Warsaw Treaty 
Organization (WTO)); and most of the neutral or nonaligned States had liberal democratic 
governments, but did not belong to either military alliance. From the late 1940s to 1990, the East 




















Large numbers of military forces were stationed in both East and West—U.S. forces alone in 
the mid-1980s included four Army divisions. The borders between East and West (the “Iron 
Curtain”) were heavily fortified and guarded, and the Berlin Wall separating East and West 
Berlin came to symbolize the division of Europe. 
 
                                                 
1 U.S. State Department, Atlas of NATO, 1985, 3. (The white areas in Europe are the neutral or nonaligned States.) 
 
 








During the 1950s and 1960s, communication between the 
two blocs was limited, and tensions were often very high: 
the 1962 Cuban missile crisis brought the world to the brink 
of nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet 
Union. Though the two countries avoided this catastrophe, 
the potential consequences were too devastating to risk 
another crisis, and the idea of détente—the relaxation of 
tensions between East and West—gained ground. 
The Negotiation and Adoption of the Helsinki Final 
Act. During the 1950s and 1960s, the Soviet Union 
proposed a pan-European security conference several times, 
and détente in the late 1960s led to an agreement to hold 
such a conference. Preparatory talks were held at the foreign 
minister level in Helsinki from November 1972 to June  
1973, during which the participants worked out the agenda, rules of procedure, organizational 
structure, and arrangements for a three-stage Conference on Security and Cooperation in 
Europe.2 The three stages would be a meeting of foreign ministers, a second stage for the actual 
drafting of the final document, and a concluding stage to adopt the document. 
The agreements from the preparatory talks were published as the Final Recommendations of 
the Helsinki Consultations. These Recommendations outlined the framework for the Conference, 
and the agenda—the four “baskets”—to be negotiated:3 
 
I. Questions relating to security in Europe: 
    — Principles of international relations between participating States, and 
    — Confidence-building measures;  
II. Cooperation in the fields of economics, science and technology, and the environment;  
III. Cooperation in humanitarian and other fields; and  
IV. Follow-up to the conference. 
 
The objective was to promote better relations among the participating States, and to provide 
the conditions in which their people could live in peace free from any threat to their security. The 
work would proceed from the premise that the strengthening of security in Europe was not 
directed against any State, and should contribute to world peace and security.4 
Stage I. Stage I of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe took place in July 
1973 in Helsinki, and was a meeting of the foreign ministers of the participating States. The 
ministers first adopted the Final Recommendations of the Helsinki Consultations, and then, in 
accordance with Final Recommendations, each minister stated his government’s views on 
problems relating to European security and cooperation.5 
 
                                                 
2 The issues discussed ranged from minor details to fundamental questions, such as the titles of the principles whose 
texts were to be negotiated. 
3 “Basket” in the OSCE sense meant “a group of related subjects.” The States adopted the term in order to group 
diverse subjects together under broad headings without prejudicing the importance of any single subject. See 
Maresca, To Helsinki, 16. The OSCE later used the term “dimension.” 
4 Final Recommendations of the Helsinki Consultations, 1973, para 14. 
5 See the verbatim records, Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe: Stage I–Helsinki, 1973. 
 
 
Wreath marking location of individual 
who had been shot at the Berlin Wall 
while trying to escape to the West 













Stage II. Stage II took place in Geneva from September 1973 to July 1975, and was the actual 
negotiation of the Helsinki Final Act. Experts and delegates appointed by the States carried out 
the work in committees and subcommittees, and a committee of representatives met periodically 
to coordinate the work, and to review the final document.  
The States had different interests in negotiating the Act. The Soviet Union’s objectives were 
to gain acceptance of the post–World War II borders (there had been no comprehensive treaty 
after the war), obtain increased economic relations with the West, and keep international 
relations in Europe relatively stable while continuing the ideological struggle between East and 
West. The Eastern European countries desired increased Western economic and cultural 
contacts, and more flexibility in their relationships with the Soviet Union and the West. The 
neutral and nonaligned States, which were directly affected by East-West relations but had 
limited means to influence these relations, sought reduced tensions between the two blocs, and a 
way to participate in the European security system on an equal basis with the members of 
military alliances. 
The Western European countries’ objectives were to initiate a long-term process that would 
reduce tensions, develop cooperation and lower barriers between East and West, and obtain 
respect for human rights. A number of Western European governments believed that the OSCE 
should be used to obtain liberalization of the Eastern regimes and thereby provide a means for 
peaceful change. The United States wanted to support its European allies, but “stayed a half step 
behind” them throughout the process.6 
The different countries’ objectives can be seen in an exchange of communiqués regarding the 
conference. The Warsaw Pact proposed two agenda items: European security, and the expansion 
of economic, scientific, and technological cooperation. NATO replied that the conference should 
deal with “(a) The principles which should govern relations between States, including the 
renunciation of force, and (b) The development of international relations with a view to 
contributing to the freer movement of people, ideas, and information and to developing 
cooperation in the cultural, economic, technical and scientific fields as well as in the field of 
human environment.”7 
Given the States’ different aspirations and often antagonistic views, the negotiations were 
protracted and difficult, but there were no internal deadlines—discussions continued until the 
item on the agenda was agreed to by consensus, at which time the talks moved on to the next 
item.8 Despite the obstacles, after twenty-two months of negotiations, the Helsinki Final Act was 
completed in July 1975, and Stage III, a summit at which the Heads of State or Government 
would sign the document was scheduled for July 30–August 1, 1975.  
All of the European States, East and West, strongly supported the Helsinki Final Act. The 
Soviet Union reportedly “reacted triumphantly” to the end of Stage II, and the top commentator 
of the official Soviet Tass press agency stated, “Political observers around the world note the 
positive results of the peace-loving Socialist foreign policy.”9  
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However, the text of the Final Act provoked an almost universal wave of criticism in the 
United States, focusing in particular on the perception that through the Act, the United States 
would accept the division of Europe and “sell out” Eastern Europe without any reciprocal 
advantage. The Wall Street Journal compared the Final Act to the agreement at Yalta and 
questioned whether U.S. President Gerald Ford was becoming the “chief apologist for the Soviet 
Union”; Soviet dissident Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn said that the Act betrayed the Eastern European 
countries and would result in their “slavery forever”; and former California Governor Ronald 
Reagan stated that he was against the Act and thought all Americans should be against it, and 
urged President Ford not to sign the document.10 
However, the Act did not, as alleged, ratify the division of Europe; recognize the Soviet 
annexation of the Baltic States; or change U.S. support for the aspirations for freedom of peoples 
everywhere, including those in Eastern Europe. No borders were agreed to that had not been 
accepted by previous presidents or governments: for example, the treaty between West Germany 
and the Soviet Union had accepted the existing European boundaries as inviolable without 
conditions.11 In contrast, the Final Act included the principle that borders could be changed by 
agreement and peaceful means in accordance with international law.  
Furthermore, by signing the Act, the Soviets were in principle renouncing the Brezhnev 
Doctrine that asserted the right of military intervention to prevent deviation from socialism (the 
basis for the 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia). Though the Act was denounced by many 
Americans of Eastern European descent, the populations of the Eastern European countries 
described as the principal victims were, in fact, strong supporters.  
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and President Ford defended the Final Act. Kissinger said 
that the objective was to manage a fundamental conflict of moral purposes and interests while 
preventing nuclear war—to preserve peace while defending essential U.S. values and ideals.12 
He also emphasized that the potential consequences of nuclear war between the Soviet Union 
and the United States were so devastating that the easing of tensions between East and West was 
the only responsible policy that any administration could pursue. Ford said that the Act was a 
forward step for freedom for Eastern Europe, and that even if the goals were partly achieved, the 
people in Eastern Europe would be that much better off, and the cause of freedom would 
advance at least that far.13 In his remarks on signing the Act, Ford stated his reasons for doing so:  
 
We have learned from the experiences of the last thirty years that peace is a process 
requiring mutual restraint and practical arrangements…. The documents produced here 
represent compromises, like all international negotiations, but…they affirm the most 
fundamental human rights: liberty of thought, conscience, and faith; the exercise of civil and 
political rights; the rights of minorities. They call for a freer flow of information, ideas, and 
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people; greater scope for the press, cultural and educational exchange, family reunification, 
the right to travel and to marriage between nationals of different States; and for the 
protection of the priceless heritage of our diverse cultures. They offer wide areas for greater 
cooperation: trade, industrial production, science and technology, the environment, 
transportation, health, space, and the oceans. They reaffirm the basic principles of relations 
between States: nonintervention, sovereign equality, self-determination, territorial integrity, 
inviolability of frontiers, and the possibility of change by peaceful means. The United States 
gladly subscribes to this document because we subscribe to every one of these principles.14 
 
Stage III. The final stage of the Conference took place in Helsinki from July 30 to August 1, 
1975, and was a summit of leaders of the thirty-five OSCE participating States—the United  
States, Canada, and all of the European States except for 
Albania. The actual signing of the Helsinki Final Act took 
place on August 1, 1975, and was the first time so many Heads 
of States or Governments had gathered around a table to sign a 
document. During the Summit, there was general agreement 
regarding the document’s historic character; however, in their 
remarks upon signing, many Heads of State noted that the Act 
was only a beginning and that a great deal of work would be 
needed to turn the commitments into reality. As Ford said in 
his remarks, “History will judge this Conference not by what 
we say here today, but by what we do tomorrow—not by the 
promises we make, but by the promises we keep.”15 
The Helsinki Final Act. The Helsinki Final Act was an unusual document that combined a 
statement of principles of security, general and specific commitments, and a framework for 
further development. These areas were addressed by the four original “basket” topics, and one 
additional topic: Questions Relating to Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean. 
Basket I: The political-
military aspects of security. The 
section on “Questions Relating to 
Security in Europe” addressed 
political and military matters. 
The political aspects of security 
consisted of a set of ten 
principles guiding relations 
between States (the Helsinki 
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The 1975 Helsinki Decalogue:  
Declaration on Principles Guiding Relations Between 
Participating States 
 
I. Sovereign equality, respect for the rights inherent in sovereignty 
II. Refraining from threat or use of force 
III. Inviolability of frontiers 
IV. Territorial integrity of States 
V. Peaceful settlement of disputes 
VI. Non-intervention in internal affairs 
VII. Respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, 
including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief 
VIII. Equal rights and self-determination of peoples 
IX. Cooperation among States  




Helsinki Final Act Signatories,  
President Gerald Ford signing,  
August 1, 1950 








The text elaborated on each principle in lengths ranging from two to eight paragraphs. The 
States also declared that they considered all ten principles to be of primary significance, would 
apply them equally and unreservedly, and interpret each in light of all of the others.17 
The principles formed an agreement regarding how States should behave towards each other, 
and to their own citizens. The acceptance of standards regarding the internal governance of 
States was a milestone in the development of security practice: through Principle VII (respect for 
human rights and fundamental freedoms) and the eight paragraphs that articulated the principle, 
the Helsinki Final Act was the first international agreement that considered respect for human 
rights to be a core principle of international relations, and the first to recognize a relationship 
between international security and how a State treats its citizens. By including Principle VII in 
the Decalogue, the States placed respect for human rights on the same level as such security 
principles as State sovereignty and territorial integrity. In the comprehensive approach to 
security adopted in the Helsinki Final Act, the States placed the human rights aspects of security 
on the same level as the political, military, and economic aspects. 
The military aspects of security were addressed through confidence-building measures. 
Specific measures included the advance notice of major military maneuvers exceeding 25,000 
troops, and the exchange of observers.  
Basket II: The economic, scientific and technological, and environmental aspects of 
security. The “Cooperation in the Field of Economics, of Science and Technology and of the 
Environment” section dealt with such matters as economic and technical cooperation, trade 
promotion, the harmonization of standards, and environmental protection. The Basket II 
measures contained fewer commitments for specific action than the other baskets, reflecting the 
desire of the States to avoid duplication with other international organizations such as the UN 
Economic Commission for Europe (which had almost the same membership as the OSCE).18 
Basket III: The human rights aspects of security. The “Cooperation in Humanitarian and 
Other Fields” section addressed a wide range of subjects such as facilitating human contacts, 
including family visits, family reunification, and freedom of travel; the improvement of 
conditions for tourism; greater access to information; and increased exchanges in the fields of 
culture and education. These measures were intended to “facilitate freer movement, contacts, 
travel, information flows, and cultural exchanges among the participating States”—but 
particularly between East and West, which at the time was very limited and controlled.  
Basket IV: Process. In the “Follow-up to the Conference” section, the States declared their 
resolve to continue the conference by subsequent meetings in which they would thoroughly 
exchange views on the implementation of the provisions of the Final Act, and by which they 
would deepen their relations and improve security and the development of cooperation in Europe 
(a process that came to be known as the Helsinki process). The Act scheduled the first follow-up 
meeting for 1977 in Belgrade.  
Mediterranean issues. The Act also addressed Mediterranean issues, for during Stage II, six 
nonparticipating Mediterranean States (Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Morocco, Syria, and Tunisia) 
made contributions and statements on various agenda items. (This area reflected the States’ view 
that European security had to be considered in the broader context of world security.) 
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The Political Status of the Helsinki Final Act. The Helsinki Final Act was a politically 
binding document—not legally binding—and was referred to as an “Accord” because it did not 
establish any direct obligations under international law.19 Unlike a treaty or agreement, the 
States’ intent was not to make law, but to find effective political means to strengthen security 
and cooperation in Europe, and the Final Act created the political and moral obligation for the 
States to implement the commitments contained in the document, and all subsequent documents.  
The Effect of the Helsinki Final Act. The signing and publication of the Helsinki Final Act 
had immediate and unexpected consequences. Two particularly important consequences were 
that the Final Act stimulated the formation of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in 
Europe (the U.S. Helsinki Commission), and acted as a catalyst for involving individuals, 
groups, populations, and governments in achieving the purposes of the OSCE.  
The establishment of the Helsinki Commission. Because of concerns about the Helsinki Final 
Act, in August 1975 Speaker of the House Carl Albert led a congressional delegation to the 
Soviet Union and Romania. During their visit, dissenters and representatives of religious 
communities pleaded with members of the delegation to press for the implementation of the 
human rights commitments in the Act. Impressed by the need to support the provisions of the 
Final Act, Congresswoman Millicent Fenwick introduced legislation to create a bipartisan 
commission to monitor and encourage compliance with the Act. 
Ethnic and religious groups in the United States quickly saw in the proposed Commission a 
way to help their Eastern European brethren, and inundated Congress with appeals. Many 
members of Congress represented Americans of Eastern European descent, and both Houses 
overwhelmingly passed the bill. The administration objected to the legislation as encroaching on 
the executive branch’s prerogative to conduct foreign policy; nevertheless, on June 3, 1976, Ford 
signed the bill creating the Helsinki Commission as an independent U.S. Government agency.  
The Commission was comprised of senators and representatives; one member from the State, 
Defense, and Commerce departments; and a staff. The Commission monitored and encouraged 
compliance with the Act and OSCE commitments, contributed to the formulation of U.S. OSCE 
policy, and took a leading role in U.S planning and participation in the Helsinki process.  
The Commission held public hearings, conducted and published research, and prepared 
reports. During the Cold War, the Commission became a major source of information about 
Soviet and Eastern European violations of the human rights provisions of the Final Act and other 
OSCE documents, and helped to resolve hundreds of family reunification cases across the Iron 
Curtain. The Commission also examined how well the United States was living up to the OSCE 
commitments: one major study published in 1979, Fulfilling Our Promises: The United States 
and the Helsinki Final Act, identified many shortfalls. 
The Commission’s activities provided NGOs and individual citizens with a means to play a 
greater role in the Helsinki process; for example, the law establishing the Commission required 
the President to submit periodic reports on the implementation of the provisions of the Act. 
These reports put the record into the public domain, gave more visibility to OSCE activities, and 
provided organizations with the means to increase their leverage to press for human rights.  
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The establishment of human rights organizations. A second—and crucial—effect was that 
the Helsinki Final Act stimulated the formation of human rights groups within the Soviet Union, 
Eastern Europe, and elsewhere in the world. The Soviet Union considered the signing of the 
Final Act as a foreign policy victory that legitimized the post–World War II borders (and 
therefore Soviet hegemony over Eastern Europe), and published the entire text in the leading 
Soviet newspapers and magazines, and as a brochure translated into the languages of all Soviet 
republics.20 As a result, citizens throughout the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe read that their 
governments had recognized human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the freedoms of 
thought, conscience, religion, and belief, and that their countries would act in conformity with 
the purposes and principles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (this was significant 
because the Soviet bloc countries had abstained from the Declaration, but had signed the Act). 
Soon after the signing of the Final Act, dissidents in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe 
began to base their demands for internal reform on provisions in the Act, particularly the human 
rights provisions of Basket III, and established groups to promote compliance with the Act. 
“Helsinki Watch” groups formed in Moscow, Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia, and elsewhere to press 
for the implementation of all of the provisions of the Final Act. Czechoslovakia formed “Charter 
77,” aimed at the first follow-up meeting scheduled for 1977 in Belgrade, and other movements 
such as Solidarity in Poland justified their reform programs by referring to the Final Act. 
Helsinki Watch groups also formed in the West in the United States, Canada, Norway, the 
Netherlands, and elsewhere, and in 1982 the International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights 
was formed as an umbrella organization to support national groups.21  
The Act provided a platform on which these groups could base their claims (and a platform 
that their governments had approved) and from which they could work for peaceful change. The 
Act had included the right of individuals to know and act on their rights, a statement that justified 
the existence and activity of these groups; however, members in the Soviet Union and the 
Warsaw Pact countries were often persecuted, imprisoned, and exiled. Nevertheless, their actions 
raised human rights to a higher level of prominence on the agenda of East-West relations.22 
The Working of the “Helsinki Process.” Unlike many treaties and agreements, the Act 
included a framework for further development. This difference was noted on the evening after 
the Act had been signed, when one diplomat at a farewell dinner said that now the Act would be 
buried and forgotten, to which another diplomat answered, “No…we have started something.”23  
What the States had started was a process by which the States would periodically meet to 
measure progress and review the implementation of their commitments, expand areas of 
cooperation, and develop new standards and commitments. As agreed to in the Final Act, the 
first follow-up meeting began in Belgrade in 1977. Though the meeting itself resulted in little 
progress, the discussion regarding the implementation of Basket III issues was significant. 
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President Jimmy Carter had directed the U.S. delegation to strongly support the human rights 
provisions in the Act, and during the meeting, the United States (along with France, Canada, and 
other countries), cited specific examples of Principle VII violations.24  
At that time diplomats traditionally refrained from directly criticizing what other countries did 
concerning their internal affairs, and a number of States, particularly the Soviet Union, strongly 
objected to the idea that other countries had the right to monitor their human rights. These States 
invoked Principle VI (nonintervention in internal affairs) to support their position; however, the 
Soviet delegation in turn raised questions about alleged political prisoners in the United States—
a step towards accepting the international discussion of respect for human rights within States. 
The meeting also set the precedent that during the implementation review sessions, States could 
expect direct discussion of how well each was doing in implementing the OSCE commitments—
and in front of the representatives of all of the other States. 
The Madrid follow-up meeting, held from November 1980 to September 1983, had more 
tangible results. In Basket I, the States agreed to hold a Conference on Confidence- and Security-
building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (which began in Stockholm in January 1984). 
The Basket III discussion was again notable: delegates from many States cited and discussed 
over 300 specific Principle VII violations, which helped to personalize cases of human rights 
abuse, and gave dissident leaders some stature and protection through international attention.25  
The States held a number of expert meetings during the 1980s on specific topics such as 
democratic institutions, the peaceful settlement of disputes, the environment, the media, 
economic cooperation, human contacts, and human rights. The 1985 OSCE Meeting of Experts 
on the Progress on Human Rights was particularly notable in that the Soviet and Eastern 
European delegations departed from their position that Principle VI forbade detailed discussion 
of respect for human rights in other countries. The Soviet delegation came to the meeting with 
files on human rights problems in each Western country, and in response to Western criticisms 
such as the denial of religious freedom, brought up problems in Western countries such as racial 
discrimination, homelessness, unemployment, and laws on lèse-majesté as a restriction on 
freedom of speech. This discussion was a further step in the acceptance of the idea that a 
government’s respect for human rights was a legitimate subject for diplomatic discourse. 
In Basket I the States adopted the 1986 Stockholm Document, which expanded the arms 
control provisions in the Helsinki Final Act, and was the first international document under 
which the Soviet Union accepted other States’ inspections on its territory. Basket II measures 
such as industrial and scientific cooperation between governments, and the creation of joint 
ventures between companies, resulted in increased East-West economic and business contacts.26 
Basket III measures resulted in increased cultural contacts and information flows across the 
Iron Curtain: in 1985 U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz noted that because of the Final Act, 
journalists could travel more easily between East and West, and that large numbers of citizens in 
some Eastern European countries had been reunited with their families in the West.27 
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Developments in information technology such as faxes, computers, copy machines, and 
television assisted these contacts and information flows; for example, East Germans watched 
West German TV; Hungarians watched Austrian TV; and people in northern Estonia watched 
Finnish TV, which as Estonian President Lennart Meri said later, allowed Estonians to see how 
they would have been living.28 Discussions in OSCE meetings reached millions of listeners, and 
public attention to the issues encouraged citizens in Eastern Europe to press for internal reform. 
The involvement of individuals, groups, and NGOs in OSCE meetings increased the effect of 
the Helsinki process by such means as organizing events, generating debate on reform, and 
providing information to Western delegations. During the 1985 OSCE Meeting of Experts on the 
Progress of Human Rights, the International Helsinki Federation organized a parallel forum that 
brought together leading individuals from both West and East.29 During the 1986 Bern Meeting 
of Experts on Human Contacts, Western and neutral delegations passed lists of unresolved cases 
of family reunification, family visits, and bi-national marriages to their Eastern European 
counterparts, lists that were sent back to the capitals and resulted in positive decisions on a 
number of cases.30 
During this period, a particular method of the Helsinki process exerted a steady pressure for 
reform. Often a document would stipulate a general principle or commitment that was then 
further elaborated on in subsequent documents. The issue of family reunification can illustrate 
this process. During the Cold War, the Iron Curtain separated many families, and the Warsaw 
Pact countries did not recognize the right of freedom of movement. In the 1975 Helsinki Final 
Act, the States declared “their aim to facilitate freer movement and contacts, individually and 
collectively, whether privately or officially, among persons, institutions and organizations of the 
participating States,” and made commitments in the areas of “Contacts and Regular Meetings on 
the Basis of Family Ties,” “Reunification of Families,” “Marriage between Citizens of Different 
States,” and “Travel for Personal or Professional Reasons.”31 
 In the area of “Reunification of Families,” the States agreed in 1975 to the general principle 
that they would deal in a “positive and humanitarian spirit with the applications of persons who 
wish to be reunited with members of their family” and process applications in this area “as 
expeditiously as possible.”32 However, in the 1983 Madrid Document, “as expeditiously as 
possible” was defined as normally within six months, and in the 1989 Vienna Document, the 
States recognized the right of freedom of movement, stating that “everyone shall be free to leave 
any country, including his own, and to return to his country.”33 
Changes in Europe 1986–1989 and the End of the Cold War. Crucial changes began 
during the second half of the 1980s when Mikhail Gorbachev became president of the Soviet 
Union and initiated a program of “new political thinking” that included political and economic 
reforms, in particular as expressed by the terms “glasnost” (openness) and “perestroika 
(restructuring). During this period, the idea gained ground in Europe that security had to be 
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achieved with others, not against them. Gorbachev expressed this idea in 1987: “The nations of 
the world resemble today a pack of mountaineers tied together by a climbing rope. They can either 
climb on together to the mountain peak or fall together into an abyss.”34 
At the Vienna follow-up meeting, held from November 1986 to January 1989, the Soviet 
leadership instructed their delegates to strive for the deepening of the Helsinki process in the 
spirit of the “new political thinking,” strengthen the disarmament process, overcome 
confrontation regarding the Basket III issues and develop humanitarian cooperation, and adopt a 
broad program for subsequent follow-up meetings.35 At the beginning of the meeting, the Soviet 
foreign minister, Eduard Shevardnadze, surprised the delegations by proposing a conference on 
the development of Basket III human rights measures, a proposal the other States accepted.36 
The Vienna meeting resulted in significant new agreements in all “Baskets.” In the political 
area, the States reconfirmed that they would respect each other’s right to freely choose and 
develop their political, social, economic, and cultural systems, but also agreed to bring their 
laws, regulations, practices, and policies to conform with the Helsinki Decalogue and other 
OSCE commitments. A second notable agreement was the establishment of a mechanism to 
monitor the implementation of human rights commitments, a step that recognized the legitimacy 
of international discussion of human rights. In the military area, the States decided to begin a 
second round of negotiations on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures (CSBMs).37 
The Basket III section, “Cooperation in Humanitarian and Other Fields,” was renamed the 
“human dimension,” and new agreements included greater freedom to practice religion, a ban on 
jamming foreign radio broadcasts, and acceptance of the right of individuals to leave and return to 
their country.38 This latter right had significant consequences: Hungary began to allow thousands 
of East Germans to cross into Austria despite a bilateral treaty that required the return of any 
citizens caught trying to escape to the West. East Germany accused Hungary with breaking the 
treaty, conspiring with West Germany, and receiving “30 pieces of silver” for each refugee, 
accusations to which Hungarian Prime Minister Miklos Nemeth replied, “I can only answer: 
Hungary has opened the borders according to the principles of the Helsinki Agreement.”39 
The Soviet Union did not intervene—the foreign ministry spokesman said that though the 
Hungarian action was unexpected, unusual, and of some concern, the situation did not directly 
affect the Soviet Union.40 The stream became a flood: from September to October 1989, 55,000–
60,000 East Germans escaped to West Germany through Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslovakia, 
and another 50,000 during the first week of November.41  
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Huge demonstrations involving hundreds of thousands of people 
took place in East Berlin and every major city in East Germany 
demanding political and civil liberties, especially free elections: 
slogans shouted included “The wall must go,” and “No one can 
hinder the people’s will for democratization anymore.”42 On 
November 8 the entire East German Cabinet of Ministers and the 
Politburo resigned, and on November 9, 1989, the Berlin Wall fell. 
The following day the Bulgarian regime fell, a week later the 
“Velvet Revolution” began in Czechoslovakia, and in December 
Romania’s government fell. As regime after regime crumbled, a 




The OSCE 1990–1992 
 
New Agreements on Individual Rights, Democracy, the Rule of Law, and Economic 
Liberty. With the fall of the Berlin Wall and the opening of the borders dividing Europe, the 
States capitalized on the readiness for change, and during the 1990–1991 period reached 
agreement on core values and principles for international behavior and domestic governance, 
particularly pertaining to individual rights, democracy, the rule of law, and the market economy. 
The States expressed these values and principles in a number of key documents: the 1990 Bonn 
Document, 1990 Copenhagen Document, 1990 Charter of Paris, and 1991 Moscow Document.  
In these documents, the States agreed that the protection and promotion of individual rights 
was the first responsibility of governments, and that democracy would be the States’ only form 
of government—a decision based on the belief that pluralistic democracy based on the rule of 
law was the only system able to effectively guarantee individual rights.43 A definition of 
pluralism and the rule of law was adopted as including regular free elections; the separation of 
party and State; an independent judiciary; and political and civil rights that included the rights of 
free expression, association, and assembly. Other new commitments included the market 
economy as the economic systems for all of the participating States; recognition of the rights of 
persons belonging to national minorities; and provisions regarding states of emergency, 
particularly that “any derogation from obligations relating to human rights and fundamental 
freedoms during a state of public emergency must remain strictly within the limits provided for 
by international law, in particular the relevant international instruments by which they are bound, 
especially with respect to rights from which there can be no derogation.”44 
The States explicitly declared that matters concerning human rights were a legitimate concern 
of all other OSCE States and did not belong exclusively to a State’s internal affairs.45 By 
accepting this droit de regard, or right of oversight, by the OSCE community in the area of 
individual rights, the States ended their debate over the balance between Principle VI 
(nonintervention in internal affairs) and Principle VII (respect for rights and freedoms). 
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East Berlin Demonstration, 
November 4, 1989 
 








The acceptance of common values was reflected in Gorbachev’s remarks at the 1990 Paris 
Summit: “We are entering into a world of new dimensions, in which universal human values are 
acquiring the same meaning for all and in which human freedom and well-being and the unique 
value of human life must become both the foundation and basis for universal security and the 
supreme criterion by which we measure progress.”46 
The Shift to Implementation and Institutionalization. During the Cold War, the OSCE 
focused primarily on reducing tensions, preventing conflict between States, and setting and 
developing standards and values. However, during the early post–Cold War period, the focus 
shifted to two areas: implementation of the new principles and values, and responding to the new 
threats arising in Europe. The situation was not stable: the former Warsaw Pact countries faced 
formidable challenges that included transitioning to liberal democratic governments; establishing 
a rule of law based on individual rights; the massive restructuring of their economies; and the 
emergence of old and new ethnic tensions and rivalries, which in a number of cases erupted into 
violence. New countries emerged from the breakup of the Soviet Union, often with no 
experience of statehood, and the number of OSCE participating States grew to over fifty. In 1992 
the OSCE States described the difficulties of the period as follows: 
 
This is a time of promise but also a time of instability and insecurity. Economic decline, 
social tension, aggressive nationalism, intolerance, xenophobia and ethnic conflicts threaten 
stability in the [O]SCE area. Gross violations of [O]SCE commitments in the field of 
human rights and fundamental freedoms, including those related to national minorities, pose 
a special threat to the peaceful development of society, in particular in new democracies.47 
 
The States perceived the need for the OSCE to have operational capabilities, and began to 
establish institutions to translate principles into practice, and to respond to the new threats. The 
States established a Council of Ministers of foreign ministers from the participating States; a 
Committee of Senior Officials (CSO) to assist the Council and manage day-to-day business; the 
Chairman-in-Office (CiO), a foreign minister who, in addition to being the foreign minister of 
his or her own country, would have overall responsibility for the executive action of the OSCE 
for a year; and regular summit meetings of Heads of State or Government. 
The States established institutions such as a Secretariat to provide administrative support, a 
Conflict Prevention Center, and a Forum for Security Cooperation. Particularly important was 
the establishment of the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) to help 
the States implement their commitments regarding rights and freedoms, to include helping the 
new democracies develop local and central government and parliamentary structures, the 
judiciary, and electoral institutions and the election process. The OSCE also began to work out 
concepts and methods for conflict prevention and crisis management, such as “OSCE Missions” 
that would provide an international presence and facilitate political processes in particular States. 
The Reemergence of Ethnic Conflict. In November 1990 the Heads of State or Government 
met in Paris for their first summit meeting since 1975, a meeting that formally ended nearly half 
a century of East-West confrontation. The Summit marked the high point of the 1989–1990 
political watershed in Europe, and in that spirit of optimism, the Heads of State or Government 
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signed the Charter of Paris for a New Europe, a document that embodied the new common 
values and vision of the OSCE community.48 
However, ethnic tensions had been rising as the Soviet Union dissolved, and during the Paris 
Summit meeting the States decided to convene a meeting of experts to address the issue of 
national minorities and the rights of persons belonging to them. These issues were discussed at 
the 1991 CSCE Meeting of Experts on National Minorities and the 1991 Moscow Meeting of the 
Human Dimension; however, that same year new conflicts broke out in Croatia, Georgia, and 
Moldova.  
The Creation of the Position of the HCNM. The OSCE States perceived the need to prevent 
any additional ethnic conflicts from starting, but when conflict broke out in Bosnia in early 1992, 
the need for preventive measures became imperative. During the follow-up meeting from March 
to July 1992, the Netherlands put forth a proposal for a High Commissioner for National 
Minorities to provide early warning and promote the peaceful settlement of disputes.  
During the meeting, there were extensive negotiations regarding the proposed position, for a 
number of States had serious concerns. The majority of OSCE States recognized only the rights 
and duties of individuals, not groups, and there was concern that the appointment of an HCNM 
could be a step towards recognizing group rights and thereby contradict the principle of equal 
rights and duties for all. These States also feared that one group could claim rights and privileges 
not available to other groups, which could lead to inequality and increased interethnic tensions.  
Some States did not recognize the existence of national minorities and were not willing to 
acknowledge any special rights, duties, or institutions for any part of their populations. Other 
States were concerned that an HCNM might become an advocate for minorities and thereby 
exacerbate interethnic tensions within States by emphasizing differences between minorities and 
majorities, or by supporting the demands of one minority group over another. There was also fear 
that HCNM advocacy might cause tensions between States by taking sides between different 
ethnic groups among neighboring States, particularly regarding issues of secession or irredentism. 
There was concern that minorities might “use” a High Commissioner to bypass their 
governments or to voice grievances and demands publicly, in particular regarding increased 
autonomy or secession. A serious objection concerned the HCNM’s potential involvement with 
minority groups that engaged in terrorist activities. Other issues concerned the working of the 
HCNM such as how he would decide to become involved in a minority issue, his freedom to 
travel, with whom he would have contact, to whom he would be accountable, and the level of 
confidentiality he would maintain.  
The States worked out these issues and achieved consensus on a mandate for an HCNM. He 
would be a High Commissioner on National Minorities, not for them, a distinction that addressed 
a number of concerns such as advocacy. He would act under the aegis of the Council of Senior 
Officials (CSO), would consult the Chairman-in-Office (CiO), and would provide a strictly 
confidential report to the CiO after a visit.  
The mandate allowed the HCNM to collect and receive information regarding the situation of 
national minorities from any source except people or organizations practicing or publicly 
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condoning terrorism or violence. He would be free to travel anywhere in the OSCE area to assess 
national minority issues, and during these visits could discuss questions with parties directly 
concerned, and where appropriate, promote dialogue, confidence, and cooperation between them. 
These parties included governments; regional and local authorities; and representatives of 
national minorities, associations, nongovernmental organizations, and religious or other groups. 
The HCNM would be independent regarding which situations he would become involved in, 
and once involved, would act independently of all parties directly involved, and would work in 
confidence. If at any time he concluded that there was a prima facie risk of potential conflict, he 
would issue an early warning to the CiO, who would promptly inform the CSO.  
There were several restrictions on the position. The two major restrictions were that the High 
Commissioner would not consider national minority issues in situations involving organized acts 
of terrorism, and would not consider violations of OSCE commitments with regard to an 
individual person belonging to a national minority. 
The mandate allowed the HCNM to request assistance from up to three experts on specific 
matters in which brief, specialized investigation and advice were needed. These experts would be 
selected by the HCNM from a resource list maintained at the ODIHR.  
The States established the position in July 1992 at the third OSCE Summit meeting. The 
HCNM’s official mandate specified that his function was as follows: 
 
The High Commissioner will provide “early warning” and, as appropriate, “early action” at the 
earliest possible stage in regard to tensions involving national minority issues which have not 
yet developed beyond an early warning stage, but, in the judgement of the High Commissioner, 
have the potential to develop into a conflict within the [O]SCE area, affecting peace, stability or 
relations between participating States, requiring the attention of and action by the Council or the 
CSO.49 
 
The Selection of the First HCNM. The mandate stated that the High Commissioner would 
be an “eminent international personality with long-standing relevant experience from whom an  
impartial performance of the function may be expected,” and in 
September 1992, the Netherlands nominated Max van der Stoel. 
Van der Stoel was an experienced statesman whose career had 
included serving as a member of the Dutch Parliament, the 
Netherlands foreign minister, Rapporteur on Greece for the Council 
of Europe, Ambassador to the United Nations, and Special 
Rapporteur on Iraq for the UN Commission on Human Rights. He 
had been involved in the OSCE as the Netherlands foreign minister 
from 1973 to 1977, and as such had participated in negotiating the 
Helsinki Final Act. From 1989 to 1991 he headed the Netherlands 
delegation to the three-meeting Conference on the Human 
Dimension of the CSCE that resulted in the 1990 Copenhagen 
Document and 1991 Moscow Document. He was also an individual 
for whom the promotion of peace, security, and individual rights 
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had been a constant theme during his career: he had been instrumental in ensuring the inclusion 
of the human rights provisions in the Helsinki Final Act, and in recognition of his outspoken 
support for human rights, had been selected to be the first recipient of the Freedom of Speech 
Award of the Roosevelt Foundation’s Four Freedoms Awards.50 
 
 
The HCNM 1993–2001 
 
The First HCNM’s Appointment and Methods. The States appointed Max van der Stoel on 
December 15, 1992, and he began work on January 1, 1993. He was given an initial budget of 
about $400,000, a staff of four people, and a small office in The Hague.51 A private 
nongovernmental organization, the Foundation on Inter-Ethnic Relations (FIER), was set up to 
support his work through means that included research, expert consultations, publications, and 
projects that addressed the particular needs of countries in which he was involved.52 With these 
resources (which had increased to $2 million per year and a staff of sixteen by the time his tenure 
ended in 2001), the tools provided by his mandate, and his personal experience and skills, he 
worked for the next eight years to reduce interethnic tensions and prevent conflict in the OSCE 
area (this area consisted of over fifty participating States in Europe, Central Asia, and North 
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The HCNM had four primary responsibilities. His first responsibility was to continuously 
monitor the entire OSCE area for signs of tensions involving minorities that in his judgment 
might lead to tensions between OSCE States. His second responsibility was to engage in crisis 
intervention if he perceived that these tensions threatened to erupt into violence, and he did this 
several times. His third responsibility was to issue an early warning to the OSCE leadership if a 
situation developed to the point that he did not believe he could contain it with the tools available 
to him, and he took this action regarding Macedonia. His fourth responsibility was to work with 
governments to resolve minority issues that were causing tensions between OSCE States, or that 
might cause a serious crisis in an OSCE State. In these instances, the HCNM used particular 
methods. 
He first examined a situation and identified all of the factors that were causing tensions, and 
tried to understand why the situation had developed to the point that it had. In this analysis, he 
was aided by the OSCE’s comprehensive security approach, for he often found that ethnic 
tensions had their origin in economic issues or the violation of individual rights. He then 
identified what issues needed to be addressed, to include any political processes involved.  
His next steps were to analyze the possible solutions that could be reached through dialogue 
and negotiation, and develop an integrated strategy to deal with all aspects of the problem. In 
doing so, he did not use any general solutions, believing that each situation was unique and had 
to be assessed in light of its own particular circumstances, and that what worked in one State 
might be entirely inappropriate for another. The only set guidelines he used were OSCE 
principles and commitments, international norms, and legal standards. 
He would then prepare a formal written recommendation to the government concerned, 
usually in the form of a letter to the foreign minister.53 In this recommendation, he provided his 
overall analysis of the situation, taking into account all of the legitimate interests involved, and 
offered specific recommendations for the resolution of the issues. The recommendations 
generally included practical steps such as increasing the availability of language instruction or 
the establishment of a council to promote dialogue, and for the consideration of specific 
problems. As his involvement with a country progressed, he followed up his first 
recommendation with others as needed.  
His recommendations were not legally binding, had no enforcement mechanisms, and the 
extent to which they were implemented was entirely the decision of the recipient State. However, 
as an instrument of the OSCE, the HCNM represented all of the OSCE States, which gave 
increased weight to his recommendations, and the OSCE leadership, organizations such as the 
EU, and other OSCE States reinforced them. 
In working with the parties involved, he searched for “concrete” solutions, promoted dialogue, 
encouraged parties to be specific and avoid generalities, and emphasized the requirement for 
mutual respect. In particular, he proposed solutions and tried to bring parties to a consensus 
based on convincing arguments rather than coercion. He maintained confidentiality in that his 
reports to the Chairman-in-Office were private; his formal recommendations were usually 
withheld from the public for months while States considered and responded to his 
recommendations; his meetings were restricted; and he seldom talked to the press.  
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His initial goal was to help governments and minorities come up with solutions that were 
politically possible, lasting, and in keeping with OSCE principles and international standards. 
However, his long-term goal was to help parties create a pattern of cooperative interaction, and 
the processes and institutions needed so that they would be able to deal with contentious issues in 
a constructive way on their own.  
The HCNM’s Effectiveness. Van der Stoel fulfilled his mandate, for during his tenure, no 
new conflicts involving minority tensions broke out in the OSCE area except for Macedonia in 
2001, and he issued an “early warning” regarding that situation.54 It is relevant to consider his 
accomplishments in light of the ongoing institutionalization of the OSCE, the overall state of 
ethnic tensions in the OSCE area, and the cost of his work.  
From 1975 to 1989 the OSCE had no permanent institutional structures—the beginnings of 
institutionalization were initiated in 1990, with the first major steps taken during the 1992 
Helsinki Summit meeting. During his first years in office, the HCNM was operating at the same 
time that the OSCE was trying to institutionalize and simultaneously respond to the security 
situation in Europe. (The OSCE did not formally become an organization until January 1, 1995.) 
The overall situation of ethnic tensions in Europe was a second significant factor. In 1992 the 
participating States expressed the security situation in Europe as follows: 
 
For the first time in decades we are facing warfare in the [O]SCE region. New armed 
conflicts and massive use of force to achieve hegemony and territorial expansion continue to 
occur. The loss of life, human misery, involving huge numbers of refugees have been the 
worst since the Second World War. Damage to our cultural heritage and the destruction of 
property have been appalling.55 
 
In all of these ongoing conflicts, ethnic tensions were a primary or major contributing cause, 
and rising tensions elsewhere increased the expectation that additional conflicts were likely, 
particularly as economic conditions in Eastern Europe worsened, resulting in growing hardships 
and insecurity for large segments of populations.  
The HCNM expended very few resources, particularly when compared to the consequences 
and costs of conflict. The consequences of the 1991–1992 conflicts in Europe included thousands 
of lives lost; widespread suffering; massive refugee flows; regional instability; new waves of 
hatred; the destruction of irreplaceable cultural heritage; and large economic costs for the 
countries directly involved, neighboring countries, and the international community. For 
example, in the 1990s, the conflict in Bosnia alone cost the international community tens of 
billions: in contrast, the HCNM’s eight-year tenure cost a total of less than $8 million—less than 
$1 million per year.56 In this context, if the HCNM prevented even one conflict, his work was 
very cost-effective. 
Van der Stoel also made contributions beyond the fulfilling of his mandate, such as advancing 
conflict prevention concepts, and contributing to the implementation of international standards 
on minority rights, particularly regarding political participation, education, and language. For 
example, a number of minority-related international standards were established in the 1990s, 
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most notably the 1990 Copenhagen Document and the Council of Europe’s Framework 
Convention for the Protection of National Minorities. However, in order to provide some 
guidelines on how to put these standards into practice, Van der Stoel commissioned a group of 
international experts to draw up recommendations on issues that he felt needed further 
clarification. These experts developed three sets of recommendations: The Hague 
Recommendations Regarding the Education Rights of National Minorities, 1996; The Oslo 
Recommendations Regarding the Linguistic Rights of National Minorities, 1998; and The Lund 
Recommendations on the Effective Participation of National Minorities in Public Life, 1999. 
Though the Recommendations were not binding on the participating States, they had a significant 
impact, for example, by being incorporated into national legislation.57 
His work was widely recognized as having been effective, though he was often criticized by 
extreme nationalists on both sides of an issue, and sometimes by the governments of the States in 
which he was involved. The Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (the U.S. 
Helsinki Commission) repeatedly recognized the effectiveness of his work in its reports, as did 
the U.S. presidents’ reports on the OSCE. Many governments bestowed awards and recognition 
on him, and at the end of his tenure, the OSCE Permanent Council held a special meeting at 
which the first agenda item was “Homage to Mr. Max van der Stoel, OSCE High Commissioner 
on National Minorities.”58  
The Focus of the Study. The HCNM’s methods and skills contributed to his effectiveness as 
HCNM; however, this study did not focus on these aspects of his work, but on his use of the 
OSCE principles. Chapter 3 shows the derivation of the principles that Van der Stoel used in his 
work as HCNM, for not all of the principles he relied on had been clearly articulated as 
principles. The study then examined his application of the principles in three intervention cases, 
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This chapter presents the results of Phase I of the study: the identification, articulation, and 
documentation of the OSCE security principles. This step was required because the High 
Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM) relied on these principles when making his 
recommendations; however, the principles were not stated explicitly in any one document, but 
rather in a series of documents adopted by the States. 
 
 
The OSCE Security Principles 1993–2001 
 
The OSCE Principles. Content analysis of selected OSCE documents revealed twenty 
security principles in effect from 1993 to 2001. These principles can be divided into three 
groups: principles guiding relations between OSCE States; principles guiding the protection and 
promotion of individual rights within States; and principles guiding implementation, review, and 
development processes. 
 
Group I: Principles Guiding Relations Between OSCE States. Group I principles were 
intended to guide relations between OSCE States—that is, their international relations. Analysis 
showed eight principles in Group I, and these principles can be divided into four categories: 
 One general principle regarding the necessity for principles guiding international relations;  
 Three principles that addressed State sovereign rights and agreed-upon limitations on 
these rights;  
 Three principles relating to the States’ approach to security, which would be 
“comprehensive,” “cooperative,” and “common”; and  
 One principle focusing on the prevention of security threats, and the use of peaceful means 
to reduce tensions and resolve disputes and conflicts.  
 
Principle 1: The development of agreed-upon principles guiding relations between OSCE 
States. Principle 1 was the necessity for agreed-upon principles guiding international relations. 
This principle was based on the idea that States have responsibilities towards each other, and 
both need and benefit from consistency in their relations. The States expressed their belief in the 
responsibilities of governments towards each other, and their commitment to principles guiding 
international relations, as below:  
 
We reaffirm the validity of the guiding principles and common values of the Helsinki Final 
Act and the Charter of Paris, embodying responsibilities of States towards each other and of 
governments towards their people.1 
 
That the OSCE States believed that agreed-upon principles guiding international relations 
were necessary to achieve security is shown by the negotiation of the Helsinki Decalogue, and by 
statements that the Helsinki Decalogue principles had been effective in increasing international 
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security. One example refers to the role that the OSCE played in bringing about the end of the 
Cold War: “The Ten Principles of the Final Act…lighted our way towards better relations.”2 A 
more specific example follows: 
 
We have witnessed the end of the cold war, the fall of totalitarian regimes and the demise of 
the ideology on which they were based. [The OSCE] has played a key role in these positive 
changes.3  
 
The States declared that abiding by OSCE principles would benefit all of their countries, and 
expressed their determination to fully “respect and apply these principles, as set forth in the 
present Declaration, in all aspects, to their mutual relations and cooperation in order to ensure to 
each participating State the benefits resulting from the respect and application of these principles 
by all.”4 
 
Principle 2: Respect for the sovereign rights of participating States, in particular their 
juridical equality, external and internal political independence, and territorial integrity. 
Principle 2 addressed government responsibilities to respect the sovereign rights of States. These 
rights included equality under international law (juridical equality); territorial integrity; and the 
right to external and internal political independence, in accordance with international law and the 
spirit of the Helsinki Final Act.5 
“External political independence” included the right to neutrality; to belong, or not belong, to 
international organizations; and to be, or not be, a party to alliances or treaties. “Internal political 
independence” included the right of States to determine their own laws and regulations, and for 
each State to freely choose and develop its political, social, economic, and cultural systems. 
External and internal political independence included the responsibility of States to refrain from 
intervening in affairs, internal or external, that fell within the domestic jurisdiction of another 
participating State. 
The States made a number of commitments pertaining to territorial integrity, expressed in 
three general areas: State frontiers and borders; the nonuse of force or the threat of force; and the 
avoidance of activities aimed at the violent overthrow of one regime by another. Three particular 
commitments are below: 
 States would not demand, seize, or usurp part or all of the territory of any participating State; 
would regard all frontiers as inviolable; and would not assault any frontiers. 
 States would refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the 
territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or act in any manner 
inconsistent with the purposes of the UN and OSCE commitments.  
 States would refrain from providing any direct or indirect assistance to terrorist activities, or 
to subversive or other activities aimed at the violent overthrow of another participating 
State’s regime.6 
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Principle 3: Agreed-upon limits to State political independence in regard to OSCE 
commitments. In Principle 3, the States agreed to limit their political independence as it 
pertained to international law and their OSCE commitments: “[States] will ensure that their laws, 
regulations, practices and policies conform with their obligations under international law and are 
brought into harmony with the provisions of the Declaration on Principles and other [O]SCE 
commitments.”7 Particular areas in which the States accepted limits included their form of 
government, respect for individual rights and fundamental freedoms, and their economic system.  
Form of government. The States agreed to limit their political independence in that democracy 
would be their only form of government. This commitment was stated in the Helsinki Document: 
“All our countries now take democracy as the basis for their political, social and economic life.”8 
Individual rights and fundamental freedoms. The States explicitly agreed that respect for 
human rights and fundamental freedoms was a legitimate area of international relations:  
 
[The participating States] categorically and irrevocably declare that the commitments 
undertaken in the field of the human dimension of the [O]SCE are matters of direct and 
legitimate concern to all participating States and do not belong exclusively to the internal 
affairs of the State concerned.9  
 
Economic systems. The States agreed to limit their sovereignty in the area of their economic 
systems. As shown below, the States committed themselves to the market economy and 
adherence to the rules involved: 
 
Economic cooperation based on market economy constitutes an essential element of our 
relations. [We] underline the necessity of…increased integration, involving the acceptance 
of disciplines as well as benefits, into the international economic and financial system.10  
 
Principle 4: Mutual State involvement with, accountability to, and assistance to each other 
regarding the implementation of OSCE commitments. The States agreed that they would be 
mutually involved with and accountable to each other regarding the implementation of their 
OSCE commitments, and would assist each other in this area. The States would fulfill these 
responsibilities primarily through the OSCE. 
Mutual involvement. The OSCE “Helsinki process” involved periodic reviews and discussion 
of the States’ implementation of their OSCE commitments, reviews that necessarily involved all 
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of the States with each other.11 Mutual involvement included the right for all States to follow the 
internal developments in all other participating States, and through the OSCE to influence these 
developments. An example of this commitment was stated in the 1992 Helsinki Document: the 
States decided “to improve their capability to gather information and to monitor developments, 
as well as their ability to implement decisions about further steps.”12  
Mutual accountability. The States accepted that they were responsible to each other for the 
implementation of their commitments: “We recognize our accountability to each other for 
complying with…the guiding principles and common values of the Helsinki Final Act and the 
Charter of Paris.”13 During the OSCE follow-up meetings, the States evaluated and discussed 
how well each was implementing OSCE commitments. 
Mutual assistance. The States accepted the responsibility of mutual assistance regarding the 
implementation of OSCE commitments. If a State was not able to implement its OSCE 
commitments, or needed assistance in fulfilling its commitments, other OSCE States had the 
responsibility to help. One example of the States’ commitment to mutual assistance during the 
post–Cold War period is below: 
 
The transition to and development of democracy and market economy by the new 
democracies is being carried forward with determination amidst difficulties and varying 
conditions. We offer our support and solidarity to participating States undergoing 
transformation to democracy and market economy…. In order to ensure full participation 
and cooperation by recently admitted participating States we are initiating a program of 
coordinated support.14  
 
As a second example, the States created organizational structures to assist in establishing, 
strengthening, and defending the liberal democratic form of government, including the 
democratic and legal institutions required (the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human 
Rights (ODIHR) was an example). The statement below illustrates the States’ commitment to 
defend the democratic form of government: 
 
[The participating States] recognize their responsibility to defend and protect, in accordance 
with their laws, their international human rights obligations and their international 
commitments, the democratic order freely established through the will of the people against 
the activities of persons, groups or organizations that engage in or refuse to renounce 
terrorism or violence aimed at the overthrow of that order or of that of another participating 
State…. Our States will cooperate and support each other with the aim of making democratic 
gains irreversible.15  
 
Principle 5: A comprehensive approach to security (comprehensive security). 
“Comprehensive security” was a broad approach to security that encompassed all areas that 
could cause tensions, disputes, or conflicts between States. The comprehensive security approach 
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was based on the idea that security has many aspects, that tensions between States can arise from 
a wide range of issues, and that these security aspects and issues are interrelated. That the States 
took a comprehensive view of security, and believed that this view was essential to security, is 
shown below: 
 
Our approach is based on our comprehensive concept of security as initiated in the Final 
Act. This concept relates the maintenance of peace to the respect for human rights and 
fundamental freedoms. It links economic and environmental solidarity and cooperation with 
peaceful inter-State relations.16 
 
Through the comprehensive security approach, the States sought to increase security by 
providing a broad framework in which to identify and resolve tensions between them, 
particularly at the early stages: the States stated that they were “desirous of eliminating the 
causes of tension that may exist among them and thus of contributing to the strengthening of 
peace and security in the world.”17  
The States also adopted the comprehensive security approach on the basis that the different 
aspects of security were interrelated. For example, the States stated that respect for human rights, 
democracy, and the rule of law are necessary for economic prosperity:  
 
The free will of the individual, exercised in democracy and protected by the rule of law, 
forms the necessary basis for successful economic and social development…. Freedom and 
political pluralism are necessary [for] economic growth…. Economic liberty, social justice 
and environmental responsibility are indispensable for prosperity.18  
 
The OSCE States generally used three categories or “dimensions” to express their 
comprehensive security approach: the political-military dimension; the economic, 
scientific/technological, and environmental dimension; and the “human dimension.”19 The three 
dimensions can be shown as below.  
 
 
Table 3–1. The Three Dimensions of Comprehensive Security 
 
 










III. The Human Dimension: 
Human Rights,  
Democracy, and the  




                                                 
16 Helsinki Document, 1992, 10. 
17 Helsinki Final Act, 1975, 10. 
18 Charter of Paris, 1990, 4. 
19 The “human dimension” consisted of those commitments made by the OSCE States to ensure full respect for 
individual rights and fundamental freedoms; abide by the rule of law; promote the principles of democracy; and 
build, strengthen, and protect democratic institutions. In the 1989 Vienna Document, the “Cooperation in 
Humanitarian and Other Fields” basket was renamed as the “human dimension.”  
    The three dimensions correspond in general with the first three areas, or “baskets,” used in developing the 
Helsinki Final Act. (“Process” was the fourth original “basket,” and can be considered a fourth dimension of 
comprehensive security.) Note that the States considered the three dimensions to be equal in principle. 








Principle 6: A cooperative approach to security (cooperative security). “Cooperative 
security” was an approach that sought to achieve security with others, not against them, and 
recognized that States had common interests and faced common threats. That the States 
committed themselves to a cooperative approach to security is shown in the name of the OSCE 
itself (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe), and the title of Helsinki Decalogue 
Principle IX:  
 
IX. Cooperation among States. The participating States will develop their cooperation with 
one another and with all States in all fields in accordance with the purposes and principles of 
the Charter of the United Nations.20 
 
The Charter of Paris showed that the States believed a cooperative approach was essential to 
security: 
 
With all the rich diversity of our nations, we are united in our commitment to expand our 
cooperation in all fields. The challenges confronting us can only be met by common action, 
cooperation and solidarity.21  
 
Principle 7: An “in common” approach to security (common security). “Common security” 
was an approach that viewed security as “indivisible” or “linked,” and thus needed to be pursued 
in common with other States.22 Two examples of the States’ commitment to common security 
follow: “[The States recognize] the indivisibility of security in Europe,” and “security is 
indivisible.”23 The States declared that the security of States was linked: “The security of every 
participating State is inseparably linked to that of all the others…. The destiny of our nations is 
linked to that of all other nations.”24  
The common security approach recognized the need of each State for security, that the level of 
security in each State affects the security of other countries, and that all States need to contribute 
to overall security. One common security goal was equal security for all OSCE States.25 The 
common security approach acknowledged that insecurity in one State decreases the security of 
other countries, and therefore the States declared that “no State in our [O]SCE community will 
strengthen its security at the expense of the security of other States.”26 
The common security approach recognized that States had the mutual responsibility to 
contribute to overall security and to the advancement of individual rights. The States 
acknowledged “the close link between peace and security in Europe and in the world as a 
whole,” as well as “the need for each of them to make its contribution to the strengthening of 
world peace and security and to the promotion of fundamental rights, economic and social 
progress and well-being for all peoples.”27  
 
                                                 
20 Helsinki Final Act, 1975, 7. A second example is the States’ declared intention to base their relations on respect 
and cooperation: “Our relations will be founded on respect and cooperation.” Charter of Paris, 1990, 3. 
21 Charter of Paris, 1990, 6. 
22 OSCE documents also refer to “common security” as “indivisibility security.”  
23 Helsinki Final Act, 1975; Charter of Paris, 1990, 5. 
24 Charter of Paris, 1990, 5, 6. 
25 Charter of Paris, 1990, 3. 
26 Helsinki Document, 1992, 10. 
27 Helsinki Final Act, 1975, 3. 








Principle 8: The prevention of security threats, and the use of peaceful means to reduce 
tensions and resolve disputes and conflicts. States would take actions to prevent tensions and 
security threats from arising, and would use peaceful means to resolve any problems that did 
arise. The statement below shows the States’ determination to resolve disputes, prevent security 
threats from developing, and provide early warning of cases in which threats might arise: 
 
The participating States have decided to strengthen the structure of their political 
consultations and increase their frequency, and to provide for more flexible and active 
dialogue and better early warning and dispute settlement, resulting in a more effective role in 
conflict prevention and resolution, complemented, when necessary, by peacekeeping 
operations. The participating States…have also decided to improve their capability to gather 
information and to monitor developments, as well as their ability to implement decisions 
about further steps. They have recommitted themselves to cooperating constructively in 
using the full range of possibilities within the [O]SCE to prevent and resolve conflicts.28  
 
Prevention. The States declared that they would “seek effective ways of preventing, through 
political means, conflicts which may yet emerge.”29 The States agreed to reduce the potential for 
misunderstanding though openness and predictability, such as through military constraints, 
confidence-building measures, the control of dangerous technologies, and arms control: 
 
[The States recognize] the need to contribute to reducing the dangers of armed conflict and 
of misunderstanding or miscalculation of military activities which could give rise to 
apprehension, particularly in a situation where the participating States lack clear and timely 
information about the nature of such activities. [Strengthening confidence among the States 
will] contribute to increasing stability and security in Europe.30  
 
Peaceful Settlement. The States declared that the peaceful settlement of disputes was “an 
essential complement to the duty of States to refrain from the threat or use of force,” and that 
both were “essential factors for the maintenance and consolidation of international peace and 
security.”31 The States committed themselves to using peaceful means to settle disputes and 
resolve conflicts; to endeavor in good faith and a spirit of cooperation to reach a rapid and 
equitable solution on the basis of international law; and to act in a manner that would not 
endanger international peace, security, and justice. The participating States—whether or not 
parties to a dispute among them—committed themselves to refrain from any action that might 
aggravate a situation and thereby make a peaceful settlement more difficult.32  
Methods that the States would use to settle differences and disputes included negotiation; 
mediation; arbitration; judicial settlement; early warning; conflict prevention; preventive action; 
fact-finding and rapporteur missions; peacekeeping; good offices; and independent advice and 
counsel from experts, institutions, and international organizations. If a solution was not reached 
by these means, the States would continue to seek a mutually agreed way to settle disputes 
peacefully, and authorized the OSCE leadership to take action to settle disputes and conflicts.33  
 
                                                 
28 Helsinki Document, 1992, 15. 
29 Charter of Paris, 1990, 8–9. 
30 Helsinki Final Act, 1975, 10. 
31 Charter of Paris, 1990, 8. 
32 Helsinki Final Act, 1975, 6. 
33 Helsinki Final Act, 1975, 5; Helsinki Document, 1992, 15–17. In situations requiring more forceful measures, 
States had recourse to other international bodies with those capabilities, such as NATO or the UN Security Council. 








Group II: Principles Guiding the Protection and Promotion of Individual Rights within 
States. Group II principles were intended to guide the protection and promotion of individual 
rights within States. Analysis showed eight principles in Group II. These principles can be 
divided into four categories:  
 One general principle regarding the necessity for principles guiding relations between a 
State and its population,  
 Two principles relating to the purpose and form of governments, 
 Three principles relating to national minorities, and  
 Two principles relating to the requirement for respect as a basis for relations.  
 
Principle 9: The development of agreed-upon principles guiding relations between the State 
and the people who comprise the State. Principle 9 was the necessity for agreed-upon principles 
guiding relations between the State and the members of the State. This principle was based on 
the idea that States have responsibilities towards the members of the State (as does the 
population to the State, and to the other members of the State), and that national and international 
security is affected by these relations. The States’ commitment follows:  
 
We reaffirm the validity of the guiding principles…of the Helsinki Final Act and the Charter 
of Paris, embodying responsibilities of…governments towards their people.34  
 
Principle 10: State responsibility to establish and maintain the conditions in which all 
members of the State are able to fully exercise their individual rights and freedoms. The States 
accepted that governments had the responsibility to establish and maintain the conditions in 
which all individuals are able to fully exercise their rights and freedoms. The States declared that 
the protection and promotion of human rights and fundamental freedoms was the “first 
responsibility of government.”35 Regarding the importance of the individual, the States 
recognized and fully accepted “the supreme value of the human personality.”36 The States 
acknowledged that individual rights and fundamental freedoms are inalienable and derive from 
the inherent dignity of the human person: 
 
Human rights and fundamental freedoms are the birthright of all human beings [and] are 
inalienable…. Our respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms [is] irrevocable.37  
 
Rights and freedoms…derive from the inherent dignity of the human person and are 
essential for his free and full development.38  
 
The States acknowledged a relationship between international security and respect for human 
rights within States. The States declared that “respect for these rights and freedoms constitutes 
one of the foundations of the international order”; that the protection and promotion of rights and 
fundamental freedoms is “a vital basis for our comprehensive security”; and that the observance 
and full exercise of rights and freedoms are “the foundation of freedom, justice and peace.”39  
 
                                                 
34 Helsinki Document, 1992, 5 (italics added). 
35 Charter of Paris, 1990, 3.  
36 Copenhagen Document, 1990, 3.  
37 Charter of Paris, 1990, 3, 7. 
38 Helsinki Final Act, 1975, 6. 
39 Moscow Document, 1991, 29; Helsinki Document, 1992, 5; Charter of Paris, 1990, 3.  








Principle 11: Democracy, a rule of law based on human rights, and the market economy as 
the means to ensure that all individuals are able to fully exercise their rights and freedoms. 
Principle 11 specified that the States would use democracy, the rule of law, and the market 
economy as the means to establish and maintain the conditions in which all individuals could 
exercise their rights and freedoms.  
Democracy and the rule of law. A democratic political framework, and the rule of law, were 
the first two means that governments would use to protect and promote individual rights within 
States.40 The States expressed this commitment as follows: 
 
A democratic political framework based on the rule of law, with a functioning independent 
judiciary…guarantees full respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, equal rights and 
status for all citizens, the free expression of all their legitimate interests and aspirations, 
political pluralism, social tolerance and the implementation of legal rules that place effective 
restraints on the abuse of governmental power.41  
 
The States identified democracy as the source of government legitimacy and authority, 
declaring that “the will of the people, freely and fairly expressed through periodic and genuine 
elections, is the basis of the authority and legitimacy of all government.”42 As the form of 
government required to protect and promote human rights and freedoms, the States declared that 
democracy would be the “only system of government” for their nations.43  
The market economy. The market economy (economic liberty) was the third means that 
governments would use to protect and promote individual rights. The States declared that the 
market economy would be their only economic system, that economic liberty was essential for 
prosperity, and that they would accept the rules involved in the international economic and 
financial system: 
 
Economic cooperation based on market economy constitutes an essential element of our 
relations. [We underline the necessity of] increased integration, involving the acceptance of 
disciplines as well as benefits, into the international economic and financial system…. 
Economic cooperation based on market economy…will be instrumental in the construction of 
a prosperous and united Europe.”44  
 
The States declared that economic freedom was a right: “Everyone has the right to own 
property alone or in association and to exercise individual enterprise.”45  
 
                                                 
40 A democratic political framework included a representative form of government in which the executive is 
accountable to the elected legislature or the electorate; the government and public authorities act in a manner 
consistent with law and comply with their constitutions; a clear separation between the State and political parties is 
maintained, in particular, political parties are not merged with the State; military forces and the police are under the 
control of, and accountable to, the civil authorities; judges are independent and judicial services operate impartially; 
and periodic, free, and fair elections are held, for which individuals and groups have the right to freely establish 
political parties and organizations able to compete with each other on a basis of equal treatment before the law and 
the authorities, and with governmental and nongovernmental observers present for national elections. See the 
Copenhagen Document, 1990, 3–4; Charter of Paris, 1990, 24–25.  
41 Copenhagen Document, 1990, 18.  
42 Charter of Paris, 1990, 24. 
43 “We undertake to build, consolidate and strengthen democracy as the only system of government of our nations.” 
See the Charter of Paris, 1990, 3.  
44 Charter of Paris, 1990, 9. 
45 Charter of Paris, 1990, 4.  








The link to security. The States believed that the protection and promotion of individual rights 
through democracy and the rule of law was essential for lasting security: “Full respect for human 
rights and fundamental freedoms and the development of societies based on pluralistic 
democracy and the rule of law are prerequisites for a lasting order of peace, security, justice and 
cooperation.”46  
Individual rights, democracy, the rule of law, and the market economy as interdependent and 
mutually reinforcing. The States viewed human rights, democracy, the rule of law, and the 
market economy as interrelated and mutually reinforcing. The States declared that “democracy is 
an inherent element of the rule of law,” and that “democracy has as its foundation respect for the 
human person and the rule of law,” thus linking democracy and the rule of law, and focusing on 
the individual.47 The States considered respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms as 
“an essential safeguard against an over-mighty State,” thus linking individual rights with limits 
on government.48 The States expressed the relationship between democracy and the market 
economy, declaring that “democratic institutions and economic liberty foster economic and 
social progress.”49 The States linked individual rights and democracy with economic progress, 
for example, as expressed in the statement: “Freedom and political pluralism are necessary 
elements in our common objective of developing market economies towards sustainable 
economic growth, prosperity, social justice, expanding employment and efficient use of 
economic resources.”50 
The primacy of individual rights. Of particular note is the primacy that the States accorded 
to individual rights: the States did not view democracy, the rule of law, and the market 
economy as ends in themselves, but as means to support and enforce respect for human rights. 
One example is the statement, “Pluralistic democracy and the rule of law are essential for 
ensuring respect for all human rights and fundamental freedoms.”51 A second example shows 
that the States believed that democracy supports individual rights: “Democracy is the best 
safeguard of freedom of expression, tolerance of all groups of society, and equality of 
opportunity for each person.”52 That the rule of law protects and enforces individual rights and 
fundamental freedoms was stated in the Charter of Paris: “Human rights and fundamental 
freedoms…are guaranteed by law.”53 That the States believed that the rule of law itself must be 
based on respect for human rights is shown below: 
 
Principles of justice…form the basis of the rule of law…. The rule of law does not mean 
merely a formal legality which assures regularity and consistency in the achievement and 
enforcement of democratic order, but justice based on the recognition and full acceptance of 
the supreme value of the human personality and guaranteed by institutions providing a 
framework for its fullest expression.54  
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51 Copenhagen Document, 1990, 2.  
52 Charter of Paris, 1990, 3. 
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Principle 12: State responsibility to ensure that national minorities are able to exercise their 
equal rights, to include taking special measures as needed.55 In Principle 12, States were 
responsible for ensuring that minorities have full equality with other citizens in exercising their 
rights, to include making special measures as necessary. In particular, the States specified that 
governments were responsible for ensuring equality under the law and nondiscrimination for 
minorities, for ensuring that minorities could participate fully in public affairs, and for ensuring 
that minorities were able to develop their identities.  
Nondiscrimination and equality under the law. The State had the responsibility to provide 
equality under the law and nondiscrimination for minorities: “Persons belonging to national 
minorities have the right to exercise fully and effectively their human rights and fundamental 
freedoms without any discrimination and in full equality before the law.”56 
Participation in public affairs. The States accepted the right of minorities to participate in 
government: “The participating States will respect the right of persons belonging to national 
minorities to effective participation in public affairs.”57  
The right to develop identity. The States accepted that persons belonging to national 
minorities had the right to develop their identity whether ethnic, cultural, linguistic, or religious:   
 
Persons belonging to national minorities have the right freely to express, preserve and develop 
their ethnic, cultural, linguistic or religious identity and to maintain and develop their culture in 
all its aspects, free of any attempts at assimilation against their will…. The participating States 
will respect the right of persons belonging to national minorities to [participate in pubic] affairs 
relating to the protection and promotion of the identity of such minorities.58 
 
In the area of the right of national minorities to develop their identity, the States recognized 
the “rich contribution of national minorities” to society.59 The States declared their determination 
to foster this contribution, and recognized the contributions of culture to security: 
 
We recognize the essential contribution of our common European culture and our shared 
values in overcoming the division of the continent. Therefore, we underline our attachment 
to creative freedom and to the protection and promotion of our cultural and spiritual 
heritage, in all its richness and diversity.60 
 
Special measures as needed. The States recognized that general respect for individual rights is 
not always sufficient to ensure that persons belonging to national minorities have full equality 
 
                                                 
55 The States did not define a national minority, but stated that to belong to one was a matter of “individual choice” 
and that “no disadvantage may arise from the exercise of such choice.” (See the Copenhagen Document, 1990, 18). 
By emphasizing that each person had the right to decide whether or not to belong to a national minority, the States in 
effect agreed not to impose a definition. The OSCE stressed individuals rather than groups, on the basis that all 
groups consist of individuals acting in community, and therefore, OSCE documents usually referred to “persons 
belonging to national minorities” rather than to “national minorities.” Many democratic States rejected the idea of 
“group rights” because of the State’s focus on the individual, and because of the potential for groups to dominate 
individuals. However, some countries have recognized certain group rights, such as the right to education to a 
particular level in a group’s mother tongue.  
56 Copenhagen Document, 1990, 18. 
57 Copenhagen Document, 1990, 20.  
58 Copenhagen Document, 1990, 18, 20.  
59 Charter of Paris, 1990, 7. 
60 Charter of Paris, 1990, 11. The States also declared that they would implement their commitments in the cultural 
field as laid down in the Cracow Document (the Document of the Cracow Symposium on the Cultural Heritage of 
the CSCE Participating States). See the Moscow Document, 1991, 44. 








with other citizens in exercising their rights and freedoms, and that sometimes special measures 
are needed: 
 
The participating States will adopt, where necessary, special measures for the purpose of 
ensuring to persons belonging to national minorities full equality with the other citizens in 
the exercise and enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms.61 
 
Link to security. The States intended for this principle to ensure that minorities were able to 
fully exercise their rights, and thereby reduce tensions from minority issues. The States 
recognized the security aspects of respecting the rights of persons belonging to minorities, stating 
that respect for these rights was “part of universally recognized human rights [and] an essential 
factor for peace, justice, stability and democracy in the participating States.”62  
 
Principle 13: State responsibility to balance the interests of majorities and national 
minorities. In Principle 13 the States acknowledged their responsibility to protect the identity of 
national minorities and to create the conditions in which they could promote their identities, but 
without discriminating against others, including the majority. The States’ commitment to the 
general principle of balancing the interests of majorities and national minorities follows: 
 
The participating States will protect the ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious identity of 
national minorities on their territory and create conditions for the promotion of that identity. 
They will take the necessary measures to that effect after due consultations, including 
contacts with organizations or associations of such minorities, in accordance with the 
decisionmaking procedures of each State. Any such measures will be in conformity with the 
principles of equality and nondiscrimination with respect to the other citizens of the 
participating State concerned.63 
 
Principle 14: The fulfillment of responsibilities by national minorities. Minorities as well as 
States had responsibilities. Three specific minority responsibilities were to participate in public 
affairs; integrate into the wider society to a certain degree, particularly by learning the State 
language or languages; and to be responsible in general.  
Participation. The fact that the State had the responsibility to ensure that minorities can 
participate in public affairs implied that minorities had the corresponding responsibility to 
participate. This implication was further supported by the fact that the States recognized the 
importance of democracy and the rule of law, and the involvement of the wider society, in 
promoting respect and balancing competing interests: 
 
The participating States recognize that the questions relating to national minorities can only 
be satisfactorily resolved in a democratic political framework based on the rule of law, with 
a functioning independent judiciary…. They also recognize the important role of 
nongovernmental organizations, including political parties, trade unions, human rights 
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respect for their dignity, in particular their identity.  
62 Copenhagen Document, 1990, 18. 
63 Copenhagen Document, 1990, 19 (italics added). 








organizations and religious groups, in the promotion of tolerance, cultural diversity and the 
resolution of questions relating to national minorities.64  
 
A certain degree of integration. One minority responsibility was to integrate into the wider 
society to a certain degree, to include learning the State language or languages: the participating 
States “will endeavour to ensure that persons belonging to national minorities, notwithstanding 
the need to learn the official language or languages of the State concerned, have adequate 
opportunities for instruction of their mother tongue or in their mother tongue, as well as, 
wherever possible and necessary, for its use before public authorities, in conformity with 
applicable national legislation.”65 
Responsibility. An implied duty was for minorities to be responsible: the States declared that 
no OSCE commitment regarding the rights of national minorities could “be interpreted as 
implying any right to engage in any activity or perform any action in contravention of the 
purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, other obligations under 
international law or the provisions of the Final Act, including the principle of territorial integrity 
of States.”66  
 
Principle 15: State responsibility to promote a climate of respect. Principle 15 recognized the 
State’s responsibility to promote a climate of mutual respect, understanding, cooperation, and 
solidarity among all persons living on the State’s territory, without distinction regarding such 
factors as ethnicity, national origin, or religion, and to encourage the solution of problems 
through dialogue based on the principles of the rule of law. The States acknowledged this 
responsibility as below: 
  
Every participating State will promote a climate of mutual respect, understanding, cooperation 
and solidarity among all persons living on its territory, without distinction as to ethnic or 
national origin or religion, and will encourage the solution of problems through dialogue based 
on the principles of the rule of law [and will] take effective measures, in conformity with their 
constitutional systems, at the national, regional and local levels to promote understanding and 
tolerance, particularly in the fields of education, culture and information.67  
 
Principle 16: The responsibility of all individuals and groups to respect all others and their 
equal rights. The States’ commitment to promote a climate of respect implied a corresponding 
responsibility for all members of the State to respect all others and their equal rights. A further 
implication was that respect is necessary among individuals and groups, whether the groups are 
based on race, ethnicity, religion, age, or however else formed. The States declared as follows: 
 
We reject racial, ethnic and religious discrimination in any form. Freedom and tolerance 
must be taught and practiced.68 
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65 Copenhagen Document 1990, 19 (italics added).  
66 Copenhagen Document, 1990, 20.  
67 Copenhagen Document, 1990, 20, 21. A second example follows: “The participating States will…foster a climate 
of mutual tolerance and respect between believers of different communities as well as between believers and non-
believers.” Vienna Document, 1989, 8. Note that the 1975 Helsinki Final Act recognized the importance of 
respect—two of the ten principles of the Helsinki Decalogue included the necessity for respect.  
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Group III: Principles Guiding Implementation, Review, and Development Processes. 
Group III principles were intended to guide the interpretation and implementation of OSCE 
principles and commitments, and the process of reviewing their implementation and furthering 
their development. Analysis showed four principles in Group III.  
 One principle addressed the need for States to apply all OSCE principles equally and 
unreservedly, and to interpret each principle in light of all of the others; 
 One principle addressed the responsibility of all parties—governments, groups, 
organizations, and individuals—to make good faith and continuous efforts to 
implement all OSCE principles and commitments; 
 One principle addressed the requirement to identify and build on shared values; and  
 One principle addressed the need to use processes and mechanisms to develop standards 
and commitments, review their implementation, and respond to State requirements.    
 
Principle 17: The equal and unreserved application of all OSCE principles, each being 
interpreted taking into account the others. The States declared that all ten Helsinki Decalogue 
principles were of equal importance, that States would fully apply them all unreservedly, and that 
States would interpret each principle in light of all of the others. This commitment was adopted 
in the Helsinki Final Act, in which the States declared “their determination to respect and put 
into practice” the ten principles of the 
Helsinki Decalogue, all of which “are of 
primary significance and, accordingly, 
they will be equally and unreservedly 
applied, each of them being interpreted 
taking into account the others.”69 This 
commitment implied that the same 
standard would apply to commitments 
adopted in later OSCE documents. These 
commitments built on the original 
principles and commitments in the 
Helsinki Final Act, and developed into 
the OSCE acquis (the body of OSCE 
commitments), and thus all principles, 
standards, and commitments would be 
interpreted in light of the acquis. The 
States intended for all ten principles of 
the Helsinki Decalogue to help States  
achieve balanced progress towards political-military, economic, and humanitarian goals, and this 
intent continued for the subsequent commitments adopted.70  
 
Principle 18: Good faith and continuous efforts by all governments, organizations, groups, 
and individuals to fully implement OSCE commitments. In Principle 18 the States recognized 
that the full implementation of their OSCE commitments would take time and continuous effort, 
 
                                                 
69 Helsinki Final Act, 1975, 4, 8 (italics added).  
70 Vienna Document, 1989, 3.  
The 1975 Helsinki Decalogue:  
Declaration on Principles Guiding Relations 
Between Participating States 
 
I. Sovereign equality, respect for the rights inherent 
in sovereignty 
II. Refraining from threat or use of force 
III. Inviolability of frontiers 
IV. Territorial integrity of States 
V. Peaceful settlement of disputes 
VI. Non-intervention in internal affairs 
VII. Respect for human rights and fundamental 
freedoms, including the freedom of thought, 
conscience, religion or belief 
VIII. Equal rights and self-determination of peoples 
IX. Cooperation among States  
X. Fulfillment in good faith of obligations under 
international law 








and that progress towards shared objectives required the active involvement of all parties, to 
include persons, groups, organizations, institutions, and governments:71 
 
[The OSCE is] a process whose activities go far beyond formal relations among 
governments to involve citizens and societies of the participating States. Successful efforts 
to build a lasting peaceful and democratic order and to manage the process of change require 
more structured and substantive input from groups, individuals, States and organizations 
outside the [O]SCE process…. Encouragement of this sense of wider community remains 
one of our fundamental goals.72  
 
The States’ focus on the involvement of individuals was shown in the Helsinki Final Act 
when the States confirmed “the right of the individual to know and act upon his rights and 
duties” in the field of human rights.73 The States also sought synergy from the efforts of the 
different participants, to include international organizations: 
 
We are convinced that a lasting and peaceful order for our community of States will be built 
on mutually reinforcing institutions, each with its own area of action and responsibility. 
[Work] should be so structured as to avoid duplication of the work of international 
organizations and overcommitment of scarce resources.74  
 
The States identified the relationship between security and the involvement of all parties and 
their good faith efforts, referencing the “major role that nongovernmental organizations, 
religious and other groups and individuals [had] played in the achievement of the objectives of 
the [O]SCE.”75 When the OSCE began to institutionalize in 1990, the States said that 
organizations, groups, and individuals needed to be involved in the OSCE’s “activities and new 
structures…in order to fulfill their important tasks.”76 
The States recognized that they are not perfect and may not always live up to all of their 
OSCE commitments. For example, the States acknowledged that they needed “to improve the 
implementation of their [O]SCE commitments and their cooperation in [the areas of] respect for 
all human rights and fundamental freedoms, human contacts and other issues of a related 
humanitarian character.”77 However, the States did not think that failing to meet standards meant 
that the standards were invalid, but rather that the States had to continue to try, and perhaps try 
harder: the States recognized that “the implementation of the relevant provisions of the Final Act 
and of the Madrid Concluding Document requires continuous and intensified efforts.”78  
 
Principle 19: State responsibility to find and build on shared values. Principle 19 addressed 
the requirement to identify and build on shared values in international relations and relations 
within States. The States recognized the existence of shared values in a number of OSCE 
documents, such as in the statement, “We welcome the commitment of all participating States to 
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our shared values [and reaffirm the] common values of the Helsinki Final Act and the Charter of 
Paris.”79  
Relations between and within States. In the area of relations between States, a primary basis 
on which the States would conduct their international relations was adherence to the shared 
values of democracy, the rule of law, market economy, and respect for individual rights and 
freedoms. The commitment to individual rights and democracy was stated in the Charter of 
Paris: “Our relations will rest on our common adherence to democratic values and to human 
rights and fundamental freedoms.”80 The commitment to the rule of law was shown by Principle 
X of the Helsinki Decalogue: that the States would “fulfil in good faith their obligations under 
international law.”81 In the economic area, the States declared that “economic cooperation based 
on market economy constitutes an essential element of our relations and will be instrumental in 
the construction of a prosperous and united Europe.”82  
In the area of relations within States, the States agreed that shared values would guide the 
relationship between the State and the people who comprise the State. The States declared that 
their common aims were “respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the 
rights of persons belonging to national minorities, democracy, the rule of law, economic liberty, 
social justice and environmental responsibility.”83 
Development of shared values. The States recognized that shared values and norms develop 
over time, for the Helsinki process began with the search for agreement on common values, and 
the process continued for decades. The need for progress was also reflected in the fact that the 
States recognized that principles, standards, values, and norms sometimes need advancement, 
and declared that the States were “determined to support and advance those principles of justice 
which form the basis of the rule of law,” and that they would “consider new steps to further 
strengthen norms of behavior on politico-military aspects of security.”84  
The link to security. The States recognized that the advancement of shared values was 
essential to both national and international security. The States declared that the advancement of 
human rights, democracy, and the rule of law was essential to strengthening peace and security: 
“We are convinced that in order to strengthen peace and security among our States, the 
advancement of democracy, and respect for and effective exercise of human rights, are 
indispensable.” 85 The States considered that the ideas in the Final Act were powerful, and had 
played a significant role in bringing about the end of the Cold War: 
 
We recognize the essential contribution of our common European culture and our shared 
values in overcoming the division of the continent…. The courage of men and women, the 
strength of the will of the peoples and the power of the ideas of the Helsinki Final Act have 
opened a new era of democracy, peace and unity in Europe.86 
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Principle 20: The use of processes and mechanisms to develop standards and commitments, 
review their implementation, and respond to State requirements. Principle 20 addressed the 
need for processes and mechanisms to develop standards and commitments, review their 
implementation, and respond to new requirements.  
Processes and mechanisms to develop standards and commitments, and review their 
implementation. The fact that the States included “Follow-up to the Conference” in the Helsinki 
Final Act showed the importance the States attributed to processes. The States further 
demonstrated their commitment to process by executing what came to be known as the Helsinki 
process, a process in which the States met periodically to review the implementation of OSCE 
agreements, expand areas of cooperation, and set new standards and norms. The States recognized 
a relationship between processes and security, declaring that “the exchange of views constitutes in 
itself a valuable contribution towards the achievement of the aims set by the [O]SCE.”87 
Responsiveness to State requirements. The States recognized that processes and mechanisms 
needed to be flexible and responsive to State requirements, concerns, and situations. To 
illustrate, during its first fifteen years, 1975–1989, the OSCE itself was a process with no 
permanent organizational structures. However, in 1990 the States expanded this process and 
began to establish institutional structures through which they could work in practical and 
sustained ways to implement their commitments. Two examples of the States’ commitment 
follow: “Our common efforts to consolidate respect for human rights, democracy and the rule of 
law, to strengthen peace and to promote unity in Europe require a new quality of political 
dialogue and cooperation and thus development of the structures of the [O]SCE,” and the OSCE 
“has been instrumental in promoting changes; now it must adapt to the task of managing 
them.”88 A third example follows: “We reaffirm our commitment to settle disputes by peaceful 
means. We decide to develop mechanisms for the prevention and resolution of conflicts among 
the participating States.”89 
To illustrate, the States took a number of actions in response to the outbreak of ethnic conflict 
in Europe in the early 1990s. When they perceived an “urgent need for increased cooperation on, 
as well as better protection of, national minorities,” they convened a meeting of experts on 
national minorities, and later created the position of the High Commissioner on National 
Minorities (HCNM).90 
The link to security. The States recognized the connection between international security and 
agreed-upon processes and mechanisms. The example below refers to the effectiveness of the 
Helsinki process, in which principles of international and intrastate relations played a major role: 
 
The participating States welcome with great satisfaction the fundamental political changes that 
have occurred in Europe since the first Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of 
the CSCE in Paris in 1989. They note that the [O]SCE process has contributed significantly to 
bringing about these changes and that these developments in turn have greatly advanced the 
implementation of the provisions of the Final Act and of the other [O]SCE documents.91  
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The States intended for the implementation of these principles to increase their security. The 









                                                                                                                                                             
adoption of the Helsinki Final Act as one of the three most significant events to which the end of the Cold War can 
be traced. See NATO Handbook (Brussels: NATO Office of Information and Press, 1992), 57. 
Table 3–2. The OSCE Security Principles 1993–2001 
 
I. Principles Guiding Relations Between OSCE States. Achieving security requires: 
1. The development of agreed-upon principles guiding relations between OSCE States. 
2. Respect for the sovereign rights of participating States, in particular their juridical 
equality, external and internal political independence, and territorial integrity.  
3. Agreed-upon limits to State political independence in regard to OSCE commitments. 
4. Mutual State involvement with, accountability to, and assistance to each other regarding 
the implementation of OSCE commitments.  
5. A comprehensive approach to security (comprehensive security). 
6. A cooperative approach to security (cooperative security). 
7. An “in common” approach to security (common security). 
8. The prevention of security threats, and the use of peaceful means to reduce tensions and 
resolve disputes and conflicts. 
 
II. Principles Guiding the Protection and Promotion of Individual Rights within States.  
Achieving security requires: 
9. The development of agreed-upon principles guiding relations between the State and the 
people who comprise the State. 
10. State responsibility to establish and maintain the conditions in which all members of the 
State are able to fully exercise their individual rights and freedoms. 
11. Democracy, a rule of law based on human rights, and the market economy as the means 
to ensure that all individuals are able to fully exercise their rights and freedoms. 
12. State responsibility to ensure that national minorities are able to exercise their equal 
rights, to include taking special measures as needed. 
13. State responsibility to balance the interests of majorities and national minorities. 
14. The fulfillment of responsibilities by national minorities. 
15. State responsibility to promote a climate of respect. 
16. The responsibility of all individuals and groups to respect all others and their equal rights. 
 
III. Principles Guiding Implementation, Review, and Development Processes.  
Achieving security requires: 
17. The equal and unreserved application of all OSCE principles, each being interpreted 
taking into account the others. 
18. Good faith and continuous efforts by all governments, organizations, groups, and 
individuals to fully implement OSCE commitments. 
19. State responsibility to find and build on shared values. 
20. The use of processes and mechanisms to develop standards and commitments, review 
their implementation, and respond to State requirements. 
 








As a group, the twenty OSCE principles formed an OSCE security concept that can be 
summarized as below: 
 
Security depends on the development and implementation of principles guiding three 
areas: how States deal with each other and resolve problems; the protection and promotion 
of individual rights within States; and the processes and mechanisms to review and 
advance values, principles, and commitments.92 
 
The twenty OSCE principles, and the OSCE security concept, can be summarized into ten 
principles in three groups as below.  
 
 
Table 3–3. The OSCE Security Concept Principles 1993–2001 Summary 
 
 
I. Principles Guiding Relations  
Between OSCE States 
 
1. Respect for the sovereign rights of States, 
with agreed-upon limits on sovereign rights. 
2. Mutual State involvement, accountability, and 
assistance regarding OSCE commitments. 
3. A comprehensive, cooperative, and common 
security approach. 
4. The prevention of security threats, and the use 
of peaceful means to reduce tensions and 
resolve disputes and conflicts. 
 
 
II. Principles Guiding the Protection and 
Promotion of Individual Rights within States 
 
 
5. State responsibility to ensure respect for 
individual rights through democracy, the 
rule of law, and the market economy. 
6. Rights and responsibilities pertaining to 
national minorities. 
7. Respect for the equal rights of all, and a 
climate of respect. 
 
 
III. Principles Guiding Implementation, Review, 
and Development Processes 
 
8. Good faith, full, equal, and continuous efforts to 
implement OSCE principles and commitments. 
9. The development and advancement of shared values. 
10. Processes and mechanisms. 
 
 
The study uses the twenty OSCE principles for case analysis, and in Chapters 4, 5, and 6, the 




                                                 








Chapter 4. Case Study 1: OSCE Principles and Ukraine 
 
 
Background of Ukraine and the Crimean Peninsula 
 
Background of Ukraine. In 1992 Ukraine was the second largest country in Europe in terms 
of area (604,000 square kilometers), and the fifth largest in terms of population (52 million).  
Ukraine had significant natural resources, and during 
the Soviet era had produced about half of the total 
Soviet output of coal and iron ore, and over a quarter 
of the agricultural output. Ukraine was also highly 
involved with the Soviet military, industrial, and space 
complex, and maintained the third largest number of 
nuclear weapons in the world.1 
After having been part of Russia for two centuries, 
Ukraine declared its independence in December 1991 
after very high support (over 90 percent) in a  
referendum on independence.2 With independence, the Ukrainian government faced a number of 
challenges, which included integrating with Central Europe and the West; maintaining 
satisfactory relations with Russia; addressing issues pertaining to nuclear weapons; managing the 
transition from a command economy to a market economy; finding an acceptable balance 
between the central government and Crimean authorities regarding Crimean autonomy; 
strengthening the Ukrainian national identity; and addressing environmental problems, 
particularly industrial pollution and the continuing effects of the 1986 Chernobyl nuclear power 
plant accident. 
The first HCNM, Max van der Stoel, was involved in three primary issues in Ukraine: the 
relationship between the Ukrainian government and the Crimean administration; the integration 
of returning Crimean Tatars and other minorities that Stalin had deported to Central Asia during 
World War II; and language and culture, particularly concerning ethnic Russians. These three 
issues were distinct in most respects, but complicated the overall situation; for example, tensions 
between ethnic Russians and Tatars in the Crimean peninsula increased the volatility in the area. 
This study addresses the case of Crimean autonomy within Ukraine. 
Background of Crimea. The Crimean peninsula had belonged to Russia from 1783 to 1954, 
at which time the Soviet Union transferred it to the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic.3 Crimea 
was important for its historical associations, climate, and strategic location on the Black Sea, and 
contained the city of Sevastopol, where the main headquarters of the Black Sea Fleet was 
located.4 Sevastopol was also a city with a special status—called by tradition a “city of Russian 
glory”—and during the Soviet era had been administered directly from Moscow. 
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On the eve of independence, the population of Crimea consisted of about 67 percent ethnic 
Russians; 26 percent ethnic Ukrainians, many of whom spoke Russian; and 7 percent other 
minorities. In the 1991 referendum, 54 percent of the voters in Crimea favored Ukrainian 
independence.5 
After independence, the Ukrainian government granted a degree of autonomy to Crimea, and 
in March 1992, negotiations between Ukrainian and Crimean representatives resulted in a draft 
Ukrainian law in which Crimea would be a constituent part of Ukraine, but autonomous and with 
its own constitution. The Ukrainian parliament (the Verkhovna Rada) adopted the law in April, 
but did not promulgate it because in May 1992 the Crimean parliament took a number of 
separatist actions. The parliament declared Crimea to be a sovereign State, introduced a new 
constitution, claimed the right to separate citizenship, called for a treaty between the “States” of 
Crimea and Ukraine, and announced a projected referendum on independence. 
The Ukrainian government annulled the independence decree, but as a compromise passed a 
second law in June that gave Crimea greater autonomy and a special economic status. The 
Crimean leaders agreed to cancel the referendum, which ended the immediate crisis; however, 
because this second law was also not promulgated, the relationship between the central 
government and Crimea remained unclear. 
In 1992 the Ukrainian economy declined significantly—GDP and exports fell by about 20 
percent while inflation increased over 1000 percent.6 In 1993 fuel shortages contributed to 
further economic decline as Russia—on which Ukraine was dependent for most of its oil and 
natural gas—raised prices and cut deliveries, causing rolling brownouts in the major cities and 
further reductions in industrial production. As conditions continued to deteriorate, a number of 
ethnic Russians in the highly industrialized eastern sections—where economic dislocation had 
hit the hardest—began to consider seeking closer ties with Russia. Separatist sentiment also grew 
in Crimea.  
Actions of Russian nationalists in Russia and Crimea further increased tensions between 
Ukraine and Russia, and within Ukraine. In May 1992 the Russian parliament passed a resolution 
declaring that the 1954 transfer of Crimea to Ukraine had been illegal and that talks between 
Russia and Ukraine were necessary to settle the “question” of Crimea, and later declared 
Sevastopol to be a Russian city. Tensions increased regarding the Black Sea Fleet as Russian and 
Ukrainian naval servicemen attempted to “nationalize” their respective vessels, and in July 1993 
demonstrators in Sevastopol demanded that the fleet, and the city, be returned to Russian control. 
Ukraine appealed to the UN, after which the security council issued a statement (S/26118) 
supporting Ukraine’s territorial integrity. 
Russian foreign policy became more nationalistic after a significant number of 
ultranationalists were elected in December 1993, and by early 1994 many OSCE States, 
including the United States, feared that tensions in Ukraine could escalate into a situation that 
might result in Russian military intervention. A U.S. National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), 
leaked in January 1994, warned that without international assistance, Ukraine’s worsening 
economic problems could result in ethnic Russians in the eastern region pressing for secession 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
Russia and Ukraine—issues included the division of assets and costs, servicing arrangements, and liability for 
pollution. See Simonsen, Conflicts in the OSCE Area, 102. 
5 Drohobycky, Crimea: Dynamics, Challenges, and Prospects, xxvii. 
6 Keesing’s, “Economic Reform Package,” Nov. 1992. 








and unification with Russia, actions that the Ukrainian majority would seek to prevent by force if 
necessary.7 The NIE warned that any attempt at secession might lead the government to retain 
some nuclear weapons—which Ukraine had agreed to give up—to deter Russian involvement.  
Also in January 1994, Crimea held elections for its first president, who after taking office 
began working on economic agreements with Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk. Shortly 
thereafter the HCNM became involved. 
 
The HCNM’s Intervention and Recommendations 
 
1994. The HCNM began his intervention in Ukraine with his first visit in February; however, 
he did not issue any formal recommendations at that time. A week later, the Ukrainian 
parliament passed a decree that recognized extensive Crimean rights in areas that included 
economics, culture, and natural resources, but also outlined the limits of Crimea’s autonomy. In 
particular, the decree reaffirmed that the Crimean Republic, as an autonomous constituent part of 
Ukraine, had no State sovereignty, and as such could not have independent foreign, military, and 
financial policies; separate citizenship; or a constitution that contradicted that of Ukraine. The 
decree gave Crimea one month to bring its constitution and legislation in line with Ukrainian 
law.  
The Crimean administration did not comply, and a “battle” of laws and decrees ensued, with 
the Crimean authorities issuing laws and decrees, and the Ukrainian authorities annulling or 
countermanding them. When the Crimean president, Yuri Meshkov, issued a decree requiring 
Crimean residents to perform military service only on the peninsula, the Ukrainian government 
declared the act to be illegal. When Meshkov issued decrees dismissing the heads of the ministry 
of the interior and the security service, the Ukrainian president annulled the decrees, whereupon 
the Crimean authorities established parallel offices. In an act that the Ukrainian government 
interpreted as emphasizing Crimea’s ties to Russia, the peninsula adopted Moscow time, one 
hour ahead of Ukraine’s capital, Kiev. 
Tensions increased, and the HCNM made a second visit in early May, after which he issued 
his first formal recommendation on May 15, 1994. In this recommendation, he outlined that the 
status of Crimea would need to be resolved in accordance with the OSCE principle of territorial 
integrity, writing as follows: 
 
In the Trilateral Agreement between Ukraine, the Russian Federation, and the United States 
concluded in February of this year, the parties reaffirm their commitment, in accordance 
with the [O]SCE Final Act, to respect the independence and the sovereignty and the existing 
borders of the [O]SCE member States, and recognize that border changes can be made only 
by peaceful and consensual means. In my view this text is highly relevant in considering the 
problem of Crimea, even more so because as far as I am aware no [O]SCE State has 
expressed opinions deviating from it.8 
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The disagreements between the Ukrainian government and the Crimean administration were 
significant, and included issues regarding the ownership of real estate and natural resources; 
taxation; citizenship; foreign relations; symbols; language of administration; and military, 
judicial, and security functions. Nevertheless, the HCNM wrote that though these “considerable 
differences” would not be easy to resolve, he believed they were, in fact, solvable. In this regard, 
he pointed out the willingness to compromise that the president of Ukraine had expressed: 
 
It is…of great importance that President Kravchuk has repeatedly expressed the view that 
the autonomous Republic of Crimea ought to have considerable latitude in the economic 
field. For instance, in the spring of 1992, he expressed his willingness to leave to Crimea the 
control of all “territorial property” on the peninsula. He also stated that Crimea ought to 
have “all the necessary political and legal opportunities to realize its special potential.”9 
 
The HCNM’s overall recommendation was for Ukraine and Crimea to find an arrangement 
that would maintain the territorial integrity of Ukraine while providing significant Crimean 
autonomy, especially in the economic field, and he recommended that the two parties reach a 
settlement containing a complete program of steps to resolve the issues. To assist in this process, 
he recommended that the Ukrainian government accept OSCE assistance in the form of a team of 
constitutional and economic experts to look into the situation and provide suggestions for 
solutions.  
The Ukrainian government immediately accepted the recommendation regarding the experts; 
however, a few days later the Crimean parliament increased tensions by its actions, most notably 
adopting a law that restored the 1992 constitution that the Ukrainian government had abolished. 
The government viewed this action as a violation of Ukrainian legislation and as a step towards 
secession, and suspended the law until Crimea’s constitution was brought in line with Ukraine’s 
laws. The Crimean parliament responded by suspending the Ukrainian government’s suspension. 
The Ukrainian government moved additional soldiers to Sevastopol, and the Crimean authorities 
increased the guards on some buildings in Simferopol, the Crimean capitol. Within a few days 
both parliaments agreed to conduct talks, but reached no agreement. 
The OSCE States became increasingly concerned about the situation, and in June 1994, the 
OSCE Committee of Senior Officials expressed its deep concern and reaffirmed its commitment 
to Ukrainian sovereignty and territorial integrity, called on the Crimean authorities to refrain 
from any action that could cause the situation to worsen and endanger the prospects for a fruitful 
dialogue, and asked all OSCE States to act in ways that would strengthen the OSCE principles 
regarding territorial integrity and the inviolability of borders. The committee also noted that 
Ukraine was “determined to continue dealing with the issue by peaceful means, without resorting 
to the use of force and in conformity with [O]SCE principles.”10 
In July tensions eased somewhat when the supposedly pro-Russian Leonid Kuchma, who had 
been supported by an overwhelming majority of Crimea’s voters, assumed the Ukrainian 
presidency. In addition, popular support for the separatist Crimean administration decreased as 
criminal activity increased—activity that included violent clashes between criminal clans with 
alleged ties to the Crimean authorities. 
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However, in August tensions rose again when the battle of laws and decrees resumed. The 
Sevastopol city council declared Sevastopol to be a Russian city subject only to Russian 
legislation, a resolution that the Ukrainian authorities denounced as illegal. The Ukrainian 
parliament adopted amendments to the constitution to annul Crimean laws if they were not 
brought in line with national legislation, and assumed the right to dissolve the Crimean 
legislature.  
Concern for rising tensions resulted in an OSCE decision to establish an OSCE Mission to 
Ukraine, with headquarters in Kiev and a branch in Simferopol. The Mission’s initial 
responsibilities included supporting the work of the HCNM and the experts, and to carry out its 
tasks in accordance with OSCE principles, such as the support of the sovereignty and territorial 
integrity of Ukraine. 
1995. In December 1994 the first Chechen War broke out, and a few months later—while the 
Russian government was occupied with the war—the Ukrainian government took a number of 
actions regarding Crimea. In March 1995 the government again rejected Crimea’s 1992 
constitution, abolished the post of the president of Crimea, and issued a decree temporarily 
subordinating the Crimean administration directly to the central government. Kuchma also stated 
that Crimea’s parliament could be dissolved if it continued to violate Ukraine’s constitution. 
The Russian government initially stated that issues concerning Crimea were internal 
Ukrainian affairs, a response that the Crimean parliament chair called feeble.11 The parliament 
appealed to Russia not to conclude a pending friendship treaty with Ukraine without taking 
Crimea’s interests into consideration, and the Russian parliament issued a statement warning 
Ukraine of the negative consequences of its actions on Russian-Ukrainian relations. A Russian 
member of parliament protested Ukraine’s policies towards Crimea by tearing up a Ukrainian 
flag, an action reciprocated in the Ukrainian parliament. Russian President Boris Yeltsin stated 
that the friendship treaty could not be signed until Russia was certain that Crimean rights were 
being respected, and several days later, Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev said that the use of 
military force to protect Russians in the near abroad might be necessary in some cases.12 
The HCNM appealed to both sides to exercise restraint, but the Crimean parliament passed 
several resolutions aimed at regaining powers: most confrontational was a decision to hold a 
referendum in June on several issues including the 1992 constitution; the most recent Ukrainian 
law on Crimea; and a proposal for the economic and political unity of Russia, Ukraine, and 
Belarus. Ukraine called the referendum unconstitutional and threatened further actions, and the 
Crimean parliament withdrew the question regarding the Ukrainian law, but not the referendum.  
The HCNM took steps to avert a crisis. In May he mediated a roundtable discussion for 
Ukrainian and Crimean representatives, held in a neutral setting (Locarno, Switzerland) that 
provided for confidential, open, and face-to-face communication. The roundtable resulted in 
agreement in a number of important areas, most particularly that the unpromulgated 1992 
Ukrainian law on Crimean autonomy could be the basis for Crimea’s status. In addition, Crimea 
agreed to stop its plans for a referendum, and the Ukrainian government agreed not to dissolve 
the parliament. 
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The HCNM issued an unpublished formal recommendation at the end of the roundtable 
regarding these agreements. In that formal recommendation he recommended that both sides 
avoid any action that could lead to an escalation of tensions, and that the Ukrainian and Crimean 
parliaments create an organ of conciliation to suggest solutions to differences that might arise 
during dialogue about relevant legislation. Tensions decreased, for the Ukrainian government 
was prepared to accept wide autonomy for Crimea (a position encouraged by other OSCE States 
and the EU) and in June 1995, progress increased when more moderate politicians were elected 
in Crimea, creating a situation more conducive to compromise. 
The HCNM held a second roundtable in September 1995 that focused primarily on the 
problems of the formerly deported peoples, in particular the Tatars. After this roundtable, the 
HCNM held a series of meetings in Ukraine and Crimea, then issued his third formal 
recommendation on October 12, 1995. He recommended that the division of responsibilities 
between the Ukrainian government and the Crimean administration balance the interests of the 
two parties, and that the Ukrainian government, as the central government, be responsible for 
defense, security, and foreign policy, but to consult Crimea before concluding treaties with 
special relevance for Crimea, and to include Crimean representatives in a number of official 
delegations to other States. He also recommended that Crimea have the right to open trade 
offices abroad and conclude international agreements regarding commercial and cultural 
questions; however, he recognized the authority of the central government by adding the phrase, 
“taking into account the Ukrainian legal order.”  
In the financial area, he recommended that the Ukrainian government make arrangements to 
ensure that an equitable portion of the revenues from Crimean natural resources and Ukrainian 
property in Crimea, be used for Crimea’s benefit, and that Crimea delete references to Crimean 
citizenship in its constitution. Regarding the problem of the status of Sevastopol, he 
recommended that the parties set up a tripartite commission of representatives of Ukraine, 
Crimea, and Sevastopol to develop proposals for increasing cooperation between Sevastopol and 
Crimea in various fields.  
In November Crimea adopted a new constitution that incorporated many of the HCNM 
recommendations and significantly narrowed the disputed points. However, the constitution still 
conflicted with that of Ukraine’s, and tensions increased. 
1996–1997. Tensions continued to increase in February and March 1996, particularly as the 
Ukrainian parliament worked on a new constitution that would reduce many Crimean powers. In 
response the Crimean parliament convened a special session, issued a sharp statement, and a few 
days later adopted a resolution “proposing” that the Ukrainian parliament approve Crimea’s 
constitution by the end of March, warning that if Ukraine ignored “the expression of the 
Crimeans’ will,” the Crimean parliament would have the right to have the constitution approved 
by a referendum.13 These actions, which took place shortly before a scheduled visit by Yeltsin to 
sign a friendship treaty between Russia and Ukraine, led to a new escalation in tensions, and the 
visit—which had been postponed several times before—was postponed again. 
In March the HCNM organized a third roundtable to concentrate on the disputed provisions in 
the Crimean constitution, and included independent experts as observers to assist in legal and 
economic questions. The roundtable resulted in significant progress: the two sides agreed on a 
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basic framework for Crimea’s status within Ukraine, and agreement was achieved on all but 
twenty provisions of the Crimean constitution. 
To consolidate the gains made, the HCNM prepared a formal recommendation in which he 
recommended that the Ukrainian government immediately approve the Crimean constitution 
except for the articles still in dispute. He also recommended changes to the Crimean constitution 
such as replacing “Republic of Crimea” with “the Autonomous Republic of Crimea,” and 
“citizens of Crimea” with “citizens of Ukraine residing in Crimea.” He recommended that the 
parties make a special effort to speed up the resolution of the remaining differences, 
recommending that the Crimean parliament consider the disputed articles within a month, and 
that the Ukrainian parliament consider the new Crimean proposals as soon as possible thereafter.  
On April 3 the HCNM again visited Ukraine, and after consulting the experts who had 
attended the roundtable, prepared a detailed formal recommendation on April 5. In this 
recommendation, he urged both sides to maintain the momentum in narrowing the gap between 
their positions, make determined efforts to resolve the remaining differences “soon,” and do 
nothing that could lead to a worsening of the atmosphere in which future negotiations would be 
conducted. Similarly, he recommended that Crimea refrain from organizing a referendum, or 
“poll,” on the Crimean constitution, and that the Ukrainian government not deviate from the aim 
of providing Crimea with substantial autonomy in the fields that did not belong to the exclusive 
responsibility of Ukraine. He also made a number of legal suggestions. 
 The Ukrainian government implemented the HCNM’s recommendation by adopting a new 
“Law on the Autonomous Republic of Crimea” in which it approved all but 20 articles, or parts 
of articles, out of a total of 136.14 A number of the unapproved articles dealt with “Crimean 
citizenship,” the status of Sevastopol, and signs of sovereignty such as official symbols.  
During April and May both parliaments focused on internal controversies regarding the draft 
Ukrainian constitution—which was considered the most important document regarding the future 
of Crimea—and made little effort to resolve the remaining issues. In June the Ukrainian 
parliament adopted a new constitution that included the status of Crimea; however, continuing 
controversies in the Crimean parliament hampered progress during the rest of 1996 and early 
1997. During March and April 1997 there were protests in Crimea calling for the return of the 
Crimean peninsula to Russia, and actions in Russia further exacerbated tensions. In April the 
upper house of the Russian parliament voted to make Sevastopol a special international city, and 
a Russian Federation Council commission decided that Russia should declare Sevastopol an 
international city under international law, and that the 1954 Supreme Soviet resolution that gave 
Crimea to Ukraine had been unconstitutional and had exceeded Soviet President Nikita 
Khrushchev’s authority.15 
However, the situation changed significantly on May 31 when Presidents Yeltsin and Kuchma 
signed the long-awaited friendship treaty, which unequivocally supported the territorial integrity 
of both countries. The presidents also made final agreements on the Black Sea Fleet. These 
actions decreased Crimean separatist hopes for Russia’s help. 
In June the Crimean parliament adopted amendments to Crimea’s constitution, but the 
amendments neither brought the Crimean constitution in line with Ukraine’s, nor fully 
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implemented the HCNM’s recommendations. The Ukrainian parliament reacted negatively, a 
reaction exacerbated by the Crimean parliament’s subsequent actions, which included passing 
resolutions declaring the Russian language to be Crimea’s only official language, and demanding 
that Russian be a state language in all of Ukraine.  
1998–2001. Controversies continued within and between the two parliaments. For example, in 
January the Ukrainian president issued a decree to replace the elected mayor of Yalta with a 
presidential appointee, an action that incensed the Crimean parliament and provoked responses 
that included appealing to the Ukrainian parliament and the Council of Europe. The Crimean 
parliament also voted to put three highly controversial items on its agenda: holding a referendum 
on restoring the 1992 constitution, declaring Crimea to be a Russian autonomy, and adopting 
Russian as the area’s official language. 
However, the situation significantly improved in March 1998 when a large number of more 
“pragmatic” individuals were elected to the Crimean parliament. This group preferred to develop 
a new constitution rather than amend the previous draft, and therefore concentrated on 
developing a draft acceptable to the Ukrainian parliament, and passed the new draft in October 
1998. There were still discrepancies with the Ukrainian constitution and laws, but the Ukrainian 
parliament took actions that brought the entire issue to a swift conclusion. The Ukrainian 
parliament inserted a provision into the Crimean document that any current and future acts of the 
Crimean parliament and executive branch would be invalid if they contradicted Ukrainian 
legislation, and on December 23, 1998, approved the Crimean constitution. For the rest of the 
HCNM’s tenure, though some tensions continued, they remained at a reduced level.  
 
 
OSCE Principles, Implementation, and Effect on Security 
 
From 1994 to 1996 the HCNM made five formal recommendations in which he made specific 
recommendations to the Ukrainian government, the Crimean administration, and both of them 
(see Appendix E). All of the recommendations either referred to, or were related to, OSCE 
principles. 
The HCNM’s Overall Recommendation. The HCNM’s overall recommendation to the 
Ukrainian government and Crimean administration was to find an arrangement that would 
maintain Ukraine’s territorial integrity yet give Crimea significant autonomy, and this 
recommendation referred to several OSCE principles. The part of the recommendation that 
addressed territorial integrity was related to Principle 2, which addressed the rights of 
sovereignty, including the territorial integrity of States. The part of the recommendation that 
addressed Crimean autonomy involved Principles 10–15, which addressed the responsibilities of 
the government to create and maintain the conditions in which all members of the State, 
including minorities, were able to exercise their basic rights. The recommendation that the 
parties develop a complete program of steps to resolve the issues concerning autonomy for 
Crimea pertained to Principle 20, which addressed the development and use of processes.  
The Ukrainian government and the Crimean administration implemented the HCNM’s overall 
recommendation; however, the implementation took nearly five years, and did not occur until 
nearly two years after the HCNM made his last recommendation in April 1996. (After this 
recommendation, the HCNM continued to visit Ukraine but did not prepare any additional 
formal recommendations.)  








The HCNM’s Specific Recommendations. The OSCE principles contained in the HCNM’s 
specific recommendations, and their implementation, can be addressed in groups. One group of 
specific recommendations addressed the division of responsibilities between the central 
government and the Crimean administration. These recommendations were most closely related 
to Principle 13, that governments balance the interests of majorities and national minorities. In 
this case, the Ukrainian government and the Crimean administration were trying to find a 
division of responsibilities that would balance the interests of the Ukrainian majority in Ukraine 
as a whole, with the interests of the ethnic Russian majority in Crimea. These recommendations 
were implemented in general, though with a significant delay. 
A second group of specific recommendations encouraged the parties to maintain the 
momentum they had developed through negotiations, and to move the negotiation and settlement 
process forward. These recommendations referred to Principle 18, that individuals, groups, 
NGOs, and governments at all levels make good faith and continuous efforts to fully implement 
their OSCE commitments. Some of these recommendations also involved Principle 19, that the 
participating States find and build on areas of agreement regarding shared values (in this 
instance, an OSCE principle that referred primarily to international relations was applied to 
relations within the State). Both parties implemented these recommendations, but often with a 
long delay.  
A third group of recommendations were intended to prevent progress that had been made 
from unraveling, such as for both parties to refrain from actions that would lead to escalating 
tensions. These recommendations referred to Principle 6, that the States use a cooperative 
approach to security, and Principle 8, which addresses the need to prevent security threats from 
arising. The Ukrainian government and the Crimean administration eventually implemented 
these recommendations, but in many cases during the 1994–1998 period, one side or the other, or 
both, disregarded the recommendations. 
A fourth group pertained to creating formal mechanisms and institutional processes for 
dialogue and to resolve differences, problems, or disputes, including those that might arise in the 
future. These recommendations (none of which were implemented) related to Principle 20, which 
addressed processes. 
The HCNM made one specific recommendation to the Ukrainian government regarding the 
acceptance of OSCE assistance, particularly in the form of a team of constitutional and economic 
experts. This recommendation pertained to Principle 4, that the participating States accept their 
mutual involvement with, accountability to, and assistance to each other in matters pertaining to 
the implementation of their OSCE commitments. This recommendation also contained an 
implied recommendation that the OSCE States provide this assistance. This recommendation was 
implemented, as was the implied recommendation to the OSCE States.  
Observed Effects on Security. There were observed effects on security when parties 
implemented the OSCE principles in the HCNM’s recommendations. These effects could be 
seen regarding a number of specific recommendations, but primarily regarding the HCNM’s 
overall recommendation. 
The HCNM’s specific recommendations. There was an observable effect on security for most 
of the specific recommendations when implemented. These effects were observed primarily in 
the increase or reduction of tensions as the two parties made—or did not make—progress in their 








negotiations. Of particular note was that at the end of each of the three roundtables, political 
leaders of both Ukraine and Crimea made statements that indicated reduced tensions.  
No effect on security was observed for the several recommendations that the HCNM made 
regarding creating formal mechanisms as the means of resolving problems or disputes. However, 
since each roundtable resulted in progress in resolving issues, it may be that formal mechanisms 
could have helped resolve these issues earlier, and thereby eased national and international 
tensions. 
The HCNM’s overall recommendation. The principal observed effects on security resulted 
from the implementation of the HCNM’s overall recommendation. When this recommendation 
was implemented in December 1998, there was evidence of a decrease in tensions within 
Ukraine, between Ukraine and Russia, and in the OSCE area. 
Tensions within Ukraine. Within Ukraine, the “battle” of laws and decrees ceased; mutual 
threats between the Ukrainian government and the Crimean administration ended; and there were 
no further reports of the buildup of forces. No outbreaks of violence, or threats of violence, 
pertaining to separatism in Crimea were reported in either Keesing’s Record of World Events or 
the Lexis-Nexis database during the years from 1999 to 2006. However, some Crimeans, and 
Russian political leaders and citizens, did not become reconciled to Crimea being part of 
Ukraine.16 
Tensions between Ukraine and Russia. The settlement of the issue of Crimean autonomy 
within Ukraine reduced tensions between Ukraine and Russia: there were no reports in Keesing’s 
Record of World Events or the Lexis-Nexis database from 1999 to 2006 of threats of force by 
Russia, or of the Russian parliament making efforts to regain Crimea. However, other factors 
contributed to the reduction of tensions such as agreements regarding the Black Sea Fleet, and 
the 1997 treaty between Ukraine and Russia that unequivocally recognized Crimea as part of 
Ukraine.  
Regional tensions. The primary evidence of reduced tensions in the region was that the OSCE 
closed its Mission to Ukraine on the basis of the successful implementation of its mandate, and 
because the Ukrainian government and the Crimean administration had normalized their 
relations.17 There was no further direct HCNM involvement, and no situations regarding Crimea 
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Chapter 5. Case Study 2: OSCE Principles and Estonia 
 
 
Background of Estonia 
 
In 1992 Estonia was a small country of about 45,000 square 
kilometers and 1.6 million people, located on the Baltic Sea 
across from Finland, and next to Russia and Latvia. World War I 
and the Russian Revolution created the conditions in which the 
Estonians, among other peoples, could achieve independence 
from Russia. In 1917 the Russian government was in increasing 
disarray––the Tsar’s abdication in March was followed by a 
Provisional Government until the Bolsheviks seized power in 
November––and Estonia proclaimed its independence in 
February 1918. The Bolshevik government attempted to 
reconquer Estonia but was unsuccessful, and in 1918 signed the 
Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, acknowledging the independence of  
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Ukraine, and Finland. At the end of World War I, the 
Bolshevik government repudiated the treaty and invaded Estonia again, but was repulsed after 
heavy fighting, and in 1920 signed the Treaty of Tartu, relinquishing all claims to the territory of 
Estonia in perpetuity.  
With independence, Estonia adopted a liberal democratic constitution with a parliamentary 
form of government, and the independence period of 1918–1940 was one of advancement in 
many areas. Compulsory education was introduced, a public library system established, and 
Estonian students had access to higher education for the first time. Through economic reform 
Estonia shifted from being a food importer to an exporter. New archives and museums 
stimulated research into Estonian culture, and cultural autonomy was also given to minorities—
unusually progressive legislation in Europe in 1925. 
Estonian independence ended in June 1940 when the Soviet Union invaded and then occupied 
Estonia until July 1941. This period was marked by summary arrests and executions; the 
collectivizing of farms; the expropriation of property to include all church property and all 
private holdings over 30 hectares (74 acres); and the Sovietization of political, educational, and 
cultural life (to include the destruction of Estonian memorials, cultural symbols, and library 
books, and closing activities such as cooking clubs).1 
Resistance, which included guerilla warfare, resulted in reprisals, purges, and deportations. 
On June 14, 1941, planned mass deportations began simultaneously in all three Baltic States as 
ordered by the “Instructions Regarding the Manner of Conducting the Deportation of the Anti-
Soviet Elements from Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia.”2 Over 10,000 Estonians––about 1 percent 
of the population––were deported to Siberia and other places in the Russian hinterland. The list 
included many political and religious leaders, but most were women, children, and the elderly. 
In July 1941 German forces drove out the Soviet army, and Germany occupied Estonia until 
September 1944 when the Soviet army retook Estonia. The German occupation was as harsh as 
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that of the Soviets, and by the time the war ended, Estonia had lost more than one-fifth of its 
population and nearly half of its infrastructure. 
With the end of World War II, the Sovietization of Estonia resumed; however, resistance 
continued, particularly through guerilla warfare by the “forest brethren,” actions to which the 
Soviets responded with a number of measures including a massive purge. On March 25 and 26, 
1949, about 21,000 Estonians––more than 2.5 percent of the population––were arrested and 
deported, and in the following month more than half of the farms in Estonia were collectivized.3 
The guerilla movement continued, nevertheless, until its final suppression in the 1950s.4 
The Soviet Union integrated Estonia into its centrally-planned economy, and brought in large 
numbers of Russians and Russian-speakers to work in new industrial factories, along with large 
numbers of Soviet military forces and secret police. The Soviet Union’s immigration and other 
policies (such as arrests, executions, and deportations), combined with losses from World War II, 
significantly altered Estonia’s demographics. The share of ethnic Estonians in the population 
declined from 88 percent in 1934 to 62 percent in 1989, and the share of Russian-speakers 
increased from 8 to 35 percent.5 In the northeast areas bordering Russia the population became 
90 percent Russian, and the two largest towns in the northeast, Narva and Sillamäe, became 
almost entirely Russian, as did nearly half of the capital, Tallinn. Estonia also became one of the 
most highly militarized areas in the Soviet Union, with the military controlling more than 500 
installations, nearly 2 percent of Estonian territory, and over 130,000 troops.6 
Russification was implemented, with the Russian language taught in schools and imposed for 
official use throughout the country. By 1989 almost all Estonians had learned Russian but few 
Russians could speak Estonian. 
The breakup of the Soviet Union provided the opportunity for Estonia to reassert its 
independence, which was accomplished in 1991 after a period of primarily nonviolent struggle, 
though support for an independent Estonia among the Russian-speakers varied. In July 1989 
thousands of Russian-speakers demonstrated against Estonian independence, and in August went 
on a countrywide strike. In a 1990 survey, about 11 percent of the Russian-speakers supported 
Estonian independence, whereas 77 percent believed that Estonia’s future lay within the Soviet 
Union.7 In the 1991 independence referendum, 25–30 percent of the non-Estonians (primarily 
Russian-speakers) voted in favor of independence, but 35–40 percent voted against.8 
The new Estonian government faced a number of serious challenges, including preserving 
independence, managing the transition from a command economy to a market economy, and 
restoring the Estonian national identity. The government saw integration with the West, 
particularly through membership in the EU and NATO, as the best way to achieve security, and 
vigorously pursued joining these and other international institutions.  
Asserting that the Republic of Estonia had continued to legally exist under international law 
throughout the Soviet period, in February 1992 the Estonian parliament (the Riigikogu) 
reinstituted Estonia’s prewar citizenship law, which gave automatic citizenship only to those 
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who had held it before the Soviet occupation, and their direct descendants.9 The law’s 
provisions, which were similar to those of many OSCE countries, did not discriminate on the 
basis of ethnicity, and as a result, 80,000 non-Estonians became citizens automatically under the 
law. However, more than 500,000 Russians and Russian-speakers who had come during the 
Soviet era (and their children, many of whom had been born in Estonia), were left with an 
uncertain citizenship status.  
In response, Russians and Russian-speakers at a large meeting in Tallinn protested against 
Estonian independence and called for the establishment of a “Baltic Russia.” In April, energy 
workers in Narva went on strike, demanding automatic Estonian citizenship for all Russians in 
Estonia. The Russian government also reacted, and the Russian parliament passed a resolution 
warning of economic sanctions, suspending the cooperation treaty with Estonia, and threatening 
to raise the issue at the UN. In October Russian President Boris Yeltsin suspended Russian troop 
withdrawals from the Baltic States. 
The Estonian parliament began working on a second law that would clarify the status of 
noncitizens, and provide policy and procedures for naturalization. However, progress was slow 
and the legislation was not finished when the OSCE appointed the first HCNM, Max van der 
Stoel, in December 1992. At the time that the HCNM began his work, tensions were increasing 
among the Estonian government, the Russian-speaking minority, and the Russian government, 
raising fears among the OSCE States that these tensions might escalate to armed conflict. The 
sources of these tensions included a border dispute, the withdrawal of Russian troops, payment 
of Russian military pensions, jurisdiction over the Estonian Orthodox Church, environmental 
damage incurred during the Soviet period, and issues regarding ethnic Russians and other 
Russian-speakers in Estonia.10 This last issue––that interethnic tensions within Estonia were 
causing tensions between two OSCE States, Estonia and Russia as the kinstate of the Russians in 
Estonia––was the HCNM’s direct concern. 
Within Estonia there were several sources of interethnic tensions. The preservation of 
independence was a crucial government objective, and Estonians feared that the Russians in 
Estonia might contribute to the loss of this independence.  
The Russian military presence in Estonia was also viewed as a threat to independence. In 
March 1993 about 7,600 Russian troops were reported as still being in Estonia, as well as a large 
number of military retirees.11 Many Estonians believed that Russia had deliberately kept military 
officers in Estonia (often retiring them as early as their thirties and forties) so as to form a fifth 
column that could work for Russian intelligence, cause instability in Estonia, or even support an 
invasion—the Estonian defense plan considered the retired Russian officers as a primary internal 
threat to the country’s security.12 The Russian military also continued to conduct maneuvers such 
as an April 1993 map exercise that Estonian military officials said focused on the “capture and 
keeping of strategically important targets in the Baltic States until the arrival of main forces,” a 
charge that Russia called deliberate disinformation.13 
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Another government priority was to restore the suppressed Estonian national identity and 
culture, in particular the Estonian language. A complicating factor was a legacy of bitterness 
from the Soviet era, which as the HCNM wrote, had “led to great suffering for virtually all 
Estonian families.”14  
Tensions on the part of the Russians included fears of being forced to leave Estonia or of 
being deprived of rights if they were able to stay. There was deep resentment over the citizenship 
issue, for under the new law they were considered as immigrants––a resentment intensified 
because many Russians had voted for independence on the assumption that they would be 
Estonian citizens. A third source of tension was that Estonian efforts to reestablish their language 
and culture were seen by many Russians as aimed against them.  
 
 
The HCNM Intervention and Recommendations 
 
1993–1994. In early 1993 the HCNM made his first visit to Estonia. At that time interethnic 
tensions were increasing over a number of issues, particularly over the provisions of a draft law 
on naturalization requirements. Of most concern to the noncitizens were two draft provisions: 
first, that everyone who had not applied for Russian or Estonian citizenship would have to apply 
for a residence permit within a year or leave the country, and second, that former and present 
members of foreign military and security services and their families would not be issued permits. 
In April 1993 the HCNM issued his first formal recommendation, regarding which the 
government took almost no action from April to June, while on the Russian-speakers’ side, 
opposition increased to the draft legislation. Russian organizations in Estonia organized large 
demonstrations; called on the Russian government for assistance; and threatened to close down 
power plants, conduct sabotage, and take up arms.  
The Russian government protested the draft law at the UN, and the Russian foreign ministry 
warned Estonia that it was headed for a dangerous confrontation that could have serious 
consequences for the whole Baltic region. Russia also tried (unsuccessfully) to prevent Estonia 
from joining the Council of Europe on the grounds that hundreds of thousands of people were 
deprived of citizenship and that Estonia’s conformity with European norms was an illusion.15 
The Estonian parliament nevertheless passed the law on June 21, 1993, sparking a crisis 
involving the Estonian government, the Russian-speaking minority in Estonia, and the Russian 
government. Many noncitizens interpreted the law as an effort to force them to leave, and 
Russian organizations in Estonia claimed that the law provided the legal basis for mass 
deportations and called for civil disobedience. Russian President Yeltsin warned that all 
necessary measures would be taken to protect Russians in Estonia, and cut gas supplies to 
Estonia the following day, ostensibly because of unpaid bills. He also called the Estonian 
government’s actions “ethnic cleansing” and “an Estonian version of apartheid,” adding that the 
Estonian leadership had forgotten about “some geopolitical and demographic realities” about 
which Russia was able to remind them.16  
 
                                                 
14 HCNM letter to Foreign Minister Jüri Luik, March 9, 1994. 
15 Andrew Marshall, “Russia Resists Estonia Joining Human Rights Body,” Independent, May 13, 1993. 
16 Justin Burke, “Charges Fly Between Russia, Estonia Over Citizenship Law,” Christian Science Monitor, June 29, 
1993. 








On June 28 the town councils of Narva and Sillamäe voted to hold referenda on declaring 
their towns as autonomous regions. The Estonian government considered that the referenda 
would be illegal and a threat to Estonia’s territorial integrity, fearing that any autonomous 
regions might try to join with Russia, a perception increased by statements by nationalists in 
Russia. The Estonian government discussed using force to stop the referenda, and the Russian 
parliament passed a resolution urging sanctions on Estonia including suspending troop 
withdrawals. The potential for Russian intervention increased, for the resolution stated that 
Estonia’s actions could not be seen as a purely internal affair, and Yeltsin declared that Russia 
might have to intervene if interethnic relations worsened. 
The president of Estonia, Lennart Meri, asked the OSCE for help, and the OSCE Committee 
of Senior Officials asked the HCNM to look into the situation (an unusual action), and for the 
Estonian government to take appropriate action in response to his recommendations. The HCNM 
undertook a period of intense “shuttle diplomacy” between the Estonian government and 
representatives of the Russian community, while maintaining informal contacts with Russian 
officials, the foreign minister in particular.  
The HCNM’s most immediate recommendation was for the Estonian president, who under the 
country’s constitution was required to promulgate all laws before they would take effect, to defer 
his decision until the Council of Europe and OSCE had assessed the law in light of international 
standards. The president accepted the recommendation, and after receiving comments sent the 
law back to the parliament, which amended it. The EU welcomed the changes to the law but the 
Russian Foreign Ministry stated that the revised law maintained the discriminatory spirit of the 
earlier draft. On July 12 Meri promulgated the revised version, stating that it was now in line 
with European principles.  
On the same day, the HCNM issued a statement that included assurances he had received 
from the Estonian government and Russian community representatives, which included a 
commitment from the government that it had no intention of beginning a process of expulsion, 
and a commitment from the Russian community that it would abide by the decision of the 
Estonian court regarding the legality of the referenda. The two towns did conduct the referenda, 
the Estonian Supreme Court declared them null and void, and the Russian community respected 
the decision. The crisis ended without violence, but the underlying problems had not been 
resolved and tensions remained. 
Relations with Russia regarding interethnic tensions remained strained during this period, 
particularly as the Russian leadership came under increasing criticism from nationalists, 
hardliners, and communists regarding the status of the 25 million Russians in the former Soviet 
republics. This was a serious concern for the Russian government, but was also an issue that 
could be exploited by political leaders and groups as the December 1993 elections neared, an 
approach that contributed to the election of the leader of the ultra-nationalist Liberal Democratic 
Party of Russia (LDPR) Vladimir Zhirinovsky. 
Russian citizens living in Estonia were allowed to vote in Russian elections, and almost half 
of those who voted in the Russian December 1993 elections voted for the LDPR, a matter that 
increased tensions for Estonians.17 The success of the LDPR so alarmed the Baltic States that 
their three leaders held an emergency summit to discuss the implications of the election. 
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In 1994 nationalistic rhetoric increased in Russia (some analysts attributed this rhetoric to the 
perceived need to regain the initiative lost to the nationalists in the elections). In January 1994 
Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev said that Russia should not withdraw from regions that had 
been in its sphere of interest for centuries, and that troops needed to stay in the Baltics because a 
complete withdrawal would create a security vacuum that would leave the Russians there 
undefended.18 Zhirinovsky called for economic measures to force the collapse of the Baltic 
States if they did not give full voting rights to the Russians.  
In February 1994 one instance of violence was reported when unknown attackers destroyed a 
checkpoint at a Russian airbase near Tallinn. The Russian foreign ministry called the attack “an 
extremely dangerous provocation which could lead to unforeseeable consequences,” but 
Estonian officials denied that the attack had been sanctioned.19  
Little was done to implement the HCNM’s recommendations, and tensions remained high 
over a number of issues, especially administrative problems in obtaining residence permits and 
passports. The government had seriously underestimated the time and resources required to 
process and issue 400,000 residence permits in one year, and the resulting delays, confusion, and 
long lines caused frustration and fear on the part of the Russians. Most alarming was that the 
application deadline was July 1994, and by early 1994 the full-scale application process had not 
yet started, and fears of expulsion increased. The HCNM learned of these fears during a 
February 1994 visit, and made a number of recommendations regarding residence permits: 
general recommendations such as making the application process “as simple and smooth as 
possible,” and others aimed at specific problems such as providing the application form in 
Russian. The HCNM also recommended that the government extend the deadline; however, in 
order to make sure that the Russian-speakers took the deadline seriously––for some Russian 
organizations planned a boycott campaign––the government did not announce the extension until 
a few weeks before the deadline, a delay that caused a great deal of anxiety for many Russians. 
These fears were communicated to the Russian government, and relations between the two 
governments continued to be poor. In May 1994 Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev said 
that the withdrawal of Russian troops was “closely linked to guarantees of normal life for the so-
called Russian-speaking population,” and added that it wouldn’t take long to send 
reinforcements.20 In July Yeltsin announced further delays in the troop pullout due to the “crude 
violations of human rights.”21 In August a poll of 615 Russian military officers listed Russia’s 
enemies, in order, as Latvia, Afghanistan, Lithuania, Estonia, and the United States.22  
1995. In 1995 the Estonian government increased tensions by lengthening the residence 
requirement for naturalization and adding a constitution exam.23 Russians in Estonia, and the 
Russian government, reacted sharply. The Russian foreign ministry said that the law was 
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designed to legitimize discrimination against Estonia’s Russian-speaking community, and Russia 
brought the matter up at the Council of the Baltic Sea States and the UN, actions that led to 
investigations by both organizations. In April Kozyrev criticized Estonia and Latvia for 
legislation designed to “push” Russians out, and stated that military force was among a large 
arsenal of means at Russia’s disposal for protecting Russians in the “near abroad,” and might be 
necessary in some cases. Later, though, he stressed that he had not threatened to use force against 
Estonia, and that force would only be used in very special situations.24 In June the Narva Union 
of Russian Citizens demonstrated, and wrote an open letter to the Estonian parliament protesting 
against “the continuing mockery of citizens of Russia in Estonia” caused by Estonia’s “strident 
national radicalism.”25 
As the December 1995 elections approached in Russia, candidates increased their rhetoric. 
Presidential candidate and Communist Party leader Gennady Zyuganov raised the specter of 
secession when he declared that the eastern expansion of NATO would mean the division of 
Estonia since the majority of the Russians in the northeast would vote for joining Russia. 
Communists and nationalists won a majority to the Duma (the lower house of the Russian 
parliament), and one-third of the Russian voters in Estonia voted for political parties with 
platforms that included reviving Russia’s greatness or restoring the Soviet Union.26 
1996. During 1996 the Estonian government still made little effort to integrate the noncitizens, 
and the HCNM, concerned about the resources needed to implement his recommendations, asked 
the other OSCE States to provide assistance for programs in language training and integration 
projects. The government set up a Language Training Center to coordinate this assistance and 
distribute funds to projects, and to develop a language strategy for teaching Estonian in schools 
and to adults.  
In the meantime, administrative problems with residence permits continued, and Russian-
speakers without permits again feared being expelled. Similar problems affected the issuing of 
alien passports, and by October, 96,000 people were still without passports—and to travel 
outside the country they had to apply for a travel document each time.27 These issues caused 
frustration and resentment on the part of the noncitizens and increased their perception that they 
were not wanted, but the most serious consequence was that large numbers of noncitizens 
became Russian citizens through a simple registration procedure that they could do at any 
Russian embassy. Some registered because of residence permit problems, but about two-thirds so 
that they could visit relatives. As a result, statelessness was reduced, but the number of Russian 
citizens in Estonia increased, a situation that did not assist in developing loyalty and national 
cohesion. 
The HCNM recommended that the government speed up the processing of residence permits 
and passports, but also intervened to help the situation. He coordinated with the Swiss 
government to provide funds for computer equipment for the processing, and the Council of 
Europe paid for the printing of a hundred thousand passports. 
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Relations between Estonia and Russia continued to be poor. In April the Estonian foreign 
minister increased tensions when he said in an international forum that Russia was planning to 
consume neighboring States.28 Rhetoric increased again during the Russian 1996 election 
campaign. Zyuganov said that Estonia was a parasite on Russia, retired general Aleksandr Lebed 
said in nearly every speech that Estonia would have no future if NATO expanded there, and 
Zhirinovsky threatened to erect giant fans along Russia’s border to waft toxic nuclear fumes into 
the Baltic States.29 Estonian President Lennart Meri said that it was important to separate 
electoral rhetoric from real political substance, but noted that there had been “a sharp increase in 
the level of hostility coming from Russian politicians towards the Baltic States and especially 
Estonia.”30 Of concern to many Estonians was that a large majority of the 25 million Russians in 
the former Soviet republics voted for Zyuganov, who supported reincorporating the Baltic States 
into Russia. Also of concern was that in March 1996 the Duma passed a nonbinding resolution 
reversing the dissolution of the Soviet Union. 
1997. Beginning in 1997, the EU played an increasing role in Estonia, for membership was an 
extremely important foreign policy goal for the government. In 1993 the EU had published the 
criteria for membership, including that candidate countries had achieved stable institutions 
guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of 
minorities; a functioning market economy and the capacity to cope with the competitive 
pressures and market forces within the EU; and the ability to take on the obligations of 
membership, including adherence to the aims of political, economic, and monetary union.31 
The EU declared that in the area of minorities it would be guided by the HCNM’s 
recommendations, and therefore, in the spring of 1997 the Estonian foreign ministry prepared a 
document showing how Estonia had implemented all but two of the HCNM’s recommendations, 
and presented this document to the members of the OSCE Permanent Council—which included 
representatives from all of the EU States. The intent was to show the EU members that Estonia 
had fulfilled the EU requirements regarding minorities, and therefore was eligible to start 
accession talks. 
The HCNM did not reply directly to the Estonian government’s assessment, but prepared a 
formal recommendation in May 1997. In this letter he assessed the overall interethnic situation in 
Estonia to be good, but wrote of a number of concerns regarding unimplemented 
recommendations, including stateless children, the slow process of naturalization, the high 
percentage of the population that remained stateless (14 percent), the issuing of alien passports, 
the lack of an ombudsman, the difficulty of the constitution exam, and the need for more 
language training. The HCNM believed that the government’s integration efforts had been half-
hearted despite the resources provided, and therefore recommended that the government speed 
up the preparation of the language training strategy, give it top priority, and include at least one 
Russian member with experience in the language training field in the working group drawing up 
the strategy.32 
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The EU issued its first report on Estonia as an applicant country in July 1997, and the report’s 
overall assessment was that on the whole, the rights of the Russian-speaking minority were being 
respected, and that there were no major problems between Estonians and the Russian minority. 
However, the report reiterated the HCNM’s recommendations and outlined a number of areas 
that needed improvement. The report criticized areas such as the lack of an ombudsman and the 
administrative difficulties regarding residence permits, but particularly emphasized the need to 
facilitate the integration of the Russian-speaking minority to include increased language training, 
and to reduce statelessness including that of children. The report noted the decreasing rate of 
naturalizations, and stated that if the rate continued, a large percentage of Estonia’s population 
would remain foreign or stateless for a long time.33  
The Estonian government took a number of actions in response. The government created a 
new post, a Minister for Inter-Ethnic Relations whose responsibilities included population and 
integration issues––the first time a government member was officially responsible for the 
integration process. The UN Development Program (UNDP) office in Tallinn convened a 
committee that worked out the aims and principles of the integration policy. The HCNM 
recognized positive aspects of the policy, writing that the integration strategy emphasized “the 
importance of Estonians and non-Estonians working together in the consolidation of the 
country’s society; it points out that integration is a two-way process, with responsibilities on both 
sides; it explicitly rules out assimilation as a goal; and it places emphasis on youth.”34 
The government established a new “state language teacher” post with incentives to teach in 
the Russian areas, with the goal of providing one or two teachers in each Russian-language 
school. The HCNM welcomed the decision, as did the OSCE and EU.  
The government attached the ombudsman responsibility to an existing position, the office of 
the Legal Chancellor; however, the office was not independent as had been recommended, but 
was filled by a government official. Nevertheless, the office expanded to include satellite offices 
in the northeast, and use of the office increased significantly, generating positive comments from 
the EU and the HCNM.35 
The Estonian government made progress on residence permits and passports, though by May 
1997 there was still a backlog of 50,000 passports to be distributed. By the end of 1997 the 
government had largely completed the processing of both permits and passports, which finally 
ended fears of expulsion. 
Reports of tensions between Estonia and Russia regarding interethnic relations were mixed in 
1997, but on the whole diminished. In January Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov said 
that Russia would not sign a 1996 border agreement with Estonia because of Estonia’s lack of 
respect for the rights of Russian-speakers, and stated that Russia should impose economic 
sanctions on those countries that discriminated against ethnic Russians, in particular Estonia. 
However, in the same month, the Council of Europe’s Parliamentary Assembly voted to close the 
monitoring procedure for Estonia, highlighting the country’s progress in the field of human 
rights, though the Council noted some areas that still needed attention.36 At the November 1997 
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OSCE Implementation Meeting on Human Dimension Issues, Russian representatives voiced 
their concern for the Russian-speaking populations in the areas bordering Russia, the former 
republics, and the Baltic States in particular; however, the Russian attitude was evaluated as 
being more moderate than in the previous year’s meeting.37 In early December a delegation of 
Russian foreign ministry officials visited Estonia to investigate the human rights situation, and 
reported that the situation was not as bad as they had thought, with the main problem being 
continuing difficulties for ethnic Russians in obtaining citizenship.38  
Shortly before the December 1997 EU summit—at which the decision would be made as to 
which countries would be invited to open negotiations for joining—the Estonian government 
announced its decision to address the issue of stateless children. Later that same month, the EU 
decided to include Estonia in the first group of countries to begin accession negotiations, a major 
foreign policy achievement for Estonia. 
1998. The EU and the Estonian government signed the accession document in March 1998, an 
important step towards the achieving of security for Estonia, involving as it did some measure of 
physical and psychological protection by the EU. Also in March the government took a 
significant step towards developing a formal integration program by establishing an Integration 
Foundation to initiate and support projects aimed at the integration of Estonian society, and to 
coordinate the effective use of resources. 
Significant shifts in attitude were reported as having taken place in Estonia during 1998. The 
government reported that in contrast to the early 1990s when most Estonians expected the 
Russians to leave, most Estonians accepted that the great majority of the Russians were going to 
stay, and a similar change occurred on the Russian side in accepting Estonia as an independent 
State. The Estonian government also recognized that continued alienation of the non-Estonians 
was a danger: 
 
As a result of heavy migration during the Soviet occupation, a very sizeable and somewhat 
isolated Russian-speaking community has arisen in Estonia. Isolation of this community 
threatens both social stability and national security.39 
 
However, progress was not constant: domestic opposition hindered the passing of legislation 
on stateless children, and the EU wrote in its 1998 report that it was regrettable that parliament 
had not adopted amendments that “would align it with OSCE recommendations and facilitate 
naturalization of stateless children.”40 Other States and the OSCE echoed the message, and in 
December 1998 parliament passed the legislation. The HCNM issued a press release welcoming 
the law’s adoption, the EU issued a statement acknowledging that Estonia had fulfilled the 
OSCE recommendations with regard to citizenship, and the Russian foreign ministry expressed 
satisfaction.41 
1999. In 1999 the government adopted an integration action plan, half funded by the EU and 
half by the Estonian government, that included developing a methodology for teaching Estonian 
as a second language, teacher training, language training in vocational and higher education 
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institutions, and teaching materials. The government increased Estonian language teaching in 
Russian secondary schools and to adults, and provided language-training programs on television 
and elsewhere.  
The Integration Foundation also supported integration projects such as Estonian language 
camp and family exchanges. Language camps provided young people the opportunity to 
supplement their knowledge of Estonian outside of school. Family exchange projects provided 
the opportunity for children and youths to practice their Estonian by talking with Estonians of 
their own age; live with an Estonian family for a week to two months; and familiarize themselves 
with Estonians and Estonian culture, while at the same time sharing their own culture. 
2000. In 2000 the government adopted the State Integration Programme 2000–2007. In this 
program, integration policy was expressed as the idea that the harmonization of society was a 
two-way process that involved the integration of Estonians and non-Estonians around a strong 
common core of the knowledge of the Estonian language and Estonian citizenship, while at the 
same time creating conditions for maintaining ethnic differences based on the recognition of 
minority cultural rights. 
Problems still existed, however. In 1998 and 1999 parliament had passed laws requiring the 
use of Estonian in private businesses, and requiring parliamentary candidates to be able to speak 
Estonian. The issues were resolved, but under strong international pressure, particularly from the 
EU as shown in its 1999 report: 
 
The concerns raised by the adoption of this law go beyond the non-compliance by Estonia of 
the political criteria for membership on minorities issues and could conflict between the law 
and the obligations of Estonia under the Europe Agreement…. The OSCE High 
Commissioner [on National] Minorities has also pointed out that the current text contradicts 
a number of international standards as regards freedom of expression, in particular those 
introduced by the European Convention on Human Rights, of which Estonia is a contracting 
party…. The adoption of the Language law, which restricts access of non-Estonian speakers 
in political and economic life constitutes a step backwards and should be amended. In the 
meantime, the Commission will closely monitor the implementation of the law to see what 
impact it will have in practice.42 
 
The 2000 census showed progress in reducing statelessness and acquisition of citizenship, 
with the percentage of the population that was stateless decreasing from more than 33 percent in 
1992 to about 12 percent in 2000, with the proportion of Estonian citizens highest among those 
under thirty-five and especially high for children under ten.43 From 1992 to 2000, over 110,000 
persons acquired Estonian citizenship.44 
2001. The 2001 EU report recognized Estonia’s progress “in further consolidating and 
deepening the stability of its institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights 
and respect for and protection of minorities,” but also noted that continued attention and 
resources were needed to implement all elements of the integration program, including the 
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naturalization process, language training, and awareness and involvement in the integration 
process across all sections of the Estonian population.45  
During this period, Russian officials continued to criticize Estonia in fora such as the UN, and 
in December 2001 Russia opposed the ending of the OSCE Mission to Estonia, stating that the 
Mission had not completed its tasks and its closure was regrettable.46 However, the overall 
situation appeared to improve: no criticisms or threats were reported in Keesing’s Record of 
World Events or the Lexis-Nexis database, and in March 2002 the new HCNM, Rolf Ekeus, said 
that he did not see any major problems in Estonia and would focus his efforts on supporting 
social integration.47  
 
 
OSCE Principles, Implementation, and Effect on Security 
 
From 1993 to 1999 the HCNM made thirteen formal recommendations in which he made 
overall and specific recommendations to the Estonian government; ethnic minorities in Estonia, 
particularly the Russian-speaking community; and other OSCE States (see Appendix F). All of 
the recommendations involved OSCE principles. 
Overall HCNM Recommendation. The HCNM’s first formal recommendation, issued in 
April 1993, contained his overall recommendations to the Estonian government and the Russian-
speaking minority. The HCNM’s overall recommendation to the government was to integrate the 
Russian minority by a deliberate policy of integration, particularly by facilitating the acquisition 
of Estonian citizenship, and assuring the minority of full equality with Estonian citizens. His 
overall recommendation to the Russian-speaking minority was to adapt to and develop loyalty 
towards Estonia as an independent State, and to contribute to their own integration, in particular 
by making a “determined effort” to learn enough Estonian to be able to conduct a simple 
conversation (except for those who had retired from work).  
OSCE Principles. All of the HCNM’s recommendations either referred to OSCE principles, 
or were related to them. Most of his specific recommendations involved Principles 10–15, 
dealing with the protection and promotion of rights and freedoms within States.  
The HCNM’s recommendations regarding general human rights were examples of references 
to Principle 10, that the government has the responsibility to create and maintain the conditions 
in which all individuals are able to fully exercise their rights. An example was his 
recommendation that the government use humanitarian considerations and reasonableness as the 
guiding principles regarding those who would neither qualify for citizenship nor have the status 
of permanent residents. 
Principle 11 stated that the States would use democracy, the rule of law based on human 
rights, and the market economy as the means to ensure that all individuals are able to fully 
exercise their rights and freedoms. Those HCNM recommendations that aimed at clarifying 
legislation, and ensuring consistent interpretation and implementation, referred to the rule of law 
aspect of Principle 11.  
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Principle 12 recognized that sometimes special measures are needed to ensure that minorities 
can exercise their equal rights, and the majority of the HCNM’s recommendations referred to 
this principle. All of the HCNM’s recommendations regarding mechanisms and institutions to 
ensure minority participation in government decisions pertained to this principle. The HCNM’s 
recommendation that the government assist the non-Estonian population in acquiring citizenship 
was an example in that minorities cannot exercise their equal rights without participating in the 
political process.  
The HCNM referred a number of times to Principle 13, which addressed the need to balance 
the interests of majorities and national minorities. One example was when he wrote in his first 
formal recommendation that the stated aim of the Estonian government was to find a formula for 
the problem of the non-Estonian population in accordance with the international standards 
subscribed to by Estonia. The HCNM continued the discussion of balance by addressing the 
“two completely contradictory options” that the government faced, the first being to provide a 
privileged position for the Estonian population, an option that he wrote would not be compatible 
with the spirit, if not the letter, of the international obligations that Estonia had accepted. The 
second option was to balance the interests of the two groups by aiming at integrating the non-
Estonian population. 
The HCNM also referred to Principle 13 when he discussed the Estonian and non-Estonian 
desire to maintain and develop their identities. He acknowledged the Estonians’ determination to 
reestablish their national identity after its suppression during the Soviet era, but stressed that the 
Estonians could strengthen their political, cultural, and linguistic identity, and at the same time 
integrate the non-Estonians. In turn, he stated that non-Estonians could learn Estonian without 
sacrificing their cultural or linguistic identity.  
The HCNM recommendations to the Russian-speaking community referred primarily to 
Principle 14, that minorities fulfill their responsibilities. As an example, he wrote in his April 
1993 recommendation that he was aware that the policy he was advocating required an effort on 
the part of the government, and an equal contribution on the part of the non-Estonian population. 
The issue of language use in public and private involved Principle 15 in that the majority and 
minority have linguistic rights that may sometimes conflict. As an example, minorities can use 
their language in their private businesses, but for public safety, emergency personnel need to be 
able to communicate with the individuals they serve.  
The HCNM’s recommendations dealing with giving and accepting help among countries 
referred to Principle 4, that the participating States accept their mutual involvement with, 
accountability to, and assistance to each other in matters pertaining to the implementation of 
their OSCE commitments. Examples were the assistance that other OSCE States gave to the 
Estonian government for language training and integration efforts. Principle 4 was also the basis 
for the help that the HCNM personally directed, such as arranging for the Foundation on Inter-
ethnic Relations to publish brochures on the naturalization process, and arranging an 
international seminar on minority education. 
On several occasions the HCNM referenced Principle 18, that individuals, groups, NGOs, and 
governments at all levels make good faith and continuous efforts to fully implement their OSCE 
commitments. One example was his statement that the Estonian government had repeatedly 
assured him of its determination to fully respect OSCE commitments, including those concerning 
minorities. A second example was when he wrote that the Russians in Estonia would adapt more 
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Implementation. The government implemented nearly all of the HCNM’s recommendations, 
but often only after a significant delay, sometimes of several years. In some areas, however, the 
government went beyond the HCNM’s recommendations in facilitating integration and the 
acquisition of citizenship. In 2000 the government began to allow students who achieved a 
certain level on school language and civics exams to use these tests to fulfill the language and 
constitution exam requirements for citizenship. Estonia also gave noncitizens the right to vote in 
local elections, which the EU noted was a right that few countries in Europe allowed, and that 
contributed effectively towards the integration of noncitizens and the protection of their rights.48 
The HCNM’s recommendations to the Russian minority were to adapt to Estonia as an 
independent State; develop a sense of loyalty towards Estonia; and contribute to their own 
integration, in particular by learning Estonian. The majority of the Russian-speakers, particularly 
younger people, tried to implement these recommendations. In a 1996 survey, over half of those 
without citizenship said that they had tried to improve their knowledge of Estonian since 
independence, and two-thirds of individuals aged 18–29 said they had tried.49 The 2000 
population census showed that 94 percent of persons fifteen and older used the Estonian 
language as either their mother tongue or as a second language, including two-thirds of Estonian 
citizens of Russian ethnicity. The attitude towards the language requirement for citizenship also 
changed. In a February 1993 survey, most of the respondents in the predominately Russian-
speaking town of Narva disagreed with the citizenship requirement of Estonian language 
knowledge; however, three years later, well over 90 percent of all Russian-speakers in Estonia 
agreed or strongly agreed that their children ought to learn Estonian.50  
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The HCNM made three specific recommendations to other OSCE States. One was to the 
kinstate, Russia, to fulfill her OSCE commitment to remove her troops, which was done in 1994. 
The HCNM made one recommendation to other OSCE States to provide significant assistance to 
the government for language training and integration, and recognize the Estonian Alien Passport 
as a legal travel document. Only some OSCE States recognized the passport as a legal travel 
document; however, a number of States and international organizations did provide significant 
assistance to the Estonian government for language training and integration.51 
Observed Effects on Security. The primary effects on security regarding the implementation 
or non-implementation of the OSCE principles contained in the HCNM’s recommendations were 
seen in the levels of tensions within Estonia, between the Estonian and Russian governments 
regarding specific issues, and in the region.  
Tensions within Estonia. When the HCNM’s recommendations were not implemented, as 
was generally the case from 1993 to 1996, tensions remained high within Estonia, and between 
Estonia and Russia regarding the issues referenced in the HCNM’s recommendations. However, 
in 1997, when the Estonian government began to implement a number of the HCNM’s 
recommendations, especially those involving acute anxieties such as residence permits (which 
affected whether or not people would be allowed to live in Estonia), tensions began to diminish. 
In 1998 the government (and the Russian minority) began to seriously implement the HCNM 
recommendations, including his overall recommendation to each, and tensions diminished as 
indicated by poll results showing better interethnic relations, and the increased acquisition of 
Estonian citizenship, particularly among young people. However, in 1998 and 1999, tensions 
increased when the Estonian parliament passed laws not in keeping with OSCE principles and 
other international standards, but decreased when these laws were revised. From 2000 to 2001 
statelessness continued to be reduced, and tensions with Russia remained at a lower level. In 
2001 the new HCNM stated that he believed he only needed to monitor interethnic relations. 
Tensions between Estonia and Russia. Implementation of the OSCE principles in the 
HCNM’s recommendations reduced tensions between the Estonian and Russian governments 
regarding issues pertaining to the Russian minority in Estonia, though criticisms continued. 
Indications of reduced tensions included the absence of threats, and the overall lowered tone of 
statements by the Russian government.  
Regional tensions. Evidence of reduced tensions in the region included the closure of the 
OSCE Mission to Estonia based on the perception of the decreased likelihood of conflict. The 
HCNM issued no further formal recommendations, and no situations involving interethnic 
tensions arose that required the attention of the OSCE leadership.52 
Summary. The implementation of the OSCE principles contained in the HCNM’s 
recommendations had a significant effect on security by reducing tensions within Estonia, 
between Estonia and Russia, and in the region. Though some Russian citizens in Estonia and 
Russia did not become fully reconciled to Estonian independence, and tensions concerning 
language and minority education were not completely resolved, overall security was increased.  
***
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Chapter 6. Case Study 3: OSCE Principles and Macedonia 
 
 
Background of Macedonia 
 
In 1991 Macedonia was a small, landlocked country in southeastern Europe (about 25,000 
square kilometers and 2 million people), sharing borders with Greece, Bulgaria, Serbia, and 
Albania. Before the twentieth century Macedonia had comprised a much larger area, but had  
been partitioned in 1913 among Greece (51 percent), Serbia 
(39 percent), Bulgaria (9 percent), and Albania (1 percent).1 
After World War II, the Serbian part became one of the six 
constituent republics of Yugoslavia (Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and 
Slovenia). In 1991, during the period of great change that 
took place in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe at the end 
of the Cold War from 1989 to 1991, Macedonia declared its 
independence after a referendum in which more than two-
thirds of the eligible voters voted in favor of independence.2  
Macedonia was the only Yugoslav republic that seceded without armed conflict, and at the time, 
war was already being waged in Croatia, and conflict was to break out in Bosnia in 1992. 
The new government faced serious challenges that included lack of international recognition 
as a State; the need to preserve independence, avoid war, and increase the State’s defense 
capability; serious economic challenges, and high interethnic tensions. Because of Greek 
opposition, Macedonia experienced great difficulty in achieving general international 
recognition, and membership in international organizations such as the UN and the OSCE. 
Greece strongly objected to the use of the name “Macedonia,” believing that the inhabitants did 
not have any links to the Macedonians of classical Greece, and that the use of the name and 
Hellenic symbols were usurping Greek heritage (as an example, Macedonia used the Star of 
Vergina from the tomb of King Philip of Macedon as its national symbol and on its flag). Greece 
also feared that the use of the name “Macedonia” might support a territorial claim in northern 
Greece, which contained a province also called “Macedonia,” and in which a significant number 
of ethnic Macedonians lived.  
Macedonia’s national security was problematic: Serbia had withdrawn almost all of the 
Yugoslav Army and equipment, leaving Macedonia without an adequate defense capability in 
the event of a feared Serbian attack, or to monitor its long, mountainous, and poorly marked 
borders. A particular fear was that the ongoing conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina would spill over 
and embroil Macedonia in a broader Balkan war. The international community was also 
concerned with this possibility, and in the fall of 1992, established the United Nations Preventive 
Deployment Force (UNPREDEP) of peacekeepers to Macedonia’s borders with Albania and 
Serbia—the first time the UN had deployed forces to a region before the outbreak of any 
fighting. The OSCE established a Mission in Macedonia to monitor developments along the 
borders with Serbia and other areas that could be affected by the spillover of the conflict in the 
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former Yugoslavia; to promote respect for Macedonia’s territorial integrity and the maintenance 
of peace, stability, and security; and to help prevent possible conflict in the region.3  
Macedonia’s economic challenges included managing the transition from a command 
economy to a market economy, high inflation, and significant unemployment. These challenges 
were exacerbated by the loss of financial support from the central Yugoslav government, and the 
effects of UN-imposed sanctions against Serbia during the Bosnian war, which caused 
Macedonia to lose its major trading partner and only direct overland route to Western Europe. 
The lack of international recognition prevented Macedonia from applying for foreign loans and 
capital, though organizations such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) informally 
recognized Macedonia in order to provide aid. 
There were significant interethnic tensions within 
the country. At the time of independence, 
Macedonia’s population consisted of about two-
thirds ethnic Slav Macedonians; less than one-
quarter ethnic Albanians; and about one-tenth other 
minorities (Fig. 6–1), and the primary tensions were 
between the Macedonian and Albanian 
communities.4 During the Yugoslav era, the two 
communities had coexisted peacefully, but with little 
contact and mutual suspicion, a situation that 
continued after independence. 
The Albanian minority had significant tensions involving a number of areas. In particular the 
Albanian community believed that they were treated as second-class citizens, pointing to their 
low education level and poor representation in public service positions, and believed that they 
should have an equal status with the Macedonian majority. This belief was reflected in a number 
of demands, such as the recognition of Albanian as a second official language. 
A major Albanian concern was better education at all levels for their children. Macedonia’s 
constitution guaranteed primary and secondary education for minorities in their own language; 
however, Albanian education was generally poorer, and in 1993, less than one-third of Albanian 
students attended high school (a significantly lower rate than that of ethnic Macedonians), and 
even fewer went on to college.5 A major—and contentious—demand was for a State-funded 
Albanian-language university.6 
On the Macedonian side, a great concern was the possibility of secession: the Albanians were 
primarily concentrated in the western part of the country along the borders of Albania and the 
Serbian province of Kosovo, and Macedonians feared that the Albanians’ ultimate objective was 
to be part of a pan-Albanian State consisting of Albania, Kosovo, and parts of Macedonia. 
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Fig. 6–1. Ethnic Distribution in Macedonia,  
mid-1990s 
 








Macedonians were also alarmed by the increasing Albanian population from the higher Albanian 
birth rate and immigration from Kosovo, and feared becoming the minority (see Fig. 6–2).7 A  
number of Macedonians suspected the 
Albanian community of not respecting 
the nation’s laws, and of disloyalty to 
the new State. For example, many of 
Macedonia’s Albanians boycotted the 
September 1991 referendum concerning 
independence, and in January 1992 had 
held their own unofficial referendum in 
which a large majority voted in favor of 
territorial and political autonomy within 
Macedonia—a referendum that the 
government rejected, and that many 
Macedonians interpreted as the first 
step towards secession. Macedonians 
also tended to view Albanians as a  
minority that should not be granted greater rights than those of other minorities. In addition, the 
government feared internal instability or even the break-up of the country if Albanian demands 
were met—for other minorities in Macedonia often complained that Albanians received 
disproportionate attention and benefits. 
 
The HCNM’s Intervention and Recommendations 
 
1993–1995. In February 1993 Greece accepted international arbitration over the issue of 
Macedonia’s name, after which Macedonia was admitted to the UN under the provisional name 
of “The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia,” but without a flag pending arbitration 
regarding Greek objections to the Star of Vergina on the flag. Macedonia was then admitted to 
the OSCE in April, but only with observer status, and the HCNM made his first visit in June. He 
made a second visit in October, after which he issued his first formal recommendation on 
November 1, 1993. His initial specific recommendations dealt with the issues of minority 
education, mechanisms for dialogue, minority representation in public service, and a census.  
In the area of education, the HCNM recommended that the government ensure that an 
adequate number of Albanian teachers receive proper training for teaching in elementary 
schools, and promote greater access to high school for Albanian students. During the 1993–1995 
period, the government did not implement the recommendation concerning teacher training, but 
did establish quotas for minority students to attend high school, and thereby increased the 
number of students going on to secondary education. 
He recommended that the government strengthen the Council for Inter-Ethnic Relations in 
ways that could improve its ability to promote interethnic harmony, ways such as by being able 
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to initiate investigations of events that had led to interethnic tensions, and also that the 
government provide the Council with an adequate staff to perform these additional 
responsibilities. These recommendations, however, were not implemented. 
The HCNM recommended that the government ensure, through the progressive process that 
was already underway, that the staffing of all government departments adequately reflect 
minorities.8 The government made efforts to implement this recommendation, but progress was 
slow: for example, though the government set quotas for minority police training, attrition 
reduced the potential increase in staffing.9  
The Albanian community believed that their numbers were underrepresented in the population 
figures, and therefore the HCNM recommended that the government resubmit a draft law on a 
census to parliament (the Sobranie).10 The government held a census in 1994 with support from 
the EU and Council of Europe; however, some members of the Albanian community boycotted 
the census and protested the results.11  
During this period, another challenge arose: in February 1994 Greece imposed a trade 
embargo on Macedonia over the dispute regarding the country’s name and other issues. This 
action had serious economic consequences, which the Macedonian government estimated cost 
the economy about $60 million per month.12  
The HCNM visited Macedonia again in November 1994, after which he issued his second 
formal recommendation. In this recommendation he made a number of new specific 
recommendations and reiterated previous ones.  
He recommended that the government reduce the residency requirement for citizenship from 
fifteen to five years (the requirement used in many OSCE States). The government did not 
implement this recommendation, with the negative effects often associated with statelessness 
such as resentment and the hampering of the development of loyalty to the State.13 
The HCNM recommended that the government resubmit an earlier draft law on local self-
government to the newly elected parliament, and emphasized the importance of particular 
articles pertaining to the official use of the languages and alphabets of the country’s ethnic 
groups. The parliament did pass a law on local self-government in 1995 that allowed official use 
of minority languages in “units of local self-government” when a minority comprised at least 20 
percent of the population.14 
He recommended that TV broadcasts in the Albanian language be increased from one to two 
hours per day, with further subsequent increases. The government implemented this 
 
                                                 
8 The HCNM also recommended that the government prepare annual progress reports in this area, and that the 
Council for Inter-Ethnic Relations review them. This recommendation was also not implemented. 
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See HCNM letter to Stevo Crvenkovski, Nov. 16, 1994; U.S. State Department, Macedonia, The Former Yugoslav 
Republic of, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2001.  
10 The resulting figure of 23 percent Albanians was disputed by ethnic Albanians; however, international observers 
rejected their objections. See Shea, Macedonia and Greece, 239. 
11 Keesing’s, “Albania Boycott of Census,” July 1994, and “Results of Controversial Census,” Nov. 1994.  
12 HCNM letter to Foreign Minister Stevo Crvenkovski, Nov. 16, 1994. 
13 The EU also noted the problem of stateless persons. See European Commission, Former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia Stabilisation and Association Report, 2002, 10. 
14 The implementation sometimes needed improvement, for in 1998 the HCNM addressed implementing the “spirit” 
of the law as well as specifics such as the transfer of resources. 








recommendation, increasing Albanian programming to three hours per day and five hours on 
Wednesdays.15 
The HCNM recommended that other OSCE States and the international community offer 
enough assistance to enable Macedonia to start a process of economic recovery, noting that 
economic conditions in Macedonia had continued to deteriorate. The States and international 
organizations did provide aid; however, GDP continued to decrease, hampered by Greece’s 
embargo and the sanctions on Serbia. 
He also recommended that the Macedonian and Greek governments normalize their relations, 
to include ending the Greek embargo. This recommendation was partially implemented in 
October 1995 when Greece and Macedonia signed an interim accord that normalized their 
relations and settled all of the disputed issues except for the country’s name. The agreement also 
opened the way to international recognition and membership in international organizations 
(however, the Accord stated that Greece would not object to Macedonia joining any 
international, multilateral, or regional organization of which Greece was a member unless 
Macedonia was to be referred to in any other way than “The former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia”). Trade between the two countries increased, and Greece eventually became the 
primary investor in Macedonia. 
A new recommendation was for the Macedonian government to maintain the country’s 
stability, and the HCNM outlined two areas that he saw as threats to this stability. The first was a 
possible deterioration of the economic situation, which he wrote could lead to social tensions, 
and the second was interethnic tensions, which in early 1995 did result in a crisis over the issue 
of an Albanian-language university. 
In December 1994 the government decided that a request to initiate an Albanian-language 
university was not in accordance with the constitution and the education law, and when the self-
styled “Tetovo University” attempted to open despite this ruling, the police forcibly closed the 
university. The HCNM immediately went to Macedonia and urged the government to 
accommodate Albanian aspirations for a university, but also urged the self-appointed rector of 
Tetovo University to use legal ways to achieve his aims. The HCNM repeatedly pointed out to 
both sides that OSCE commitments and other international standards recognized the right of 
persons belonging to national minorities to establish their own educational institutions, but that 
this right had to be exercised in accordance with national legislation.  
Nevertheless, the issue became increasingly divisive and a second attempt to open the 
university resulted in clashes in which one Albanian was killed and about twenty people, 
including policemen, were injured. The HCNM again flew to Macedonia to defuse the situation. 
After meeting with Macedonian President Kiro Gligorov, the HCNM made a public statement on 
February 20, 1995, in which he called for calm and dialogue, and emphasized the importance of 
respecting both law and OSCE commitments: 
 
I am strongly convinced that this is a time for restraint and for all the parties to remain calm. 
It is in the common interest of everyone in this country to live together in harmony. 
Incidents like that of [February 17] can only disturb this harmony. I am also deeply 
convinced that, if there is a further escalation of tensions, the interests of all ethnic groups 
will be further damaged. Now is the time not for mass demonstrations but for dialogue. 
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Dialogue is the way of searching for common solutions. The question of the university is 
uppermost in this regard. In my opinion, this issue should be discussed within the framework 
of preparing the new law on higher education. It cannot be enforced by illegal actions. I 
consider it very important that your President has reiterated his firm intention to live up to 
the commitments contained in the OSCE documents, including those relating to persons 
belonging to national minorities. On this basis, it has to be possible to find solutions to the 
problems your country faces.16 
 
The HCNM then met with members of the government and Albanian leaders, and discussed 
ways of stabilizing the situation; continuing the dialogue between the government and the 
Albanian community; and promoting solutions that would, within the framework of national 
laws, meet the legitimate demands of the Albanian community.  
Tensions eased, though a large number of Macedonian students demonstrated against an 
Albanian-language university. The HCNM visited Macedonia again in March, and consulted 
with all concerned. After considering the problem, the HCNM believed that creating a new state 
university would probably require a change in the constitution, and therefore considered that a 
new private university could be a compromise. Therefore, on April 28, 1995, he issued his third 
formal recommendation, in which he focused on the issue of Albanian-language higher 
education.  
He began by establishing the overall framework in which he believed the solution should be 
sought, which was through dialogue while a draft law on higher education was being prepared, 
and with full respect for Macedonia’s constitutional order. He emphasized the need for a 
compromise formula, saying that any steps towards creating a new institution must conform with 
OSCE principles, respond to specific educational needs, contribute to interethnic harmony, and 
benefit all groups in the country. 
In this recommendation, the HCNM proposed that the government create a Higher Education 
Center for Public Administration and Business as a private institution that would work in close 
cooperation with Skopje and Bitola universities. He emphasized the need for attention to 
languages, such as that the Center would contain a language training center and that lectures 
would be in Macedonian, Albanian, and English. He also noted that the curriculum would have 
to be approved by the government, and recommended that the government ask for international 
assistance for the Center’s financing. 
He pointed out that the Macedonian constitution, and OSCE standards, allowed the formation 
of a private university, but emphasized that both documents stressed that educational institutions 
had to conform with national laws. He addressed how the Center could benefit Macedonia in that 
the high-level training could result in the expansion of small- and medium-sized businesses that 
would help the economy; increase the country’s international focus in higher education (which 
was needed); and that education in public administration and business would help increase the 
number of Albanians in public service. However, little action was taken on this recommendation. 
1996–1997. In 1996 the HCNM focused on interethnic relations and the Albanian-language 
university in Tetovo, visiting Macedonia several times and meeting with representatives of the 
government and the Albanian minority. In his visits he stressed the need for dialogue and 
constructive solutions to problems, and in December chaired a roundtable on building 
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harmonious interethnic relations in Macedonia, bringing together representatives of parliament, 
the government, Albanian political parties, the academic community, and local NGOs. The 
participants discussed interethnic issues facing the country, three in particular: the role of local 
self-government in a multiethnic society, minority participation in public affairs, and minority 
education as a means of preserving ethnic identity while strengthening the integration and 
cohesion of society as a whole. 
In early 1997 parliament passed a law allowing Albanian-language instruction at Skopje 
University for Albanian teachers of kindergarten and grades 1–4. The HCNM acknowledged this 
as a positive step; however, noted that the problem of the quality of teaching in grades 5–8 and 
secondary schools remained compelling, and urged further government action. He pointed out 
that improving education at these levels could stimulate the social and economic level of the 
Albanian population, increase the number of students starting and completing higher education, 
and remove a major barrier preventing the gradual appointment of ethnic Albanians to leading 
positions. 
However, the law provoked verbal attacks from Macedonian nationalists and daily 
demonstrations by students and professors. These protests escalated into sporadic violence 
against Albanians including a violent confrontation after a soccer match; however, the Albanian 
political leadership restrained the Albanian community from responding in ways that might have 
escalated the situation. Interethnic tensions nevertheless increased and became further polarized 
when elections resulted in the success of a more radical Albanian party, and Macedonian 
attitudes hardened against any further concessions to the Albanians.  
In July tensions erupted over the issue of the flying of the flags of other countries. Members 
of the more radical Albanian party were elected as mayors of the towns of Tetovo and Gostivar, 
and began flying the Albanian flag next to the Macedonian flag in front of the town halls. 
Macedonia’s constitution guaranteed minorities the right of self-expression to include the use of 
symbols such as flags, but also prohibited the flying of the flags of foreign States.17 A legal 
protest resulted in a Constitutional Court ruling to remove the flags, but neither mayor complied. 
The government decided not to take immediate action, but to prepare a new draft flag law as a 
compromise: Albanian flags would be allowed during sport and cultural events, and, in 
municipalities where an ethnic minority was the majority, kinstate flags could be flown next to 
the Macedonian flag on official state holidays.  
Parliament (which included Albanian representatives), passed the new law, but the two 
mayors continued to fly the Albanian flag, and in the early morning of July 9, 1997, the police 
took the flags down. Later that day there were disturbances in Tetovo, and in Gostivar a 
demonstration turned into clashes during which 3 people were killed and over 200 injured, 
including a number of police. Both mayors were charged with failing to implement the 
Constitutional Court ruling. The mayor of Gostivar was also charged with organizing resistance, 
and with instigating national, racial, and religious hatred, discord, and intolerance.  
The HCNM flew to Macedonia the next day and met extensively with members of the 
government and the Albanian community. After these meetings, the HCNM issued a statement in 
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which he said that in his view, it was more important than ever for all groups to strive to find 
solutions for interethnic problems by rejecting ethnic hatred and intolerance and by seeking 
constructive and continuous dialogue, with equal rights for all ethnic groups as the guiding 
principle. The statement said that in order to be successful, this dialogue had to be based on 
internationally accepted norms and standards, but equally on respect for the sovereignty and 
territorial integrity of the State, the constitutional order, and the rule of law. 
Tensions eased somewhat, and the HCNM continued to visit Macedonia, emphasizing how 
important it was for all groups to promote constructive dialogue, tolerance, and respect, and 
stressing that this dialogue would yield productive results only when conducted in the context of 
respect for the constitution and the rule of law. He took direct actions as well: in November 1997 
he held consultations in The Hague with Albanian leaders, and through the Foundation on Inter-
Ethnic Relations initiated a Transition Year Program project to help Albanian high school 
students improve their university entrance examination scores.18  
1998. The HCNM issued his fifth formal recommendation on November 6, 1998, after the 
parliamentary elections but before the new government was formed. This recommendation, 
issued in the form of a press release, was a comprehensive statement on a number of interethnic 
issues, and can be expressed as follows: 
 
That the parties engage in a serious, constructive, and continuous dialogue regarding the 
steps that can be taken to accommodate the specific desiderata of minorities and find 
solutions acceptable to both sides regarding interethnic questions, and use a specific 
framework for this dialogue.  
 
This dialogue, the HCNM wrote, must be based: 
 
 Equally on internationally accepted norms and standards, and respect for the sovereignty and 
territorial integrity of the State as well as respect for the rule of law and the constitutional 
order, including that it can only be changed in accordance with constitutional rules; 
 On the recognition, that as all groups pursue their specific interests, they also have common 
interests, such as the maintenance of peace and stability, the promotion of economic 
development, and the reduction of unemployment;  
 On the guiding principles of equal rights for all ethnic groups, and the rejection of ethnic 
hatred and intolerance;  
 On recognition that the government and the majority avoid considering any concession to a 
minority as a weakening of the State, and recognize that meeting the wishes of a minority, 
within the constitutional framework of a unitary State, may strengthen the State;  
 On recognition that the essence of democracy is compromise in that both sides have to 
modify some of their positions, and that in a democratic multiethnic State a minority cannot 
impose a dictate on a majority, but neither can a majority afford to ignore the desiderata of a 
minority; 
 On recognition that disregard of these basic rules will inevitably lead to destabilization of the 
State, and very possibly to violence, from which all concerned would suffer and no one would 
gain, whereas success would provide a firm basis for the stability of the country in the future. 
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The HCNM accompanied these general principles with more specific recommendations, and 
reiterated previous recommendations regarding education, minority participation in public 
affairs, local self-government, teacher training, and Albanian-language higher education. He also 
recommended that the other OSCE States provide international assistance to enable students of 
Macedonian and Albanian ethnicity to study, in common, new subjects like civic education and 
human rights, and to fund projects aimed at promoting the integration process such as summer 
camps and courses for students of different ethnicity. 
1999–2000. The new government was receptive to the recommendations; however, in the 
spring of 1999, fighting and “ethnic cleansing” in Kosovo caused more than 250,000 Kosovar 
Albanians to seek refuge in Macedonia. This influx increased the population of Macedonia by 
more than 10 percent in a few weeks; significantly changed the interethnic balance; and 
exhausted the resources of the government, leaving no funds to pay government salaries, 
unemployment benefits, and pensions. Interethnic tensions in Macedonia increased, particularly 
as the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA)—the force fighting Serbs in Kosovo—ran recruitment 
videos on Albanian television stations in Macedonia, increasing fears that the KLA would turn 
its attention to Macedonia.  
As the refugee burden on Macedonia grew, the HCNM became so concerned that he gave a 
formal early warning to the OSCE Permanent Council, after which he issued a press release on 
the situation on May 12, 1999.19 In this release, the HCNM made two specific recommendations: 
that the Macedonian government and all political parties do their utmost to maintain the stability 
of the country during the crisis, and that the OSCE States increase their efforts to help 
Macedonia avoid destabilization from the influx of refugees from Kosovo. These 
recommendations were implemented, for the international community did provide support, and 
stability in the country was maintained. States gave bilateral aid and held an international 
donor’s conference; in addition, international organizations such as the IMF and the UN gave 
assistance (the UN, which did not normally compensate host countries for refugee support, made 
an exception for Macedonia). 
When the Kosovo crisis ended almost all of the refugees returned to Kosovo, and during his 
next visit, the HCNM noted a more constructive atmosphere regarding the issue of an Albanian-
language university. He visited Macedonia several more times, and in February 2000 brought 
international education experts to discuss issues such as funding, subjects to be taught, and the 
legal status of the proposed institution. In April he presented a proposal for a private Institute of 
Higher Education that would consist of two sections: teacher training, and business management 
and public administration. However, the draft law on higher education required all instruction to 
be in Macedonian or “world languages,” and the HCNM and experts assisted in the preparation 
of a new law that would allow for the use of other languages in private institutions of higher 
education. The new law, despite strong opposition from extremists on both sides, was passed on 
July 25, 2000. 
To implement the plan, the HCNM held a series of meetings with international experts, 
Macedonian experts, and ethnic Albanian representatives, and by October 2000 a business plan 
for the new university had been completed and presented. An international foundation was 
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established to oversee funding, legal issues, and implementation, and the European countries, the 
EU, Soros Foundation, and United States contributed more than 90 percent of the funds needed 
(the United States contributed about half).  
2001. The groundbreaking ceremony for South East European (SEE) University took place in 
Tetovo on February 11, 2001. However, as the date approached, a serious crisis had been 
brewing. In January 2001, an organization calling itself the National Liberation Army (NLA) 
attacked the police station of a Macedonian village, killing one policeman and wounding three 
others. The NLA then issued a “communiqué” threatening the government and moderate 
Macedonian Albanians:  
 
On 22 January a special unit of the National Liberation Army supported by a group of 
observers with automatic guns and hand grenade launchers attacked a Macedonian police 
station…. The attack was limited and was a warning to the Macedonian occupiers and their 
Albanophone collaborators. The uniforms of the Macedonian occupiers will continue to be 
attacked until the Albanian people are liberated. The policemen are called upon to return to 
their families and not sacrifice their lives in vain for the illusory Macedonian plans to 
dominate the Albanian majority.20 
 
The NLA had ties to the KLA, and included ethnic Albanians from Macedonia who had either 
fought with the KLA or took up arms to fight with the NLA, and in February carried out armed 
assaults in Macedonia, seizing territory and attacking government forces.21 The NLA claimed to 
be fighting for greater rights for Albanians; however, the insurgency was analyzed as a deliberate 
attempt to destabilize Macedonia in order to pursue Albanian independence in Kosovo and the 
western area of Macedonia, and to preserve smuggling rings and other criminal activities.22 
Independence in Kosovo and the western area of Macedonia. Analysts speculated that the 
international community’s support of the Serbian leadership after the Kosovo crisis might have 
discouraged some Kosovar Albanians’ hopes for independence. The KLA, therefore, may have 
wanted to capitalize on Albanian frustrations in Macedonia and open a new front by provoking 
an overreaction by the Macedonian government, which would in turn elicit Western sympathy 
and support, and spark a conflict between the government and the Albanian community.23 There 
was speculation that the NLA sought to manipulate the NATO countries into supporting the 
Albanians as had happened during the Kosovo crisis: the BBC’s Balkans correspondent reported 
that the NLA was anxious to know how NATO would react to the campaign, and would be 
greatly disappointed by NATO’s response.24 
The attacks occurred as Macedonia and the EU were preparing to sign a Stabilization and 
Association Agreement (a significant step towards membership in the EU), and as the date for 
the SEE University groundbreaking approached. Both events were expected to increase stability 
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in Macedonia, which would dampen prospects for independence and interfere with smuggling 
(the agreement would give Macedonia duty-free access to markets in the EU area). 
Smuggling and criminality. In February 1999—shortly after Macedonia recognized 
Taiwan—China vetoed extending the UN peacekeeping operation in Macedonia. By summer 
1999 the KLA was reported as having regrouped, and there were frequent reports of arms 
smuggling in and out of Kosovo. The OSCE Mission reported that the absence of a significant 
international presence had left the area open to organized crime, and noted a machinegun 
exchange between groups of smugglers and government forces.25  
In February 2000 a wave of ethnic violence broke out in 
southern Serbia, which NATO and Albanian sources in Kosovo 
said were primarily instigated by members of the KLA 
infiltrating Serbia from Kosovo.26 Incidents on the Kosovo-
Macedonian border increased, including attacks on Macedonian 
police by organized groups of ethnic Albanians. NATO and 
Yugoslav forces therefore tightened control over the borders, and 
conflicts increased between the border police and smugglers 
(Macedonia was a major transit point for a number of illegal 
activities such as trafficking in human beings—women in  
particular—and smuggling of many kinds including arms, tobacco, and heroin from Southwest 
Asia). The first clash involving government forces occurred in the village of Tanusevci, a 
smuggling haven and a 1999 KLA base. 
The response of the international 
community. Condemnation of the NLA 
and support for the Macedonian 
government were almost universal.27 
NATO Secretary General Lord George 
Robertson ordered an immediate political 
and military mission to Macedonia, and 
NATO started dismantling the 5-kilometer 
buffer zone they had established between 
Kosovo and Serbia because Albanian 
guerrillas were using it to stage incursions 
into Serbia.  
The United States strongly condemned 
the actions of the Albanian extremists and  
increased monetary, security, and technical assistance to Macedonia.28 U.S. Secretary of State 
Colin Powell traveled to the Balkans, and Macedonian President Boris Trajkovski was invited to 
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Washington, where he met with senior government officials including President George W. 
Bush.  
The OSCE Chairman-in-Office Mircea Geoana and the HCNM issued a joint statement 
strongly criticizing the unprovoked acts of violence by groups of extremists. The statement 
included the following from the HCNM: 
 
As the events in the Balkans during the past 10 years have shown, armed conflict leads to 
disaster for all concerned, whatever their ethnicity. Everything possible has to be done to 
prevent such an outcome. Recently, the chances of finding solutions for interethnic 
differences have greatly improved. It would be a tragedy if the ongoing peaceful dialogue 
would be replaced by armed struggle.29 
 
The resolution of the conflict. The fighting continued during the spring and summer, during 
which Macedonia came close to civil war. In May 2001 Robertson warned that Macedonia was 
“on the brink of the abyss,” and the international community (particularly NATO, the EU, the 
OSCE, and the United States) made increasing efforts to restore order.30 Under international 
mediation, a ceasefire was brokered in July 2001, and a coalition of Macedonian and Albanian 
political leaders negotiated the Ohrid Framework Agreement with facilitation by the United 
States and the EU. The Agreement, signed in August, contained a set of general principles and 
specific implementing actions such as a national census; a super-majority system for laws 
directly affecting culture, language, education, and symbols; increased decentralization for local 
governments; amendments to be made to the constitution; and modifications to be made to laws. 
Peace was restored, though the fighting escalated as the talks neared completion (OSCE monitors 
reported that the NLA instigated 90 percent of the new fighting in July).31 
SEE University. The HCNM wrote later that for a while it had seemed that full-scale civil war 
was inevitable and that work on the new university might have to stop. Nevertheless, SEE 
University was completed with only a few weeks’ delay, and initially consisted of five 
departments: law, business administration, public administration, communication studies, and 
pedagogic methodology for teachers, and a partnership with the University of Indiana was 
established. The aims and principles of the university included the following: 
 
 To be trilingual, with courses in Albanian, Macedonian, and English; 
 To provide opportunities for young Albanians to study, and therefore serve the interests of 
the Albanian language and culture, but also serve equally members of other ethnic groups; 
 To improve interethnic relations and to promote ethnic harmony, and thus contribute to peace 
and stability in Macedonia; and  
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 To recognize that each ethnic group has its own specific interests, but also a common interest 
in promoting a peaceful and prosperous Macedonia. 
 
The university began with 900 students—more students than expected because of the security 
situation—of which 10 percent were non-Albanians and 40 percent were women.32 The 
university opened on November 20, 2001, with Max van der Stoel and the new HCNM, Rolf 
Ekeus, attending the opening ceremony. 
The opening of the university was the fulfillment, in great part, of a major Albanian 
aspiration: higher education in Albanian, for courses would be taught in Macedonian, Albanian, 
and English. The implementation had overall positive effects on security, but did generate some 
protests by those Albanians who wanted the institute to be State-funded. Positive effects included 
statements by high-level officials from a number of countries and international organizations. A 
greater effect was the increased opportunity for young persons of all ethnicities in Macedonia, 
but particularly for Albanian youth, and by 2002 total enrollment had more than doubled.  
 
 
OSCE Principles, Implementation, and Effect on Security 
 
Recommendations and Principles. From 1993 to 2001 the HCNM made seven formal 
recommendations in which he made specific recommendations to the Macedonian government, 
the minority communities in Macedonia—the Albanian community in particular, and the OSCE 
States and the international community (see Appendix G). All of the recommendations either 
referred to OSCE principles, or were related to them. 
The recommendations primarily referred to principles 10–16 in Group II, which addressed the 
protection and promotion of rights within the State. These principles involved the responsibility 
of governments to create and maintain the conditions in which all individuals, including 
minorities, are able to fully exercise their rights and freedoms; the responsibilities of minorities 
to fulfill their responsibilities; and requirements regarding respect, in that all groups must respect 
all other groups, and that governments have the responsibility to promote a climate of respect. 
The recommendations to other OSCE States primarily addressed the mutual assistance part of 
Principle 4. Principle 8, which involved preventing security threats from arising, and using 
peaceful means to resolve disputes that do arise, was a key principle that involved the nonuse of 
force. Principle 20, which addressed the need to use processes, applied to the recommendations 
regarding dialogue and mechanisms for dialogue. 
The HCNM’s recommendations addressed a number of areas including minority participation 
in public affairs, mechanisms for dialogue, minority access to the media, Albanian-language 
education, international assistance and international relations, the framework in which to seek 
solutions to issues involving interethnic tensions, and the maintenance of stability and avoidance 
of violence. Most of the recommendations in these areas were implemented with positive effects 
on security; however, the 2001 insurgency caused the most serious negative effect on security. In 
taking up arms against the government—an action widely seen as illegitimate—the NLA 
seriously violated a number of OSCE principles. Members of the NLA did not use peaceful 
means to resolve problems (Principle 8); failed to fulfill their responsibilities (Principle 14); and 
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did not respect the rights of others (Principle 16), such as by committing egregious acts including 
murder and mutilation (government forces and civilians on both sides also committed acts that 
violated international human rights law). 
The non-implementation of OSCE principles had long-lasting 
negative effects on security. Lives were lost; over 100,000 people 
became refugees; and hundreds of homes and buildings were 
destroyed, including 14th century Lesok Monastery.33 The serious 
violations of international humanitarian law provoked retaliation 
and spiraling violence.  
The insurgency had negative economic effects. GDP, which had 
been projected to grow at 6 percent, declined 4.6 percent, and 
unemployment and the government deficit both surged.34 The EU 
reported that the insurgency slowed down the process of making the 
changes necessary for Macedonia to make progress towards 
membership. The international community incurred significant 
costs from the use of NATO forces and prolonged diplomatic 
efforts.  
The conflict negatively affected the rule of law in Macedonia. As part of the Ohrid 
Framework Agreement that stopped the conflict, the international community accepted the 
commitment to train 1,000 new minority police officers by July 2003, and the OSCE began this 
training program, graduating its first class in December 2001. However, two years later, police 
presence had not yet been completely reintroduced into western Macedonia, where most of the 
human trafficking and smuggling took place.35 
In the aftermath of the insurgency, interethnic tensions increased significantly. Tensions 
increased even more among the Macedonian population regarding Albanian issues, resulting in 
increased mistrust, fear of secession, demonstrations, and overreactions. The more nationalistic 
Macedonian political leaders accused the West of supporting the Albanian insurgents, and 
became increasingly hostile to the international community. The EU reported that negative 
attitudes to the EU had increased among the Macedonian majority as having forced them into 
concessions to the Albanian minority.36  
The conflict deepened divisions at the community level, resulting in increased physical 
separation as city districts were “claimed” by one group or the other, and separation in mixed-
ethnic villages became more marked, and included pressure on non-Macedonians and non-
Albanians to take sides. The cleavage included maintaining separate facilities such as shops, 
clinics, bus stops, playgrounds, and schools: it became common for Macedonian and Albanian 
students to fight before and after school, boycott classes, and protest policies seen as favoring the 
other group. Many schools began teaching the two groups in shifts to reduce contact, and parents 
increasingly sent their children to separate schools. 
 
                                                 
33 Kim, Macedonia: Country Background and Recent Conflict, Nov. 7, 2001, 8. The NLA also reportedly used 
people—primarily women and children—as human shields, and Orthodox and Muslim religious sites as military 
bases and firing positions. See “Press Profile,” OSCE Newsletter, June 2001, 17. 
34 GDP declined during the first half of the 1990s, but steadily increased during the second half. See European 
Commission, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia Stabilisation and Association Report, 2002, 15. 
35 UNICEF/UNOHCHR/OSCE ODIHR, Trafficking in Human Beings in South Eastern Europe, 2003, 177. 
36 European Commission, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia Stabilisation and Association Report, 2002, 31. 
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New radical splinter groups formed, such as the so-called Albanian National Army (ANA), 
which rejected the Ohrid Framework Agreement and pledged to continue to fight for a “greater 
Albania.” These groups did not appear to have broad public support, but were funded primarily 
by criminal activity and the diaspora, and overlapped with criminal gangs involved in smuggling. 
During 2002 and 2003, the ANA claimed responsibility for a series of terrorist attacks in 
Macedonia, Kosovo, and southern Serbia.  
Though a broader Balkan war was avoided, the international community may have sent the 
message that the use of violence can bring gains. The United States increased its assistance to 
Macedonia, and in March 2002 the World Bank and the European Commission held an 
international donor’s conference at which nearly €600 million was pledged.37 The Albanian 
community achieved many of its objectives through the Ohrid Framework Agreement, and the 
NLA’s political leader, Ali Ahmeti, emerged from the conflict as a major figure. 
Summary. During the 1993–2000 period, the Macedonian government, the majority of the 
Albanian minority, and the other OSCE States implemented in great part the OSCE principles 
referenced in the HCNM’s recommendations, and tensions were reduced to the extent that the 
parties implemented the recommendations. However, in 2001 a minority within the Albanian 
community, with the involvement of Kosovar Albanians, did not implement Principle 8, which 
involved the use of peaceful means to resolve disputes and conflicts, and launched attacks in 
Macedonia that quickly escalated into an insurgency. There is little evidence that the violence 
was justified: from 1993 to 2000 all parties had made progress towards effective integration, and 
Albanian aspirations were being fulfilled, particularly higher education in the Albanian language. 
The violence severely worsened interethnic tensions within Macedonia, and decreased the 
effectiveness of the rule of law in the western regions of Macedonia, allowing criminal activities 
to go unchecked. Several times it appeared that the conflict would descend into civil war; 
however, this outcome was averted through strong efforts by the international community. 
Epilogue. For the next several years, though the government implemented almost all of the 
Ohrid Framework Agreement provisions, the negative consequences of the conflict continued. 
Interethnic relations continued to be poor; the rule of law was not completely reintroduced into 
all areas of Macedonia; and radical or unknown groups conducted a number of terrorist attacks.38 
Though the economic situation improved, deep mistrust and mutual suspicion remained.  
There were positive indications, however. From 2001 to 2006 there were no incidents of 
interethnic violence at SEE University. Ethnic relations were slowly rebuilt, and in 2005, for the 
first time in seven years, poll results showed that a majority of ethnic Macedonians and 
Albanians held favorable opinions of each other.39 
*** 
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The purpose of this study was to use the work of the first High Commissioner on National 
Minorities (HCNM) to test whether or not the implementation of OSCE principles had a 
significant effect on security in the OSCE area. To answer this question, the study addressed two 
research questions: 
 
What OSCE security principles were in effect during the first High Commissioner on 
National Minorities’ 1993–2001 tenure? 
 
Did the implementation of the OSCE security principles contained in the first HCNM’s 
recommendations have any significant effect on security? 
 
To answer these questions, the study first extracted from official OSCE documents a set of 
basic principles designed to guide the security relationships among the member States including 
their behavior toward their own populations. The study then assessed the practical effects of the 
implementation of the principles by tracing their application by Max van der Stoel, the first 
OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities, to situations involving a high threat of 
conflict from interethnic tensions in Ukraine, Estonia, and Macedonia. 
 
 
Findings and Conclusions 
 
Findings on the OSCE Principles. The study identified a set of twenty OSCE principles in 
effect from 1993 to 2001, the period studied. These principles can be divided into three groups: 
 Group I: Principles guiding relations between OSCE States; 
 Group II: Principles guiding the protection and promotion of individual rights within 
States; and  
 Group III: Principles guiding implementation, review, and development processes. 
 
Group I: Principles guiding relations between OSCE States. The first group of principles 
guided relations between OSCE States; that is, their international relations. These principles were 
designed to promote security by avoiding conflict between OSCE States, reducing tensions 
between them, and strengthening their relations. Through the framework provided by these 
principles, the States sought to achieve security through three means: first, addressing how States 
would deal with each other; second, a comprehensive, cooperative, and common approach to 
security; and third, the use of preventive and peaceful means to resolve tensions and conflicts. 
Relations between OSCE States. The principles adopted regarding the relations between 
OSCE States addressed the rights and responsibilities of State sovereignty, and the aspects of 
those rights that the States agreed to limit. The primary limitations that the States accepted were: 
the States’ form of government would be liberal democracy; respect for individual rights and 








fundamental freedoms would be matters of direct and legitimate concern to all participating 
States; the economic system of all OSCE States would be the market economy and adherence to 
the rules involved; and the States’ mutual involvement with, accountability to, and assistance to 
each other regarding the implementation of their OSCE commitments. This mutual involvement 
included participation in the Helsinki process (the periodic review of how well the States were 
implementing their commitments, and the process of developing the principles and commitments 
further). 
A comprehensive, cooperative, and common security approach. Three principles addressed 
the States’ “comprehensive, cooperative, and common security” approach. 
Comprehensive security was a broad approach that encompassed all areas that could cause 
tensions, disputes, or conflicts between States or affect their security.1 Through a comprehensive 
security approach, States could address threats as wide-ranging as military attack, weapons of 
mass destruction, weapons proliferation, ethnic conflict, international crime, terrorism, 
transnational diseases, environmental degradation, unregulated population flows, and human 
rights violations. The States also adopted the comprehensive security approach because the 
different aspects of security were interrelated.  
Cooperative security was an approach that sought to achieve security with other States and not 
against them. The cooperative security approach recognized that States had common interests 
and faced common threats. 
Common security was an approach that viewed the security of States as “indivisible” or 
“linked,” and thus needed to be pursued in common with other States. The common security 
approach recognized the need of each State for security, that the level of security in each State 
affects the security of other countries, and that all States need to contribute to overall security. A 
common security goal was equal security for all OSCE States, and since insecurity in one State 
or region decreases the security of other countries, States would not strengthen their security at 
the expense of the security of other States. In the common security approach, all States need to 
contribute to overall security, and to promote fundamental rights and the well-being of all 
peoples. 
The interrelation of the comprehensive, cooperative, and common approaches to security. The 
OSCE States viewed the three elements of their comprehensive, cooperative, and common 
security approach as interrelated and mutually reinforcing. For example, promoting cooperation 
in security matters can also strengthen the implementation of common security. 
Peaceful means and a preventive focus. The States adopted one principle that focused on the 
prevention of security threats, and the methods that would be used to resolve any threats—and 
the means not to be used, such as force and the threat of force. This principle emphasized that the 
States would take actions to prevent security threats from arising, and would use peaceful means 
such as mediation, fact-finding missions, and peacekeeping to resolve problems. The States 
adopted this principle on the belief that preventing security threats, and using peaceful means to 
resolve any that did arise, provided a better and more cost-effective outcome for all concerned. 
 
                                                 
1 The OSCE States generally used three categories or “dimensions” to express their comprehensive security 
approach: the political-military; economic, scientific/technological, and environmental; and human rights aspects 
(the “human dimension”). The “human dimension” consisted of those commitments made by the OSCE States to 
ensure full respect for individual rights and fundamental freedoms; abide by the rule of law; promote the principles 
of democracy; and build, strengthen, and protect democratic institutions.  








Group II: Principles guiding the protection and promotion of individual rights within 
States. Group II principles were intended to increase security by providing the conditions in 
which all members of the State could fully exercise their fundamental rights and freedoms, and 
thus reduce the tensions and conflicts within and between States that can result from the 
nonrespect of rights. In the OSCE States’ view, violating individual rights within a State causes 
tensions that can lead to instability and conflict, which in turn can cause instability in other 
States, and threaten international security. The core of Group II principles is that respect for 
individual rights is inherently stabilizing. Through the framework provided by these principles, 
States sought to achieve security by addressing the purpose and form of governments, rights and 
responsibilities pertaining to national minorities, and the requirement for mutual respect.  
Purpose and form of government. Governments had the responsibility to establish and 
maintain the conditions in which all members of the State are able to exercise their individual 
rights and freedoms: the means to be used were democracy, a rule of law based on human rights, 
and the market economy (economic liberty). The States accorded primacy to individual rights in 
that democracy and the rule of law support and enforce respect for human rights. The States 
further declared that respect for individual rights, democracy, the rule of law, and the market 
economy were mutually reinforcing and had to be applied as a group.  
The States identified the individual person as their primary focus, and declared that the first 
responsibility of governments was to protect and promote the rights of the individuals who 
comprise the State. The requirement to ensure that all members of the State are able to exercise 
their basic rights was based on the belief that these rights and freedoms are inalienable and 
derive from the dignity inherent in every individual. A practical objective was to achieve the 
stabilizing effect that can result from respect for individual rights and freedoms. 
Rights and responsibilities pertaining to national minorities. The States adopted three 
principles intended to reduce tensions that can arise from minority issues. Two principles 
addressed government responsibility to ensure that persons belonging to national minorities are 
able to exercise their rights, to include making special measures as needed, but to also balance 
the rights of majorities and minorities. Three specific government commitments were to ensure 
the right of minorities to equality under the law, to participate fully in public affairs, and to 
develop their identities—but not at the expense of other groups. The States recognized that 
threats to stability could arise from such threats to security as ethnic conflict, aggressive 
nationalism, intolerance, and xenophobia, and declared that questions relating to minorities could 
only be satisfactorily resolved in a democratic political framework based on the rule of law, with 
a functioning independent judiciary.  
A third principle addressed minority responsibilities, which included participating in public 
affairs; integrating into the wider society to a certain degree, particularly by learning the State 
language or languages; and being responsible in general. The States further specified that no 
minority right could be interpreted as implying the right to take any action in contravention of 
international law, the Helsinki Final Act, including the principle of the territorial integrity of 
States; or the purposes and principles of the UN Charter. 
Respect. The States adopted two principles regarding respect. The first principle addressed the 
responsibility of governments to promote a climate of respect among all persons living on the 
State’s territory. The second principle addressed the responsibility of all individuals and groups 
to respect all others and their equal rights. 








Group III: Principles guiding implementation, review, and development processes. The 
third group of principles guided the processes and mechanisms States would use to interpret, 
apply, review, and advance OSCE principles and commitments. Group III principles were 
designed to increase security by enabling States to develop standards and commitments; interpret 
the body of OSCE principles and commitments and review their implementation; and respond to 
concerns and threats. Through the framework provided by Group III principles, the States sought 
to progress towards greater security, stronger relations, and increased respect for basic rights.  
The first principle addressed the need for States to apply all OSCE principles equally and 
unreservedly, and to interpret each principle in light of all of the others and the OSCE acquis (the 
body of OSCE commitments). The second principle addressed the responsibility of all parties—
governments, groups, organizations, and individuals—to make good faith and continuous efforts 
to implement OSCE principles and commitments. The third principle addressed the requirement 
to identify and build on shared values in both international and intrastate relations. A fourth 
principle addressed the need to use processes and mechanisms to develop standards and 
commitments, review their implementation, and respond to State requirements.2 
The OSCE Security Principles and the OSCE Security Concept.3 The study found that the 
twenty OSCE principles could be summarized into ten principles in three groups as below:  
 
 
Table 7–1. The OSCE Security Concept Principles, 2001 Summary  
 
 
I. Principles Guiding Relations  
Between OSCE States 
 
1. Respect for the sovereign rights of States, 
with agreed-upon limits on sovereign rights. 
2. Mutual State involvement, accountability, and 
assistance regarding OSCE commitments. 
3. A comprehensive, cooperative, and common 
security approach. 
4. The prevention of security threats, and the use 
of peaceful means to reduce tensions and 
resolve disputes and conflicts. 
 
 
II. Principles Guiding the Protection and 
Promotion of Individual Rights within States 
 
 
5. State responsibility to ensure respect for 
individual rights through democracy, the 
rule of law, and the market economy. 
6. Rights and responsibilities pertaining to 
national minorities. 
7. Respect for the equal rights of all, and a 
climate of respect. 
 
 
III. Principles Guiding Implementation, Review, 
and Development Processes 
 
8. Good faith, full, equal, and continuous efforts to 
implement OSCE principles and commitments. 
9. The development and advancement of shared values. 





                                                 
2 The States used the “Helsinki process” as their primary method to implement this principle. The Helsinki process 
was originally a series of follow-up meetings during which the OSCE States met to review the implementation of 
the commitments made through the OSCE, and to set new standards and commitments. 
3 See Appendix A for an articulation and explanation of the OSCE security concept. 








The study also found that the OSCE principles as a group formed an OSCE security concept, 
which can be expressed as follows:  
 
Security depends on the development and implementation of principles guiding three 
areas: how States deal with each other and resolve problems; the protection and promotion 
of individual rights within States; and the processes and mechanisms to review and 
advance values, principles, and commitments. 
 
The approach that the OSCE States established in 1975, and developed over the next quarter 
of a century, represented a sustained effort by almost all of the world’s democracies at the time, 
and constituted a significant body of thought and practice regarding security, and respect for the 
individual.  
Findings on the Implementation of OSCE Principles Through the Work of the HCNM. 
From 1993 to 2001, the first HCNM, Max van der Stoel, worked to help States implement the 
OSCE principles, particularly as the principles applied to minority issues and tensions. The 
primary tools he used were the OSCE principles themselves; analysis; formal recommendations; 
visits; consultations; negotiation and mediation, to include roundtables; the advice of teams of 
experts; political support from the OSCE leadership and other States; and tension-reducing 
projects funded by OSCE States, international organizations, and NGOs.  
In intervening in particular States, the HCNM took the abstract OSCE principles and applied 
them to specific situations that had a high potential for conflict. In these interventions, the 
HCNM tried to help States implement their OSCE commitments, but also sought to help States 
develop the mechanisms and processes that would enable them to resolve issues on their own. 
His objective was to help States and minorities achieve a society that involved a central core of 
loyalty to the State and respect for the rights of all, and at the same time provided all State 
members with the opportunity to develop their identities within the State.  
The effect on security. The study analyzed three cases in which the HCNM applied the OSCE 
principles to three situations with a high potential for a conflict: Crimean autonomy within 
Ukraine, interethnic relations and separatism in Estonia, and interethnic relations and separatism 
in Macedonia. In each of the three cases examined, the analysis of the detailed application of the 
OSCE principles contained in the HCNM recommendations found increases in security when the 
recommendations were implemented. The effects on security were evident regarding many 
specific HCNM recommendations on particular issues, but the primary effect on security 
occurred when the parties implemented the HCNM’s overall recommendation regarding a 
situation. The implementation of OSCE principles increased security in each State, between 
OSCE States, and in the region. 
Ukraine. In Ukraine, when the Ukrainian government and the Crimean administration 
implemented the HCNM’s overall recommendation by finding a mutually acceptable division of 
responsibilities between them, there was a significant positive effect on security. Though 
separatist sentiment did not completely disappear, tensions within Ukraine, between the 
Ukrainian and Russian governments, and in the region were reduced. Within Ukraine there were 
no further threats between the Ukrainian government and the Crimean administration; no further 
reports of the buildup of forces; and no threat or outbreaks of violence pertaining to separatism in 
Crimea. There were no further reports of threats of force by Russia, or of the Russian parliament 
making efforts to regain Crimea, and the OSCE closed its Mission to Ukraine in part because the 








Ukrainian government and the Crimean administration had normalized their relations. There was 
no further direct HCNM involvement, and no situations regarding Crimea arose that required the 
attention of the OSCE leadership.4 
Of particular significance to the security outcome was the implementation of the OSCE 
principle regarding the resolution of issues using peaceful means. In this area, the primary tools 
used were negotiation and mediation, to include the advice of constitutional experts and three 
roundtables, after each of which the contending parties grew closer to a solution. 
Estonia. In his first formal recommendation to Estonia in 1993, the HCNM made one overall 
recommendation to the Estonian government, and one to the Russian-speaking minority. His 
overall recommendation to the government was to integrate the Russian minority by a deliberate 
policy of integration, particularly by facilitating the acquisition of Estonian citizenship, and of 
assuring the minority of full equality with Estonian citizens. His overall recommendation to the 
Russian-speaking minority was to adapt to and develop loyalty towards Estonia as an 
independent State, and to contribute to their own integration, in particular by learning a basic 
level of Estonian.  
When the Estonian government and the Russian-speaking minority began to seriously 
implement these overall recommendations, significant effects on security were observed within 
Estonia, between the Estonian and Russian governments, and in the region. Within Estonia, poll 
results showed better interethnic relations, and the acquisition of Estonian citizenship increased 
among ethnic Russians, particularly among young people. Though the Russian government 
continued to criticize the Estonian government’s treatment of the ethnic Russians, the Russian 
government made no further threats of the use of force against Estonia regarding this treatment—
and statements were occasionally made that the situation was not as bad as sometimes 
portrayed.5 The closing of the OSCE Mission to Estonia was a further indication of reduced 
regional tensions. 
Of particular significance in the Estonian case was the implementation of the OSCE principle 
involving mutual assistance among OSCE States. The implementation of this principle was 
critical to the security outcome in two respects.  
First was the support that the EU States (all of which were also OSCE States) gave to the 
HCNM’s recommendations when the European Commission announced that it would be guided 
by the HCNM’s assessment as to whether or not candidate countries met the EU’s entrance 
standards in the area of minority rights. Estonia was a candidate country, and though this study 
did not focus on why parties did or did not implement the HCNM’s recommendations, the study 
found that the EU’s announcement strongly influenced the Estonian government’s decisions to 
implement the recommendations. 
Second was the significant financial support that other OSCE States provided for an 
integration program, Estonian-language training, and other projects aimed at integrating the 
Russian-speaking minority. This assistance significantly aided the Estonian government in 
implementing the Group II principles involving the State’s responsibility to create the conditions 
in which all members of the State, including minorities, could exercise their basic rights and 
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5 See, for example, John Finerty, “Russian Foreign Ministry on Estonia: ‘Situation Not as Bad as We Thought,’” 
CSCE Digest (Jan. 1997): 7. 








freedoms. Without this support, it is not likely that the Estonian government could have afforded 
the programs. 
Macedonia. The HCNM’s overall recommendation to the Macedonian government and the 
Albanian minority was, in essence, to engage in a serious, constructive, and continuous dialogue 
regarding the steps that could be taken to accommodate the specific desiderata of the Albanian 
minority, and find solutions acceptable to both sides. He also outlined that the dialogue needed to 
be based on internationally accepted norms and standards, and respect for the sovereignty and 
territorial integrity of the State and the rule of law. The primary desiderata of the Albanian 
minority included greater representation in government, increased local self-government, an 
equal status with the Macedonian majority, better primary and secondary education, and a State-
funded Albanian-language university.  
From 1994 to 2000 the Macedonian government, the Macedonian majority, and the Albanian 
minority made slow progress towards implementing the HCNM’s recommendations and the 
OSCE principles contained in them, and the level of tensions fluctuated, twice rising to the point 
that the HCNM’s crisis intervention was required. The level of tensions during this period was, 
however, affected by external events, particularly the violence and “ethnic cleansing” in Kosovo, 
which had a strong impact on ethnic Albanians in the Balkan region, including Macedonia. 
Nevertheless, by 2000, a number of major Albanian aspirations were close to being realized, 
such as greater representation in all areas of government service, and a private (not State-funded) 
university that would include courses taught in Albanian and other languages (SEE University).  
However, this progress was overshadowed by the outbreak of violence. In early 2001 
members of the Albanian minority, in conjunction with Kosovar Albanians, did not implement 
Principle 8 regarding the peaceful resolution of issues, and launched armed assaults. The effect 
on security of violating this principle by initiating armed conflict—conflict that was widely seen 
as illegitimate—was extremely negative. The assaults quickly became an insurgency that 
threatened to engulf Macedonia in civil war, and the region in a Balkan war. This insurgency 
greatly increased tensions throughout the region before the OSCE States contained the violence 
by helping the parties to negotiate the August 2001 Ohrid Framework Agreement. This 
Agreement, which was based on OSCE principles and the HCNM’s recommendations, ended the 
conflict, reduced regional tensions, and diminished the widespread fear of a regional conflict. 
However, the conflict resulted in increased interethnic tensions within Macedonia, and 
contributed to decreased cooperation and more frequent outbreaks of violence for several years. 
Of particular significance to the ending of the conflict was the implementation of the OSCE 
principle involving mutual assistance. Through the extensive efforts made by other OSCE States 
and international organizations (NATO and the EU in particular), the conflict was ended, and the 
potential consequences of a wider conflict were avoided.  
The effect on security in context. The effect on security was particularly significant in view 
of the instability and tensions of the post–Cold War period, the OSCE’s ongoing 
institutionalization process, and the limited resources and tools available to the OSCE and the 
HCNM in the 1990s. The early post–Cold War period was a very difficult and unstable time as 
the Soviet Union dissolved, new countries appeared, the first armed conflicts in Europe since 
World War II broke out, and rising tensions elsewhere threatened to erupt. The HCNM 
monitored the entire OSCE area during this period, and all of his intervention cases involved 
countries undergoing the difficult transition from communist systems of government to 








democracies, and from command economies to market economies. All of the countries carried 
the legacy of totalitarian regimes, and most had recently gained independence and had little 
experience of statehood. 
The level of the development of the OSCE was significant: in the early 1990s the OSCE had 
little institutional or operational capability, no military forces, no economic leverage, few 
resources, and no coercive tools—the most negative measure the OSCE possessed was 
suspension. The office of HCNM had few tools or resources—in 2001, the HCNM’s total budget 
was about $2 million.6 
Given the challenges of the period, more violence might have been expected than actually 
occurred; however, with the exception of Macedonia in 2001, no new conflicts based on minority 
tensions broke out in the OSCE region during the HCNM’s tenure.7 Therefore, if the HCNM 
prevented even one conflict, his efforts were very cost effective. A major conclusion that can be 
drawn from the study regarding the OSCE principles is summarized below:  
 
The systematic articulation of norms widely seen as legitimate, expressed in principles 
and implemented through mechanisms designed to bring those norms to bear on specific 
situations, can have a significant positive effect on security.  
 
Conclusion. In conclusion, the study showed that the implementation of OSCE principles in 
Ukraine, Estonia, and Macedonia significantly increased security in those three countries and the 
OSCE region. Based on the results of the study, the OSCE principles, the OSCE security 
concept, and the work of the High Commissioner on National Minorities merit further 
examination, development, and application to national security policy and practice. Governments 
have tried many approaches and theories to achieve security, and the OSCE provides a 
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Appendix A: The OSCE Security Concept, 2001 
 
 
The OSCE Security Concept 
 
Introduction. The OSCE security concept was a security framework based on the idea that 
security depends on principles guiding three areas: how States deal with each other and resolve 
problems; the protection and promotion of individual rights within States; and the processes to 
develop, implement, and advance agreements regarding the principles.1 The OSCE security 
concept was based on principles that the OSCE States began to develop in 1975 with the 
Helsinki Final Act, and continued to develop over the next decades and into the 21st century.2 
The OSCE security concept can be summarized as below, and expressed in ten principles, 
divided into three groups:  
 
Security depends on the development and implementation of principles guiding three 
areas: how States deal with each other and resolve problems; the protection and promotion 
of individual rights within States; and the processes and mechanisms to review and 




The OSCE Security Concept Principles, 2001 Summary 
 
 
1. Respect for the sovereign rights of States, with agreed-upon 
limits on sovereign rights. 
2. Mutual State involvement, accountability, and assistance 
regarding OSCE commitments. 
3. A comprehensive, cooperative, and common security approach. 
4. The prevention of security threats, and the use of peaceful 
means to reduce tensions and resolve disputes and conflicts. 
 
5. State responsibility to ensure respect for individual rights 
through democracy, the rule of law, and the market economy. 
6. Rights and responsibilities pertaining to national minorities. 
7. Respect for the equal rights of all, and a climate of respect. 
 
8. Good faith, full, equal, and continuous efforts to implement 
OSCE principles and commitments. 
9. The development and advancement of shared values. 
10. Processes and mechanisms. 
 
 
Group I: Principles 
Guiding Relations 






Group II: Principles 
Guiding the Protection and 
Promotion of Individual 
Rights within States  
 
Group III: Principles 
Guiding Implementation, 




                                                 
1 In 2001, the OSCE (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe), was an international organization 
comprised of more than fifty democratic countries. The OSCE security concept was the approach to security 
developed by these countries, a summation of the efforts of nearly all of the world’s democracies to identify and 
implement the standards and principles needed to achieve security, peace, and freedom. (Other countries such as 
Japan and South Korea were also partners for cooperation.) 











The OSCE Security Principles 
 
 
Group I: Principles Guiding Relations Between OSCE States. The first component of the 
OSCE security concept consisted of principles guiding relations between OSCE States; that is, 
their international relations. These principles were designed to provide security by avoiding 
conflict between OSCE States, reducing tensions between them, and strengthening their 
relations. Group I principles addressed four areas: respect for the sovereign rights of States, with 
agreed-upon limits on these rights; mutual State involvement, accountability, and assistance 
regarding OSCE commitments; a comprehensive, cooperative, and common security approach; 
and the use of peaceful and preventive methods to prevent and reduce tensions and resolve 
disputes and conflicts. 
1. Respect for the sovereign rights of States, with agreed-upon limits on sovereign rights. 
States would respect the rights and responsibilities of State sovereignty, and agreed-upon limits 
to those rights. Sovereign rights included equality under international law (juridical equality); the 
rights of territorial integrity; and the right to external and internal political independence, in 
accordance with international law and the spirit of the Helsinki Final Act. The States accepted 
limitations on their sovereignty: three specific agreements were that the States’ form of 
government would be liberal democracy; respect for individual rights and fundamental freedoms 
were matters of direct and legitimate concern to all OSCE States; and the economic system of the 
OSCE States would be the market economy, and adherence to the rules involved. 
2. Mutual State involvement, accountability, and assistance regarding OSCE commitments. 
The States would be mutually involved with and accountable to each other regarding the 
implementation of their OSCE commitments, and assist each other in this implementation. The 
States fulfilled this commitment primarily through the OSCE, using two methods in particular. 
One method was the “Helsinki process,” which was the periodic review of how well the States 
were implementing their commitments, and the process of further developing the principles and 
commitments. A second method was through organizational structures established to assist the 
participating States in fulfilling their OSCE commitments. An example was the OSCE Office for 
Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), which the States established to strengthen 
and defend the liberal democratic form of government, and to help the new democracies in 
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union after the end of the Cold War.  
3. A comprehensive, cooperative, and common security approach. The States would use a 
“comprehensive, cooperative, and common” approach to security.  
 Comprehensive security was a broad approach that encompassed all areas that could cause 
tensions, disputes, or conflicts between States, or affect their security. These areas included such 
threats as military attack, weapons of mass destruction, weapons proliferation, ethnic conflict, 
international crime, terrorism, transnational diseases, environmental degradation, unregulated 
population flows, and human rights violations. The States adopted the comprehensive security 
approach so that they would be able to address all issues that caused tensions between them, and 









The OSCE generally used three categories or “dimensions” to express their comprehensive 
security approach: the political-military; economic, scientific/technological, and environmental; 
and human rights aspects (the “human dimension”).3 The three dimensions of security follow.  
 
 
The Three Dimensions of Comprehensive Security 
 
 










III. The Human Dimension: 
Individual Rights,  
Democracy, and the  
Rule of Law 
 
 
Cooperative security was an approach that sought to achieve security with other States and not 
against them, and recognized that States have common interests and face common threats. 
Cooperative security was required because many threats can only be met by working together, 
and since problems in one State can affect others, States should cooperate to prevent crises and 
reduce the risk of existing crises from worsening. Furthermore, since cooperation can benefit all 
States, it is in their best interest. The vast majority of people in any country share common 
interests in economic prosperity and the ability to exercise rights and freedoms, and cooperative 
security can promote those interests. 
Common security was an approach that viewed the security of States as “indivisible” or 
“linked,” and thus needed to be pursued in common with other States. The common security 
approach recognized the need of each State for security, that the level of security in each State 
affects the security of other countries, and that all States need to contribute to overall security. A 
common security goal was equal security for all OSCE States, and since insecurity in one State 
or region decreases the security of other countries, States would not strengthen their security at 
the expense of the security of other States. All States had the responsibility to contribute to 
overall security, and to promote fundamental rights and the well-being of all peoples.  
The interrelation of the comprehensive, cooperative, and common approaches to security. The 
three elements of the States’ comprehensive, cooperative, and common security approach were 
interrelated and mutually reinforcing. For example, promoting cooperation in security matters 
can also strengthen the implementation of common security. 
4. The prevention of security threats, and the use of peaceful means to reduce tensions and 
resolve disputes and conflicts. States would take actions to prevent security threats from arising, 
and use peaceful means to resolve existing problems. This principle was based on the belief that 
preventing security threats, and using peaceful means to resolve any that did arise, provided a 
better and more cost-effective outcome for all concerned.  
The peaceful settlement of disputes was considered an essential complement to the duty of 
States to refrain from the threat or use of force, and also essential for international peace and 
security. Preventive means included such methods as mediation, fact-finding missions, 
peacekeeping, openness and predictability, military constraints, confidence-building measures, 
 
                                                 
3 The “human dimension” consisted of those commitments made by the OSCE States to ensure full respect for 
individual rights and fundamental freedoms; abide by the rule of law; promote the principles of democracy; and 
build, strengthen, and protect democratic institutions. (Note that the OSCE has used different constructs to express 









arms control, and the control of dangerous technologies. States would not use certain methods to 
resolve threats, such as force or the threat of force.  
In regard to disputes and conflicts, the States would endeavor in good faith and a spirit of 
cooperation to reach a rapid and equitable solution on the basis of international law, and act in a 
manner that would not endanger international peace, security, and justice. The States, whether or 
not parties to a dispute among them, would refrain from any action that might aggravate a 
situation and thereby make a peaceful settlement more difficult.  
 
Group II: Principles Guiding the Protection and Promotion of Individual Rights within 
States. The second component of the OSCE security concept consisted of principles guiding the 
protection and promotion of individual rights and freedoms within States.4 The principles 
addressed three areas: government responsibility to establish and maintain the conditions in 
which all members of the State could exercise their rights and freedoms: the means to be used 
were democracy, the rule of law, and the market economy; rights and responsibilities pertaining 
to national minorities; and the requirement for respect among all parties. Group II principles 
were designed to protect individual rights and freedoms, and thereby increase both national and 
international security. 
The principles were based on the premise that all people have individual rights and freedoms 
that are inalienable and derive from the inherent dignity of the human person. These rights and 
freedoms are the birthright of all human beings, and are essential for their free and full 
development. The individual is the primary focus of governments, and the protection and 
promotion of human rights and fundamental freedoms is the first responsibility of governments. 
Group II principles were intended to increase security by providing the conditions in which all 
members of the State could fully exercise their rights and freedoms, and thus reduce the tensions 
and conflicts within and between States that can result from the nonrespect of rights. In this 
view, violating individual rights within a State causes tensions that can lead to instability and 
conflict, which in turn can cause instability in other States, and threaten international security. 
The core of Group II principles in terms of security is that respect for individual rights is 
inherently stabilizing, and thereby contributes to both national and international security. Respect 
for human rights constitutes one of the foundations of international order, freedom, justice, and 
peace, and the protection and promotion of rights through democracy and the rule of law is 
required for lasting security.  
5. State responsibility to ensure respect for individual rights through democracy, the rule of 
law, and the market economy. States had the responsibility to establish and maintain the 
conditions in which all members of the State are able to exercise their individual rights and 
freedoms: the means to be used would be a democratic political framework, a rule of law based 
on human rights, and the market economy (economic liberty). The States considered this 
political framework as the only system able to effectively guarantee full respect for individual 
rights and freedoms, equal rights and status for all citizens, the free pursuit of legitimate interests 
and aspirations, political pluralism, and restraints on the abuse of government power. As such, 
democracy would be the OSCE States’ only system of government. 
 
                                                 









A democratic form of government. A democratic form of government was the first means 
governments would use to protect and promote individual rights. A democratic government 
included a representative form of government with characteristics that included the following: 
— the executive is accountable to the elected legislature or the electorate;  
— a clear separation is maintained between the State and political parties—in particular, 
political parties are not merged with the State; and  
— periodic, free, and fair elections are held for which individuals and groups have the right to 
freely establish political parties, organizations can compete with each other on a basis of equal 
treatment before the law and the authorities, and governmental and nongovernmental observers 
are present for national elections. The will of the people, expressed through periodic free and fair 
elections, is the basis of government legitimacy and authority. 
The rule of law. The rule of law was the second means governments would use to protect 
and promote individual rights. The rule of law included that judges are independent and the 
judicial services operate impartially; military forces and the police are under the control of, and 
accountable to, civil authorities; and government and public authorities comply with their 
constitutions and are not above the law. The rule of law would be based on respect for 
individual rights: “The rule of law does not mean merely a formal legality which assures 
regularity and consistency in the achievement and enforcement of democratic order, but justice 
based on the recognition and full acceptance of the supreme value of the human personality 
and guaranteed by institutions providing a framework for its fullest expression.”5  
The market economy. The market economy (economic liberty) was the third means 
governments would use to protect and promote individual rights. All individuals have the right to 
exercise individual enterprise, and to own property alone or in association with others. Economic 
freedom is essential to the effective functioning of markets and economies, and fosters economic 
progress. The market economy would be the States’ only economic system, and States would 
accept the rules involved in the international economic and financial system.  
The primacy of individual rights. The States did not view democracy, the rule of law, and 
the market economy as ends in themselves, but as means to support and enforce respect for 
human rights. The rule of law protects and enforces respect for rights and freedoms, and 
democratic institutions support individual rights through such means as safeguarding freedom 
of expression, limiting governments, ensuring respect for all groups in society, and providing 
equality of opportunity for each person.  
Individual rights, democracy, the rule of law, and the market economy as interdependent 
and mutually reinforcing. The States viewed human rights, democracy, the rule of law, and the 
market economy as interrelated and mutually reinforcing. Respect for the human person is the 
foundation of democracy and the rule of law, democracy is an inherent element of the rule of 
law, and the rule of law must be based on the recognition of the value of the individual and the 
individual’s rights. The market economy is necessary for economic growth, and democratic 
institutions foster economic progress: the free will of the individual, exercised in democracy 
and protected by the rule of law, is the basis for sustainable prosperity.  
 
                                                 









6. Rights and responsibilities pertaining to national minorities. Governments and 
minorities each had responsibilities pertaining to national minorities.6 The fulfilment of these 
responsibilities can increase security by ensuring that minorities are able to fully exercise their 
rights, and thus reduce the tensions that can arise from minority issues.  Respect for the rights 
of persons belonging to minorities is essential for stability and peace, for tensions can arise 
from such threats to security as ethnic conflict, aggressive nationalism, xenophobia, and 
intolerance.7  
Government responsibilities. Government responsibilities included ensuring the right of 
national minorities to equality under the law; to participate fully in public affairs; and to develop 
their identity, though not at the expense of other groups.  
— Equality under the law. Governments had the responsibility to ensure equal protection and 
nondiscrimination for all individuals, regardless of any group that a person may belong to. 
Where necessary, States would adopt special measures to ensure that persons belonging to 
national minorities had full equality with other citizens in exercising their rights and freedoms. 
— Minority participation in public affairs. Governments had the responsibility to ensure that 
minorities could participate fully in public affairs, to include making special provisions as 
necessary.8  
— The development of identity. Governments had the responsibility to ensure that persons 
belonging to national minorities were able to exercise their right to freely express, preserve, and 
develop their ethnic, cultural, linguistic, or religious identity. Any government measures to 
protect the identity of national minorities, and create the conditions in which they could promote 
their identities, would be in accordance with the principles of equality and nondiscrimination 
with respect to the other citizens. Limits to the freedom to develop and promote identity included 
that no action could be illegal; imperil the safety of others; conflict with public order, public 
health, national security, or morals; or infringe on the freedoms or rights of others. 
 
                                                 
6 The States did not define a national minority, but stated that to belong to one was a matter of “individual choice” 
and that “no disadvantage may arise from the exercise of such choice”—see the Copenhagen Document, 1990, 18. 
By emphasizing that each person had the right to decide whether or not to belong to a national minority, the States in 
effect agreed not to impose a definition. The OSCE stressed individuals rather than groups on the basis that all 
groups consist of individuals acting in community, and therefore, OSCE documents usually referred to “persons 
belonging to national minorities” rather than to “national minorities.” Many democratic States rejected the idea of 
“group rights” because of the State’s focus on the individual, and because of the potential for groups to dominate 
individuals. However, some countries recognized certain group rights, such as the right to education to a particular 
level in a group’s mother tongue.  
7 The realization of the security aspects of minorities came as a result of the many wars in Europe during the 20th 
century, in which tensions relating to minorities were a major cause of conflict. Max van der Stoel addressed this 
point as follows: “On the basis of our sad European history during which minorities have been subjected to all 
manner of denial of rights, abuse, and even attempted extermination, we have…finally understood that persons 
belonging to minorities must not only be protected, but also supported.” See Max van der Stoel, address, “The Role 
and Importance of Integrating Diversity,” Oct. 18, 1998. 
8 To help States achieve minority participation in government, a panel of international experts made 
recommendations on ways to facilitate this involvement, The Lund Recommendations on the Effective Participation 
of National Minorities in Public Life. The Recommendations outlined ways that States can include minorities in 
public life while enabling them to maintain their own identity and characteristics, and thereby promote good 
governance and the integrity of the State. Recommendations included such measures as special provisions for 
decentralization, autonomy, minority representation, and mechanisms for dialogue. These kinds of ways can enable 
minorities to maintain their identity while including them in the overall life of the State, and to have a greater say 









Minority responsibilities. Minority responsibilities included participating in public affairs; 
integrating into the wider society to a certain degree, particularly by learning the State language 
or languages; and maintaining responsible behavior in general. No minority right could be 
interpreted as implying the right to take any action in contravention of international law; the 
Helsinki Final Act, including the principle of the territorial integrity of States; or the purposes 
and principles of the UN Charter. 
The role of democracy. The States declared that questions relating to national minorities could 
only be satisfactorily resolved in a democratic political framework based on the rule of law, with 
a functioning independent judiciary. Democracy, the rule of law, and full respect for human 
rights are the best guarantees for a positive situation for minorities. 
7. Respect for the equal rights of all, and a climate of respect. Governments had the 
responsibility to promote a climate of respect, and all individuals and groups had the 
responsibility to respect all others and their equal rights. The involvement of the wider society is 
essential in promoting respect and balancing competing interests—nongovernmental 
organizations such as political parties, trade unions, human rights organizations, and religious 
groups have important roles in promoting respect, diversity, and the resolution of questions 
relating to national minorities.  
Respect is necessary among individuals and groups, whether groups are based on race, 
ethnicity, religion, or however else formed. The States recognized the contributions of culture to 
security, and the contributions of minorities to society, and would foster these contributions. 
 
Group III: Principles Guiding Implementation, Review, and Development Processes. 
The third component of the OSCE security concept consisted of principles guiding the processes 
and mechanisms States would use to develop, interpret, and apply OSCE principles, standards, 
and commitments; review their implementation; advance them further; and respond to State 
requirements. The States intended for Group III principles to increase security by enabling the 
States to address current and future security threats and concerns; be responsive to new 
requirements; and progress towards greater security, stronger relations, and increased respect for 
individual rights. Group III principles addressed three areas: good faith, full, equal, and 
continuous efforts to implement OSCE principles and commitments; the development and 
advancement of shared values; and processes and mechanisms. 
8. Good faith, full, equal, and continuous efforts to implement OSCE principles and 
commitments. States would apply all OSCE principles equally and unreservedly, and would 
interpret all principles in light of all of the others, and in light of the OSCE acquis (the body of 
OSCE commitments).9 The principles were intended to help States achieve balanced progress 
towards political, military, economic, and human rights goals. Progress towards shared 
objectives requires the active involvement and good faith efforts of all parties—governments, 
groups, organizations, and individuals—to make continuous efforts to implement OSCE 
principles and commitments. 
The full implementation of OSCE commitments takes time and continued effort by all parties. 
States are not perfect and may not always live up to all of their OSCE commitments, but failing 
to meet standards meant continuing to try. 
 
                                                 









9. The development and advancement of shared values. States would identify and build on 
shared values. States would conduct their international relations based on the shared values of 
respect for individual rights and freedoms, democracy, the rule of law, and the market economy. 
Shared values guide the relationship between the State and the people who comprise the State: 
the States’ common aims included respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including 
the rights of persons belonging to national minorities; democracy; the rule of law; and economic 
liberty. Shared values and norms develop over time, and the advancement of human rights, 
democracy, and the rule of law is essential to strengthening peace and security. 
10. Processes and mechanisms. Processes and mechanisms are needed to develop standards 
and commitments, review their implementation, and respond to State requirements. These 
processes need to be flexible and responsive to State needs, concerns, and situations. Agreed-




The OSCE security concept can be summarized as below, and expressed in ten principles, 
divided into three groups:  
 
Security depends on the development and implementation of principles guiding three 
areas: how States deal with each other and resolve problems; the protection and promotion 
of individual rights within States; and the processes and mechanisms to review and 




The OSCE Security Concept Principles, 2001 Summary 
 
 
I. Principles Guiding Relations  
Between OSCE States 
 
1. Respect for the sovereign rights of States, 
with agreed-upon limits on sovereign rights. 
2. Mutual State involvement, accountability, and 
assistance regarding OSCE commitments. 
3. A comprehensive, cooperative, and common 
security approach. 
4. The prevention of security threats, and the use 
of peaceful means to reduce tensions and 
resolve disputes and conflicts. 
 
 
II. Principles Guiding the Protection and 
Promotion of Individual Rights within States 
 
 
5. State responsibility to ensure respect for 
individual rights through democracy, the 
rule of law, and the market economy. 
6. Rights and responsibilities pertaining to 
national minorities. 
7. Respect for the equal rights of all, and a 
climate of respect. 
 
 
III. Principles Guiding Implementation, Review, 
and Development Processes 
 
8. Good faith, full, equal, and continuous efforts to 
implement OSCE principles and commitments. 
9. The development and advancement of shared values. 













Appendix B. Table of Documents Analyzed for OSCE Security Principles 
 
Content analysis was done on the following documents in order to identify and articulate the 
OSCE security principles that were in effect in January 1993, and from January 1993 to June 2001. 
The OSCE States usually adopted documents, but on occasion signed them, such as the 1975 
Helsinki Final Act and the 1990 Charter of Paris for a New Europe. 
 
 








Type of Document 
1. Helsinki Final Act* 
 
1975 Summit document 
2. Belgrade Document 1978 Concluding Document, first 
Follow-up Meeting 
 
3. Madrid Document 1983 Concluding Document, 
second Follow-up Meeting 
 
4. Vienna Document 1989 Concluding Document, third 
Follow-up Meeting 
 
5. Copenhagen Document  
 
1990 Human Dimension document 
 
6. Charter of Paris* 
 
1990 Summit document 
7. Moscow Document  
 
1991 Human Dimension document 
 
8. Helsinki Document 
 
1992 Summit document 
9. Budapest Document 
 
1994 Summit document 
10. Lisbon Document 
 
1996 Summit document 
11. Istanbul Document 
 
1999 Summit document 
 
* Documents signed at the highest political level, that of Heads of State or Government.
 
                                                 














Appendix C. Analysis of Level-IV States by Geographic Region 
 
Balkan region: Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia. The principal area of concern in Albania was 
the Greek minority, and the principal issues were political representation, education, use of language, 
and separatism. In Croatia the principal concern was minorities, in particular Serbs, and the primary 
issues were population dislocation and post–conflict distrust. In Macedonia, the principal area of 
concern was the Albanian minority, and the primary issues were political representation, education, 
and separatism. Macedonia also experienced outbreaks of violence in 1995 and 1997 that required 
HCNM crisis intervention, and in 2001 experienced intrastate conflict (including terrorism). 
 Baltic region: Estonia and Latvia. The problems faced by Estonia and Latvia were generally 
similar: both had been independent States forcibly incorporated into the Soviet Union, and subjected 
to political, economic, and cultural Sovietization after World War II. Soviet policies towards both 
countries included forced population transfers (deportation of Estonians and Latvians, and 
resettlement of Russian-speakers in their place); the collectivizing of farms; and Russification 
regarding language, education, and culture. These policies resulted in large demographic changes in 
both countries: from 1934 to 1989, the percentage of ethnic Estonians in Estonia dropped from 88 to 
61 percent, and in Latvia the percentage dropped from 73 to 52 percent. 
 The principal area of concern was majority-minority relations, and issues included citizenship 
(there were several hundred thousand stateless Russians in both countries), language, education, and 
the continued presence of Russian military forces. Statements by Russian officials were interpreted to 
mean that Russia was considering the use of force against Estonia and Latvia to protect the rights of 
Russians there. Estonia also had the issue of separatism: a large percentage of the Russian minority 
was concentrated in the northeastern area contiguous to Russia, and sentiment for autonomy or 
joining with Russia was strong. This situation threatened to erupt in 1993 when the northern cities of 
Narva and Sillamäe declared their intention to hold a referendum on autonomy, sparking a crisis 
requiring HCNM intervention. 
 Central European region: Hungary, Slovakia, and Romania. The principal areas of concern 
were the Slovak minority in Hungary, and the Hungarian minority in Slovakia and Romania. The 
primary issues were political representation, language, and education. Many of the problems 
stemmed from the redrawing of borders after World War I at which time Hungary ceded two-thirds 
of its territory to Romania, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia, causing over 3 million Hungarians to 
become minorities in those countries. 
 Near-Russia region: Moldova and Ukraine. The principal areas of concern in Moldova were 
the Russian, Ukrainian, and Gagauz minorities, and the primary issues were language, education, the 
consequences of Russification, and separatism to include the “frozen” separatist conflict over 
Transdniestria.10 The principal areas of concern in Ukraine were the status of Crimea, the 
resettlement of Crimean Tatars (who had been deported to Central Asia during World War II), and 
majority-minority relations. The primary issues were separatism in Crimea, which resulted in HCNM 
crisis intervention in 1995; language; education; the consequences of Russification; the potential 
radicalization of Tatar Islamic youth; and possible spillover effects from the conflict in Chechnya.  
 Central Asian region: Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. The principal areas of concern were the 
emigration of the Russian and German minorities, and the potential radicalization of Islamic youth.  
 
 
                                                 











Table C–1. Threat Analysis in Level-IV States 
 
Level IV States 
 
Interstate Conflict 
Based on Minority 
Tensions? 
Intrastate Conflict 





1. Albania  
 
No No No 
2. Croatia  
 
No No No 




threats of force 
1993–1995) 
 
No Yes: 1993 
4. Hungary  
 
No No No 
5. Kazakhstan  
 
No No No 
6. Kyrgyzstan 
 
No No No 








8. Lithuania No No No 
 
9. Macedonia  
 
No Yes: 2001 
(also interethnic 
clashes 1995, 1997) 
 




No No No 
11. Romania  
 
No No No 
12. Russia 
 
No No No 
13. Slovakia 
 
No No No 
14. Ukraine  
 

















































































I. To the Ukrainian Government and the Crimean 
Administration of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea 
(ARC) 
 
   
1. Reach a settlement regarding the division of 
responsibilities between the central government and the 
ARC that would maintain the territorial integrity of 
Ukraine but also contain a complete program of steps to 
solve various issues concerning the implementation of 
the formula of substantial autonomy for Crimea, 








2. Avoid any action that could lead to an escalation of 
existing tensions. (May 15, 1995) 
 




3. Divide responsibilities between the central government 
of Ukraine and the ARC as follows: Ukrainian 
government: defense, the armed forces, and foreign 
policy. 
   —Consult the ARC before concluding treaties of special 
relevance for Crimea, and include representatives in a 
number of official delegations to other States; 
   —Make arrangements to ensure that an equitable 
portion of the revenues of Ukrainian property in 
Crimea and the natural resources of Crimea will be 
used for the benefit of Crimea; and 
   —Taking into account the Ukrainian legal order, give 
the ARC the right to conclude international 
agreements regarding commercial and cultural 
questions, and the right to open trade offices abroad. 






4. In lieu of a treaty between the ARC and Sevastopol, set 
up a tripartite commission, composed of representatives 
of Ukraine, the ARC, and Sevastopol, to come forward 
with proposals for intensifying the collaboration 
between Sevastopol and the ARC in various fields. 







5. Make a special effort to speed up solving the remaining 
constitutional differences, and for the ARC parliament 
to give renewed consideration to the articles still in 
dispute within a month, and for the Ukrainian 
parliament to consider the ARC parliament’s new 
proposals as soon as possible thereafter. (March 19, 
1996) 
 


























6. Maintain the momentum in narrowing the gap between 
the positions of Ukraine and the ARC regarding a 
considerable number of issues, make determined 
efforts soon to resolve the remaining differences, and 
do nothing that could lead to a worsening of the 
atmosphere in which future negotiations will be 






II. To the Ukrainian Government. 
 
   
1. Consider OSCE assistance, particularly a team of 
constitutional and economic experts who could, after 
investigating the issues in dispute, provide some 






2. Use the 1992 Ukrainian law that divided powers 
between Ukraine and the ARC and that did not enter 
into force, with some modifications and additions, as 
the future ARC constitution, and for the Ukrainian 
parliament to adopt a parallel constitutional law with 
the same content, and if the 1992 Ukrainian law is 
adopted, end the subordination of the Crimean 
government to the government of Ukraine and do not 






3. Adopt, as quickly as possible, a Ukrainian law on the 
approval of the ARC constitution that would approve 
the coming into force of the ARC constitution with the 
exception of those articles that are still in dispute. 






4. Agree to have a permanent arrangement regarding the 
one channel budget system, if simultaneous agreement 
can be reached on the supervision of the system and on 
the manner of assuring respect for the Ukrainian 
unified tax system, and ensuring an equitable share of 
the future revenues from oil and gas deposits in the 
continental shelf surrounding Crimea. (April 5, 1996) 
 




5. Declare its willingness to consult with the appropriate 
authorities of the ARC regarding matters of military 
defense and security relevant for the ARC, and to 
inform the appropriate Crimean authorities on steps 
envisaged in these relevant areas. (April 5, 1996) 
 




6. Do not deviate from the aim of providing Crimea with 
substantial autonomy in those fields that do not belong 





























III. To the Crimean Administration. 
 
   
1. Stop plans for a referendum on the ARC constitution 
that was abolished by the Ukrainian parliament. 









2. Delete references to Crimean citizenship in the draft 






3. Make the following editorial changes in the draft law on 
the approval of the ARC constitution: 
   —Replace “Republic of Crimea” with the  
       “Autonomous Republic of Crimea.”  
   —Replace “citizens of Crimea” with “citizens of  
       Ukraine residing in Crimea.”  
   —Replace “the people of Crimea” with “the  






4. Refrain from organizing a referendum, or a poll, in the 
ARC on the November 1995 ARC constitution.   






5. Make a number of changes and deletions to the 







Formal Recommendations to the Ukrainian Government Regarding Crimea.  
 
1. Letter from OSCE HCNM Max van der Stoel to Mr. Anatoly Zlenko, Minister for Foreign Affairs of 
Ukraine, May 15, 1994. 
 
2. Unpublished letter from OSCE HCNM Max van der Stoel to Mr. Hennady Udovenko, Minister for 
Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, May 15, 1995. (See Kemp, Quiet Diplomacy in Action, 221–222; Kulyk, 
Revisiting a Success Story, 44–45; and Foundation on Inter-Ethnic Relations, Bibliography on the 
OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities, 1997, 21.) 
 
3. Letter from OSCE HCNM Max van der Stoel to Mr. Hennady Udovenko, Minister for Foreign Affairs 
of Ukraine, October 12, 1995. 
 
4. Letter from OSCE HCNM Max van der Stoel to Mr. Hennady Udovenko, Minister for Foreign Affairs 
of Ukraine, March 19, 1996. 
 
5. Letter from OSCE HCNM Max van der Stoel to Mr. Hennady Udovenko, Minister for Foreign Affairs 










Appendix F. HCNM Recommendations to Estonia 
 
 












I. To the Estonian Government. 
 
   
I-1. Naturalization: Policy. 
1. Grant citizenship to children born in Estonia who  
    would otherwise be stateless. (April 6, 1993) 
2. Consider the psychological effects of the proposed  
    naturalization law on the Russian-speaking  
    population, including its possible destabilizing effects,  
    and therefore, do not promulgate “The Law on  
    Aliens,” adopted by the Riigikogu on June 21, 1993,  
    in its present form. (July 1, 1993)  
3. Use humanitarian considerations and reasonableness  
    as the guiding principles regarding those who  
    neither qualify for citizenship nor have the status of  
    permanent residents. (April 6, 1993) 
4. Delay the entry into force of the law requiring  















































I-2. Naturalization: Process. 
1. Allow reapplication for citizenship. 
    (April 6, 1993) 
2. Make explicit that unemployment payment meets the  
    legal income requirement. (April 6, 1993) 
3. Ensure nondiscrimination in citizenship matters in  
    accordance with the International Convention on the  
    Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination  
    when enacting or implementing legal provisions  
    concerning nationality, citizenship, or naturalization. 
    (April 6, 1993) 
4. Ensure maximum publicity for the language law and  
    its implementing regulations, especially among the 
    Russian population. (April 6, 1993) 
5. Continue efforts to inform the non-Estonian  
    population about legislation, regulations, and   
    practical questions concerning citizenship, language  
    requirements, etc. (April 6, 1993) 
6. Ensure that the Virumaa Information Center can  
    effectively contribute to informing the Russian  





























































I-3. Naturalization: Constitution Exam. 
1. Make the constitution exam considerably easier.  































I-4. Naturalization: Language Requirements.  
1. Set the language exam standard as the conduct of a  
    simple conversation. (April 6, 1993) 
2. Involve the Council of Europe and OSCE in the 
    language exam standard. (July 1, 1993) 
3. Waive all language requirements for the elderly and 
    disabled. (April 6, 1993) 
4. Ensure consistent interpretation of the law on  
    language requirements. (April 6, 1993) 
5. Ensure that language testing fees are not  
    prohibitively expensive. (April 6, 1993) 







































I-5. Naturalization: Residence Permits. 
1. Provide residence permit application forms in Russian.  
    (March 9, 1994)  
2. Have noncitizen representatives cooperate in the   
    registration process. (March 9, 1994) 
3. Do not make people who settled in Estonia before  
    July 1, 1990, provide different certificates or pay 
    application fees for residence permits. (March 9, 1994) 
4. Make the application process for residence permits  
    simple and smooth. (March 9, 1994)  
5. Extend the deadline for residence permit applications.  
    (March 9, 1994)  
6. Count residence from March 30, 1990, and the time of 
    actual residence in Estonia, on the basis of permanent  
    registration in the former Estonian Soviet Socialist  
    Republic, and on the basis of temporary or permanent 
    permits under the new Law on Aliens. (Dec 8, 1994) 
7. Speed up the process for residence permits and alien 
    passports. (Oct. 28, 1996) 
8. Delete the requirement that a residence permit will not  
    be issued to any alien “who does not respect the  
    constitution system and does not observe Estonia’s  
    legal acts.” (July 1, 1993) 
9. Delete or adapt the article stating that a residence 
    permit will not be issued to any alien “who with his or  
    her actions has compromised Estonia’s national  
    interests or international reputation.” (July 1, 1993)  
10. Establish a clear and legally binding provision  
    ensuring the same rights for temporary residents as  
    for permanent residents, and provide relevant  
    information. (March 9, 1994) 
11. Reconsider or reformulate the requirement that a 
   residence permit will not be issued to aliens who have  
   served in an armed forces career position of a foreign  
   State, or to family members, to ensure that a great 




























































































































I-6. Naturalization and Full Equality: An Official 
Policy of Integration.  
1. Aim to integrate the non-Estonian population by a  
    deliberate policy of facilitating the chances of  
    acquiring Estonian citizenship for those who express  
    such a wish, and of assuring them full equality with  
    Estonian citizens, to include: 
  —Develop and implement an official policy of  
      integration. (April 6, 1993) 
  —Enhance efforts to aid non-Estonians in acquiring a  
      reasonable level of Estonian. (April 6, 1993) 
  —Use other governments’ help in language  
      education. (March 9, 1994) 
  —Increase the use of mass media, in particular 
      television, to help non-Estonians learn Estonian.  
      (April 6, 1993)  
  —Study the language education system in the city of  
      Kohtla-Jaerve with a view to its possible  
      implementation elsewhere in Estonia. (April 6, 1993) 
  —Speed up preparing the Language Strategy  
      Document, and give it top priority. (May 21, 1997) 
  —Include at least one Russian member, with  
      experience in this field, in the Working Group  
      drawing up the language strategy for the Language  





































































I-7. Full Equality: Mechanisms and Institutions. 
1. Implement a visible and consistent policy of  
    dialogue and integration towards the non-Estonian  
    population. (April 6, 1993) 
2. Establish a roundtable of noncitizens and ethnic 
    minorities. (July 1, 1993) 
3. Establish an Office of a National Commissioner on  

























I-8. Full Equality: Alien Passports. 
1. Allow alien passports to residents who have the  
    right to a residence permit in Estonia and are not  
    citizens of another State. (July 1, 1993) 
2. Make alien passports available without complicated 




















I-9. Full Equality: Framework Convention for the 
Protection of National Minorities. 
1. Clarify that the intended reservation to the Council of  
    Europe’s Framework Convention for the Protection of  
    National Minorities does not mean that the  
    government plans to restrict the rights of noncitizens  



































I-10. Full Equality: The Regulation of Language Use. 
1. Ensure that the Estonian language is not required in  
    the internal affairs of private enterprises and   
    organizations. (April 6, 1993) 
2. Do not promulgate amendments requiring proficiency  
    in the Estonian language in order to be a member of  
    the parliament or a local governmental council.  
    (April 22, 1996)  
3. Follow the letter and spirit of the amended Law on 
    Language, in particular as pertaining to the scope of  
    application to public interests permissible under  
    international law and in proportion to the legitimate  
































II. To Minorities. 
 
1. Adapt to and develop loyalty towards Estonia as an  
    independent State. (April 6, 1993) 
2. Contribute equally towards their own integration  
    within Estonia. (April 6, 1993) 
3. Make a determined effort to master Estonian to the  
    extent of being able to conduct a simple conversation  
    in Estonian, except for those who have retired from  


























III. To Other OSCE States. 
 
III-1. Recommendation to the Kinstate. 
1. Rapidly remove Russian troops from Estonia in line  
    with the Helsinki Document, para. 15. (April 6, 1993) 
 
III-2. To Other OSCE States. 
1. Provide assistance to the Estonian government for  
    language training. (March 9, 1994) 
2. Recognize the Estonian Alien Passport as a legal  










































Formal Recommendations to the Estonian Government.  
 
1. Letter from OSCE HCNM Max van der Stoel to Mr. Trivimi Velliste, Minister for Foreign Affairs of 
the Republic of Estonia, April 6, 1993. 
 
2. Letter from OSCE HCNM Max van der Stoel to Mr. Lennart Meri, President of the Republic of 
Estonia, July 1, 1993. With Statement of the High Commissioner on National Minorities, July 12, 
1993. 
 
3. Letter from OSCE HCNM Max van der Stoel to Mr. Jüri Luik, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Estonia, 
March 9, 1994. 
 
4. Letter from OSCE HCNM Max van der Stoel to Mr. Jüri Luik, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the 
Republic of Estonia, December 8, 1994. 
 
5. Letter from OSCE HCNM Max van der Stoel to Mr. Siim Kallas, Minister for Foreign Affairs of 
Estonia, December 11, 1995. 
 
6. Letter from OSCE HCNM Max van der Stoel to the members of the OSCE Permanent Council, 
February 14, 1996. 
 
7. Unpublished letter from OSCE HCNM Max van der Stoel to Mr. Lennart Meri, President of the 
Republic of Estonia, April 22, 1996. (See Kemp, Quiet Diplomacy in Action, 147.) 
 
8. Letter from HCNM to Mr. Siim Kallas, Minister for Foreigner Affairs of the Republic of Estonia, 
October 28, 1996. 
 
9. Letter from OSCE HCNM Max van der Stoel to Mr. Toomas Hendrik Ilves, Minister for Foreign 
Affairs of the Republic of Estonia, May 21, 1997. 
 
10. Unpublished letter from OSCE HCNM Max van der Stoel to Mr. Lennart Meri, President of the 
Republic of Estonia, December 19, 1998. (See Kemp, Quiet Diplomacy in Action, 150.) 
 
11. Unpublished letter from OSCE HCNM Max van der Stoel to Mr. Toomas Hendrik Ilves, Minister for 
Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Estonia, March 26, 1999. (See Kemp, Quiet Diplomacy in Action, 
151; Annual Report 1999 on OSCE Activities, 1999, 52–53.) 
 
12. Unpublished letter from OSCE HCNM Max van der Stoel to Mr. Toomas Hendrik Ilves, Minister for 
Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Estonia, July 12, 1999. (See Kemp, Quiet Diplomacy in Action, 
152.) 
 
13. OSCE Press Release, “Statement Regarding the Adoption of Amendments to the Law on Language by 




























I. Minority Participation in Public Affairs.  
 
1. Census.  
  Macedonian government: Submit a draft law on the 














2. Citizenship.  
  Macedonian government: Reduce the citizenship 









3. Local self-government.  
  1) Macedonian government: Resubmit the July 1993 
draft law on local self-government to the newly elected 
parliament, in particular because articles 79, 80, 81, 
and 82 contain provisions for the official use of the 
languages and alphabets of ethnic nationalities in units 
of local self-government in which there is a majority 
or a significant number. (Nov. 16, 1994) 
 
  2) Macedonian government: Ensure, within the areas 
of their responsibilities, the most efficient functioning 
of local self-government, and with a spirit that reflects 
the constitutional legal provisions and in addition, 
perform the following: 
  —improve the system of collecting local taxes, and  
      ensure that financial resources from the State  
      budget, aimed at supporting units of local  
      government, are promptly transferred to them in  
      accordance with existing legal regulations; 
  —analyze how the practical implementation and  
      execution of powers of local government in areas  
      as mentioned in Article 115 of the Constitution  
      could be improved and strengthened, and continue  
      comprehensive cooperation on the matter  
      between the relevant authorities and the specialized  
      organs of the Council of Europe; and 
  —strengthen the Macedonian Association of Local  
      Self-Government Units, established in conformity  
      with Article 10 of the Law on Local Self- 
      Government, and use as a forum for  
      exchanges of experiences and for developing a  
      meaningful relationship between self-government 
      units, and between them and the central  
























































4. Electoral processes.  
  Macedonian government: Take steps to remedy 
some of the weaknesses in the electoral process that 
became evident in the recent elections, to include: 
 —make a special effort to increase the accuracy of the 
     electoral lists and ensure their permanent updating;  
 —resubmit the draft law on elections to the newly 
     elected parliament, which would also include the  
     partial introduction of a system of proportional  
     representation; and 
 —revise the borders of constituencies in such a way  
     as to ensure that each electoral district encompasses  









5. Minority participation in public service.  
  Macedonian government: Ensure, through the 
progressive process already underway, that the staffing 
of all government departments, to include the military 
and the police at all levels, adequately reflects the 








II. Albanian-language Education. 
 
1. Albanian teacher training. 
Macedonian government: Ensure that an adequate 
number of Albanian teachers receive a proper training 















2. Access to secondary school. 
 Macedonian government: Promote greater access  









3. Framework in which to seek solutions for 
questions involving Albanian-language higher 
education. 
  Majority and Minority: Seek and find solutions to 
questions regarding higher education in the framework 
of full respect for the constitutional order of 
Macedonia, conduct dialogue on these subjects in the 
framework of the preparation of the law on higher 
education, and find a compromise formula regarding a 
new university on the basis of the following premises:  
  —any further step towards creating a new institution  
       of higher education must be in accordance with  
       the constitutional order, and conform with OSCE  
       principles;  
  —the institution must have the purpose to contribute  
       to interethnic harmony;  
  —the institution must respond to specific educational 
       needs; and  
  —all population groups in the country ought to  














































































4. A new, private, Albanian-language institute of 
higher learning. 
  Macedonian government: Establish a private, 
Albanian-language institute of higher education.  
(April 28, 1995)  
 
  OSCE States: Provide international assistance to     
realize the plan for a private, Albanian-language 





























III. Mechanisms for Dialogue.  
 
1. Council for Inter-Ethnic Relations. 
   Macedonian government: Give the Council for 
Inter-Ethnic Relations the responsibility to analyze 
ways to promote interethnic harmony and initiate 
investigations of events that have led to interethnic 
tensions; provide the Council with an adequate staff to 
perform these additional responsibilities; and provide, 
for review, annual progress reports regarding minority 
staffing of the military, police at all levels, and all 















IV. Minority Access to the Media. 
 
1. Access to television.  
  Macedonian government: Increase TV programs in 
the Albanian language from one to two hours per day 
as an interim measure, with a further substantial 














V. Framework in Which to Seek Solutions to Issues 
Involving Interethnic Tensions. 
 
1. Framework. 
  1) Majority and minority: Strive to find solutions for 
interethnic problems by rejecting ethnic hatred and 
intolerance and by seeking constructive and 
continuous dialogue (with equal rights for all ethnic 
groups as the guiding principle), and base this dialogue 
on internationally accepted norms and standards, and 
equally on respect for the sovereignty and territorial 
integrity of the State, and respect for the constitutional 
order and the rule of law. (July 13, 1997) 
 
  2) Majority and minority: Recognize, as specific 
interests are pursued, that all groups have common 
interests such as the maintenance of peace and 
stability, the promotion of economic development, and 









































































  3) Majority and minority: Respect the territorial 
integrity of the State and the constitutional order, 
including that it can only be changed in accordance 
with constitutional rules, and recognize that 
disregarding these basic rules will inevitably lead to 
destabilization of the State, and quite possibly to 
violence from which all concerned would suffer and 
no one would gain. (Nov. 9, 1998) 
 
  4) Majority and minority: Move beyond the 
discussion between the Macedonian parties that favor 
the present unitary state system, and the Albanian 
parties that want to change it, and engage in a serious 
dialogue regarding the steps that can be taken to 
accommodate the specific desiderata of minorities, and 
find, through discussions on future government 
programs, solutions acceptable to both sides regarding 
a number of interethnic questions that have been the 
subject of discussion for many years, within the 
following framework:  
  —in accordance with the commitments accepted 
when Macedonia joined the OSCE and became a party 
to a number of international agreements in the 
framework of the UN and the Council of Europe; and 
  —that the discussion take into account that the 
essence of democracy is compromise in that both sides 
have to modify some of their positions: in a 
democratic multiethnic State a minority cannot impose 
a dictate on a majority, but neither can a majority 
afford to ignore the desiderata of a minority, 
particularly when it constitutes an important 
percentage of the population. (Nov. 9, 1998) 
 
  5) Macedonian government and all Macedonian 
parties: Avoid considering any concession to a 
minority as a weakening of the State, and recognize 
that meeting the wishes of a minority, within the 
constitutional framework of a unitary State, may 
strengthen the State. (Nov. 9, 1998) 
 
 






































































































































VI. The Maintenance of Stability.  
 
1. Maintain national stability. 
  Macedonian government: Maintain the stability of 
the country. (Nov. 16, 1994) 
 
2. Maintain stability during the refugee crisis. 
   Majority and minority: Do their utmost to ensure 
that the massive influx of refugees from Kosovo 
does not lead to a destabilization of Macedonia. 
(May 12, 1999) 
 
3. Maintain stability during the 2001 crisis. 
  Majority and minority: Avoid armed conflict. 
















































VII. International Assistance. 
 
1. Aid for economic recovery. 
  OSCE States: Offer sufficient assistance to enable 
Macedonia to start a process of economic recovery. 
(Nov. 16, 1994)   
 
2. Aid for projects to promote interethnic 
harmony. 
  OSCE States: Provide international assistance to 
enable the study of new subjects such as civic 
education and human rights (particularly so that 
students of Macedonian and Albanian ethnicity may 
study these subjects in common), and enable the 
conduct of summer camps for students of different 
ethnicity—and all combined with courses aimed at 
promoting integration. (Nov. 9, 1998) (Note: The 
HCNM also referenced NGOs as possible donors.)  
 
3. Aid for the refugee crisis.  
  OSCE States: Significantly increase efforts to help 
Macedonia avoid destabilization from the massive 
influx of refugees from Kosovo (which caused an 
increase of the population of the fYROM of more 


































































VIII. International Relations.  
 
1. Normalization of Greek-Macedonian relations.  
  OSCE States—Macedonia and Greece: Find ways 
to normalize relations, to include ending the 























Formal Recommendations to the Macedonia Government.  
 
1. Letter from OSCE HCNM Max van der Stoel to Mr. Stevo Crvenkovski, Minister for Foreign 
Relations of the FYROM, November 1, 1993. 
 
2. Letter from OSCE HCNM Max van der Stoel to Mr. Stevo Crvenkovski, Minister for Foreign 
Relations of the FYROM, November 16, 1994. 
 
3. Letter from OSCE HCNM Max van der Stoel to Mr. Stevo Crvenkovski, Minister for Foreign 
Relations of the FYROM, April 28, 1995. 
 
4. OSCE Press Release, “Statement on Events in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia by the 
OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities,” July 13, 1997. See also Report of the High 
Commissioner on National Minorities Regarding His Visit to the FRY of Macedonia 10–13 July 1997, 
July 16, 1997. 
 
5. OSCE Press Release, “Inter-ethnic Relations Need Further Attention in the former Yugoslav Republic 
of Macedonia,” November 9, 1998.  
 
6. OSCE Press Release, “OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities Addresses Permanent 
Council,” May 12, 1999. 
 
7. OSCE Press Release, “Violence a Threat to Peace and Stability in the former Yugoslav Republic of 
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